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CHAPTER 1 PREFACE 
1.1 Introduction 
During the past decades, globalisation in all of its facets dominated many controversial 
debates of political leaders and common citizens and called the predominant attention of the 
international press and the scientific community. A major phenomenon in this context is the 
ongoing internationalisation of the economic activities of firms. The simultaneous interest in 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade can be attributed to the fact that the two modes at 
times complement each other or conduce to alternatives in serving a foreign market. The 
crucial questions that arise in this context are diverse. 
Trade activities around the world have since the 1950s largely been backed by 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) with 214 of them being actively in force (Fiorentino, 
Verdeja and Toquebeouf 2007). The number of RTAs particularly surged during the past 15 
years, coming along with stagnating multilateral negotiations. In Europe, the transition of 
centrally planned economies to market economies rearranged trade relations between the East 
and the West profoundly. As an important starting point, the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs)1 signed the so-called Europe Agreements (EAs) with the European Union 
(EU) in the 1990s. The agreements recognised the CEECs’ aspiration to EU membership and 
allowed for the establishment of Interim Agreements (IAs), which gradually liberalised 
bilateral trade between the two regions. The eventual EU accession of the CEECs in 2004 and 
2007 represented a peak in the process of European integration, but it was not the end of it. 
From the very beginning, the longsome procedure of negotiations and ratifications has been 
accompanied by major uncertainties related to the preferential nature of the trade concessions. 
Whole countries, separate industries or single economic actors outside as well as inside the 
 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise stated the CEECs comprise in this study Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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EU raised concerns about possible adverse effects for themselves (see e.g. Neven 1994). 
Against this background, a thorough analysis of the trade effects of the agreements on 
member states and on the Rest Of the World (ROW) can provide important insights about 
whether and to which extent the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have actually caused a 
geographical restructuring of trade flows. 
Almost simultaneously with the signature of the first IAs, the treaty of the EU, widely 
known as the Maastricht treaty, introduced the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as a 
long term strategy towards the move to a common currency. Although all 27 EU member 
states participate also in the EMU, only a subset of 15 countries has introduced the Euro yet. 
In 2007, Slovenia officially adopted as the first of the new EU member states the single 
currency. Malta and Cyprus followed in 2008 and Slovakia has been approved by the EU 
commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the council of the EU to introduce the 
Euro by 1 January 2009. Other EU member states will follow in due course although exact 
dates of entry have not been fixed yet. While the events of real and monetary integration in 
Europe bear analogies, the underlying questions are distinct. Mundell’s (1961) statement that 
only highly integrated countries can successfully form a currency union has been challenged 
since Rose’s (2000) finding of large ex-post trade gains. In the eve of the CEECs’ accession 
to the Euro Area, it is therefore crucial to obtain information about its potential impact from a 
trade perspective. 
While the enlargement of the EU and the EMU to the East keeps raising fears in the 
public, the strong increase of FDI flows2 over the past decades has redirected a great part of 
scientific interest towards a better understanding of its causes and consequences. In Germany, 
media and academic research have been heavily concerned with firms shifting their 
production facilities to low cost countries while staying comparably silent about the 
determinants and effects of inward FDI. Although recent studies find significant positive 
effects of inward FDI on the local economy (see e.g. Bitzer and Görg 2008), there exists – to 
the best of my knowledge – no study investigating the regional determinants of location 
choices of foreign multinationals in Germany. The analysis is, however, of substantial interest 
to both, the scientific community and policy makers. Heterogeneities across the German 
federal states may drive or hamper the competitiveness of regions in the attraction of FDI. 
 
                                                 
2 FDI outflows rose by 45.2% and FDI inflows by 38.1% in 2006 amounting to FDI stocks of  12474 and 11999 
billions of US$, respectively (UNCTAD 2007: 9). 
 
1.2 Theoretical Background 3 
 
 
Accordingly, investigating the determinants of inward FDI endows policy makers with new 
tools to enhance the relative competitiveness at the regional level. 
The preface chapter continues with providing the theoretical (Chapter 1.2) and 
empirical background (Chapter 1.3) for the topics that have briefly been touched. Based on 
the state of the existing research, Chapter 1.4 formulates the main research questions and 
outlines where these will be picked up within this thesis. 
1.2 Theoretical Background 
This chapter aims at sorting the topics highlighted in the present thesis into the 
existing theoretical literature. The brief overview does not claim to be exhaustive; rather, the 
focus of the main chapters determines a selection of theoretical aspects that crucially redound 
to the understanding of the aspects discussed later on. To start with, I lay out the Vinerian 
concepts of trade creation and trade diversion (Chapter 1.2.1) and the new trade theory 
predictions (Chapter 1.2.2) that arise in the context of preferential trade liberalisation. The 
trade effects of regional integration in Europe will be studied with the help of gravity 
equations. Chapter 1.2.3 continues therefore with providing some theoretical underpinnings of 
gravity models. Finally, Chapter 1.2.4 discusses the basic concepts behind the location choice 
theory. 
1.2.1 Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
Theoretical insights into the allocation effects of RTAs were first given by Viner and 
Byé; their contributions in the 1950s laid the analytical foundation for the Customs Union 
(CU) theory (Viner 1950; Byé 1950). Before that, economists mostly regarded regionalism as 
a step towards free trade.3 The idea behind this perception is that global free trade allows 
consumers to purchase from the cheapest source of supply, so that production can be located 
according to comparative advantages. Trade barriers, in contrast, discriminate against foreign 
supply and divert consumption to the output of domestic industries, even though produced at 
 
                                                 
3 There were few exceptions to this view, however. Robbins states in 1937: “…From the international point of 
view, the tariff union is not an advantage itself. It is an advantage only in so far as, on balance, it conduces to 
more extensive division of labour.” (Robbins 1937: 122). In 1944, Hawtrey even went further than theoretically 
justified, writing: “In fact the wider the extent of economic activity encircled by a tariff barrier of given height, 
the greater is its effect in excluding the goods of foreign producers.” (Hawtrey 1944: 135). 
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higher costs. As a consequence, a partial liberalisation through RTAs, reducing at least some 
tariffs, was widely assumed to generate gains from trade. 
Viner questioned the free-trade perception of regional integration arguing that a 
fractional reduction of trade barriers leads only to a shift, but not to an elimination of the 
discrimination of different sources of supply. The change in the location of production 
following the establishment of a CU is accompanied by two opposing effects, the net 
economic effect of which depends on whether the diversion of purchases is in favour of lower 
or higher money-cost sources of supply (Viner 1950: 42). In his famous contribution “The 
Customs Union Issue”, Viner clearly distinguished between trade-creating and trade-diverting 
effects of CUs. 
Trade creation is associated with the portion of the new trade between member 
countries that is wholly new resulting from an improvement in the international resource 
allocation. It occurs when subsequent to the formation of a CU, domestic production at high 
costs is replaced by lower-cost sources from the new partner country. This shift has two 
aspects: first, it leads to a reduction or elimination of higher-cost domestic production of 
goods which can now be imported from the more efficiently producing partner country. This 
saving in real costs is called the production effect. Second, the shift induces a rise in 
consumption of those goods now being imported at lower costs from the partner country that 
had to be consumed at higher costs prior to the trade deal. The resulting gain in consumer 
surplus is called the consumption effect. 
Trade diversion refers to the part of the new trade between member countries that is 
only a substitute for trade with third countries. It describes a situation in which the 
preferential trade liberalisation causes higher-cost production from the new partner country to 
replace imports from low-cost sources in the ROW. In this case, the resource allocation is 
worsened. Here again, two effects can be distinguished: first, the production effect consists 
this time of a cost increase for those goods initially imported from an efficient producer in a 
non-member country and now taken from the new trading partner. Second, the consumption 
effect comprises a loss in consumer surplus due to the substitution of lower-cost goods from 
outside the CU for higher-cost goods from the partner country (Lipsey 1957: 40). 
According to the above portrayal of orthodox theory of CUs, trade diversion is 
associated with a loss of exports for the ROW and thus, its reduced ability to purchase 
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imports.4 Trade creation, in contrast, is associated with an increase in exports for the RTA 
member states. Since every CU will be trade-creating in some and trade-diverting in other 
sectors, Viner suggested that the net impact of the tariff reduction depends on the relative 
magnitude of the two opposing effects. He recognised, however, that even if trade-creating 
forces are predominant, the outside world loses in the short run due to the reduction in trade, 
while, in the long run, it may benefit from the worldwide diffusion of the increased propensity 
(Viner 1950: 44). This aspect was formally assessed only in the context of the new trade 
theory. 
1.2.2 The New Trade Theory and Regional Integration5 
The original framework for studying allocative effects of CUs is based on the 
assumptions of perfect competition and homogenous products; the only sources of trade 
creation and trade diversion are differences in factor endowment and productivity. In the 
Vinerian CU theory, the issue of economies of scale was partly taken into account. From three 
possible pre-union situations, production in both, production in neither and production in one 
of the two member states, Viner analysed only the latter case: in the presence of economies of 
scale, imports from the ROW will necessarily be replaced by dearer domestic production, 
because the established Common External Tariff (CET) allows either the initial producer or a 
new producer (who will drive out the established producer) to capture the whole union 
market. Viner termed this effect – which occurs equally when there is no initial production – 
trade suppression. Contrary to the case of trade diversion, the dearer source is a newly 
established domestic producer. Finally, if both contracting countries were producing the good 
before the implementation of the CU, the more efficient producer will now serve the whole 
market at lower costs. Again, the effect differs from trade creation in the sense that instead of 
moving to a cheaper source of supply a cheapening of an existing source of supply takes 
place. 
 
                                                 
4 In principle, this loss could be offset by consuming the freed resources domestically. There are, however, 
situations, in which the reduced exports cannot be perfectly balanced out. First, there may be market distortions, 
allowing exporters to generate extra profits from selling a good abroad. If the exporter was able to charge 
monopoly prices selling his goods abroad or if exports (or imports) were taxed, trade diversion may lead to an 
income loss in the ROW that exceeds the value of the freed resources. Second, the decreased export demand 
might force down the prices of the ROW’s exports and worsen thereby its terms-of-trade. And third, if the 
reduction of exports is substantial, producers in the ROW may additionally suffer losses of specialisation 
benefits (Schiff and Winters 2003: 213ff). 
5 Robson (1998) provides an excellent overview on this issue. 
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Hence, economies of scale can be incorporated into the framework of orthodox CU 
theory. The traditional concepts of trade creation and trade diversion must simply be 
supplemented (or extended) by two further effects – trade suppression and cost reduction. 
Nevertheless, many issues concerning economies of scale were left unresolved by the fact that 
orthodox analysis can only assess the impact of integration on inter-industry trade but not on 
intra-industry trade which predominates in Europe since the 1960s (Caves 1981). In this 
connection, it seems plausible that Viner underestimated the importance of scale economies 
“[…] there is one qualification in favor of customs union [economies of scale] which needs to 
be made, on which both free-traders and protectionists can with reason find some common 
ground, although, in the opinion of the writer, they both tend to exaggerate its importance for 
the customs union problem.” (Viner 1950: 45). 
Only the new trade theory evolving in the early 1980s was able to assess the possibly 
more realistic cases of imperfect competition. While not denying that there are some sectors 
in the economy in which factor endowments and specialisation according to comparative 
advantages play an important role, the new approach focuses on the explanation of intra-
industry trade in similar products. Even if countries were completely identically endowed and 
traditional specialisations gains could not be attained, they can still benefit from regional 
integration by concentrating their production in industries with increasing returns to scale 
(assuming that there are no excessive transport costs). Potential gains from regional 
integration arise from 
- Increased competition: the reduction of internal trade barriers increases the 
effective market size, giving rise to more competition and reducing the 
possibilities for market segmentation; 
- Cost reduction: to meet the increased demand of the larger market, firms need to 
produce a higher output which enables them to reduce their costs; 
- Higher product diversity: the increased market size may also allow producing a 
bigger range of goods profitably, augmenting thereby the consumers’ welfare; 
- Higher plant specialisation: by reducing production costs integration may lead to 
producing fewer varieties in one plant, thus, using the production facilities more 
efficiently and lowering costs in turn again. 
With respect to the impact of regional integration for the ROW, the new trade theory 
makes two statements. First, considering only the relative price changes taking place, the 
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improved competitiveness of the union may result in a decline of imports from third 
countries. However, once the income effect is taken into account, the net import demand of 
the trade bloc may even go up, depending on the relative magnitude of both effects. Second, 
even if losses from trade diversion occurred, they can be offset by the competitive gains 
through lower prices (Robson 1998). 
Despite of these achievements, analytical elaboration has shown that most of the 
mentioned arguments depend on the particular circumstances of RTAs and CUs in practice. 
Viner was well aware of this and stated: “confident judgement as to what the over-all balance 
between these conflicting considerations [trade creation and trade diversion] would be, it 
should be obvious, cannot be made for customs unions in general and in the abstract, but must 
be confined to particular projects and be based on economic surveys thorough enough to 
justify reasonably reliable estimates as to the weights to be given in the particular 
circumstances to the respective elements in the problem.” (Viner 1950: 52). 
1.2.3 The Gravity Equation to International Trade 
Two methods have in the past been used to quantify the effects of regional integration 
on international trade patterns – Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) and gravity models. 
CGE models are typically used in ex-ante simulations to forecast the effect of trade policy. 
Their general equilibrium character reflects the manifold interdependencies between sectors, 
policy fields and market actors well. On the one hand, the CGE models’ rigorous and 
complex theoretic underpinnings help reproducing the various relationships and interlinkages 
within an economy; on the other hand this intricacy makes the model hard to tackle for 
researchers and policy makers. Since CGE models are very sensitive to the parameters 
included, the data used and the assumptions made about the model structure, they have to be 
interpreted accordingly (Piermartini and Teh 2005).6  
An alternative to CGE models are empirical gravity models, mostly employed in ex-
post analyses of trade policies. This thesis uses and develops gravity equations to capture the 
effects of trade creation and diversion throughout the process of European integration of the 
CEECs. Whilst gravity models can appraise with traditional econometric criteria, they do not 
aim to capture the various interactive effects associated with the formation of an RTA. Their 
 
                                                 
6 Panagariya and Duttagupta (2001) underline the sensitivity of results by showing that beneficial trade 
liberalisation predicted by CGE models is in many cases due to a wrong model structure and wrong parameter 
values.  
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static nature makes them subject to the Lucas critique.7 Other more specific points of critique 
that apply to this method will be discussed in the respective sections. 
Tinbergen (1962), Pöyhönen (1963) and Linnemann (1966) were among the first 
authors to apply the physics’ gravity equation to international trade. Despite the lacking 
theoretical support at the beginning, the model’s high explanatory power turned it quickly into 
a popular instrument for the empirical analysis of trade flows. The basic idea is that the 
intensity with which a pair of countries trades is subject to pull factors like their respective 
Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) and push factors like trade impediments in the form of 
customs duties or the geographic distance between them. In its simplest form, the equation 
takes the form 
 
ij
ji
ij D
YY
kM =  (1.1) 
 
where ijM  denotes the imports of country i from country j, iY  and jY  are measures for their 
economic sizes and ijD  stands for the distance between the two countries ( k  is a parameter 
constant). Although intuitively plausible, equation (1.1) is not model-based. Especially 
striking is the missing connection to classical trade theory. Neither technological differences 
nor relative factor endowments play a role. On the contrary, since the import value is related 
to the product of the countries’ GDPs, the similarity with respect to their relative sizes also 
matters. 
Against this background it is not astonishing that first attempts to endorse the model 
with a sound theoretical foundation emerged mainly in the context of the new trade theory and 
were based on a set-up of increasing returns to scale, imperfectly competitive markets and 
firm-level product differentiation (Helpman and Krugman 1985; Bergstrand 1989, 1990).8 
Helpman (1987) went on to demonstrate that the trade volume in the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) 
model under factor price equalisation is independent of the country sizes, concluding, thus, 
 
                                                 
7 In a macroeconometric framework, Lucas stated that a policy change alters the parameters of the model, so that 
inferences based on a structural model become invalid (Lucas 1976). 
8 In an early attempt to endorse the gravity equation with a theoretical framework, Anderson (1979) models 
goods to be differentiated by country of origin. This so-called Armington assumption was overcome with the 
concept of monopolistic competition. 
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that the gravity equation cannot arise from any market structure but monopolistic competition. 
Deardorff (1998), however, showed that the standard H-O model, based on comparative 
advantages and perfect competition, permits interpretations that correspond to the gravity 
model as well as the new theories of international trade.9 
With respect to the theoretical underpinnings of the gravity equation, this thesis is 
methodologically closely related to the discussion of multilateral trade resistances. In a 
gravity study on trade flows between Canadian and United States (US) provinces, McCallum 
(1995) came to the remarkable conclusion that cross-provincial trade is up to 22 times larger 
than cross-border trade. These extraordinarily high numbers gained some fame under the title 
“McCallum border puzzle”. Probably even better known has in the meantime become the 
solution to the puzzle, as developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The authors build 
upon Anderson’s (1979) Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) expenditure system with 
monopolistic competition in differentiated products. Unlike the early work in gravity theory, 
in which prices were assumed to be identical across countries, Anderson (1979) accounted for 
“price effects” related to transportation costs and other border barriers that cause prices to 
differ internationally. By using an implicit solution of the price terms (compare equation 
(1.12) in Box 1.1), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) demonstrate that each country’s price 
index depends on these border barriers and on its trading partners’ price indices which again 
depend on their respective border barriers and their trading partners’ price indices. For this 
reason, the eventually derived gravity equation defines trade not as a function of the bilateral 
trade resistance of two countries in a trading pair but as a function of the bilateral trade 
resistance relative to the multilateral trade resistance of these two countries to trade with the 
ROW (see Box 1.1 for a formal derivation of Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) gravity 
equation).10 As earlier studies (including McCallum) did not properly take this fact into 
 
                                                 
9 In light of the theoretical advances, authors have begun to assess the portion of the competing theories in the 
success of the gravity equation. Evenett and Keller (2002) use several trade models to see whether the gravity 
model shows a better performance in sub-samples of country pairs that better fit the presumptions of the different 
models. They find that trade between an industrialised and a developing country can be well explained by an 
imperfect specialisation H-O model of trade in homogenous goods (Evenett and Keller 2002: 283). Focusing on 
transition countries, Kandogan (2003) examines the role of the competing trade theories in the different 
components of trade. His main finding is that the H-O theory explains the inter-industry component of trade 
while intra-industry trade components are elucidated by the new trade theory. However, since “[…] the gravity 
equation appears to characterize a large class of models”, Deardorff warned that “its use for empirical tests of 
any of them is suspect.” (Deardorff 1998: 21). 
10 Different approaches on how to include the multilateral trade resistances correctly in empirical gravity 
applications are discussed in Chapter 2.4.1. 
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account, they could not explain why a country (or a province) is pushed towards trading with 
a given partner. 
Box 1.1: The Gravity Equation by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
Since the gravity estimations in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis will be built upon an Anderson and van 
Wincoop-like specification, I briefly lay out its foundation. Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) homothetic, 
identical CES preferences take the functional form of 
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1
/)1(/)1(
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=
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where ijc  is country i’s consumption of goods from country j, jβ  is a positive distribution parameter and 
),1( ∞∈σ  is the above-unity elasticity of substitution between goods originating from country i and country 
j. Assuming CES preferences might not be realistic for every product pair, but secures that consumers always 
prefer the same product originating from the geographically closest country and allows thereby incorporating 
a key feature of the gravity equation – the negative relation between distance and trade – into the model. 
Transport costs ijt  are assumed to be of the “iceberg” type, where a fraction )1( −ijt  of the total imports of a 
certain good “melts” away in transit. Since transport costs are shifted to the importer, the ‘landed’ c.i.f. (cost, 
insurance, freight) price is in most studies defined as  
 jijij ptp =   (1.3) 
as a function of bilateral trade costs ijt  and the f.o.b. (free on board) price jp . The representative consumer 
in country i maximises its utility subject to the budget constraint 
 ∑
=
=
J
j
ijiji cpY
1
   (1.4) 
with iY  being country i’s aggregate nominal expenditure, which yields the demand  
 )/()/( iiiijjij PYPpc
σβ −=    (1.5) 
where iP  refers to country i’s price index for all import-competing goods, defined as 
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From the definitions and derivations outlined, it follows that the total value of country i’s imports from 
country j can be expressed as 
 ijijij cpM =   (1.7) 
whereby substituting from equation (1.5) gives 
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Employing general equilibrium conditions has the convenient side effect of eliminating the distribution 
parameter jβ , for which data is not on-hand. Producer prices in country j must then adjust, such that 
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Anderson (1979), Deardorff (1998) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) solve now for the scaled prices 
jjp β  by assuming that all supply prices jp  are equal to one, thus, 
 ( )
σ
σ
β
−
=
− ⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=
∑
1
1
1/1
I
i
iiij
j
jj
YPt
Y
p .  (1.10) 
Substituting back into equation (1.8) and defining ∑
=
=
I
i
iw YY
1
 then gives 
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Equation (1.12) reveals that the equilibrium price index depends on the average transport costs of all 
exporters to importer i, weighted by their import shares, as well as on the price levels of the trading partners. 
Since their price levels are, in turn, influenced by their bilateral trade costs to all importers and their 
respective price levels, the price level in country i eventually depends on all bilateral trade costs, even when 
they do not directly affect country i. These multilateral trade resistances are the central innovation of 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). 
The latest evolution of trade models in which productivity differences across firms 
together with variable and fixed export costs ensure that only the most productive firms serve 
foreign markets (see Melitz 2003), have proved to be compatible with gravity specifications 
as well. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007), Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) and Chaney 
(2008) incorporate important features of Melitz’ heterogeneous firm model into the gravity 
framework. Since only those firms that produce with a productivity above a certain threshold 
find it profitable to export, the authors are able to explain the existence of zeros in the trade 
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matrix. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007) propose a two-stage estimation to control for 
sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity where the probability with which two 
countries trade is calculated in the first step (the so-called extensive margin of trade) and their 
trade volume is calculated in the second step (the so-called intensive margin of trade). Based 
on a Tobit model, Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) find in this context that a trade policy may 
exert influence by increasing the number of trading partners, even though it did not 
significantly boost the volume of non-zero trade.11 
1.2.4 The Location Choice Theory 
Until the 1990s, a great part of the regional economic literature followed Marshall’s 
early propositions from the 1920s that firms would cluster in space first, because concentrated 
industries entail a specialised pooled labour market, second, because clusters support the 
production of non-tradable inputs and third, because informational spillovers improve each 
firm’s production function. Marshall was not aware of the distinction of technological 
externalities, which affect the production function of a firm directly through nonmarket 
interactions from pecuniary externalities, which are mediated by market prices. In a survey 
article, Krugman (1996) lists centripetal and centrifugal forces that affect the location of 
economic activity in various models. The centripetal forces include natural location 
advantages, market size, external economies related to demand and supply linkages and pure 
external economies in the sense of knowledge spillovers. The centrifugal forces comprise 
market (e.g. commuting costs and land rent) and nonmarket forces (e.g. congestion). Contrary 
to Marshall, Krugman (1996) emphasises the distinction between the two kinds of 
externalities, which have motivated different strands of research. 
Pure or technological externalities are extensively discussed by Fujita and Thisse 
(1996). The authors describe a simple model that goes back to Fujita, Imai and Ogawa and in 
which the agglomeration force is the existence of informational spillovers among firms. With 
ir  and iw  as location i’s land and wage rates and fS  and fL  as the amount of land and 
labour needed by the firm, its profit can be described as 
 
 
                                                 
11 The authors contradict herewith Rose’s (2004) notion that “we currently do not have strong empirical evidence 
that the [General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT)] GATT/WTO has systematically played a strong role 
in encouraging trade” (Rose 2004: 98). 
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ia  represents the aggregate benefit a firm enjoys from information, which is an 
increasing function of the density of firms at location i. Intrinsic to the model are therefore on 
the one hand a positive effect of agglomeration that rises with the number and the closeness of 
firms. On the other hand, agglomeration in a single area increases the commuting distance of 
workers and provokes higher wages and land rents in the surrounding area. The equilibrium 
distribution of firms is therefore determined as a balance of two forces of agglomeration, the 
positive network spillovers and the negative competition pressures. 
Theoretical work grouped under the name New Economic Geography (NEG) and 
initiated by Krugman (1991) leaves technological externalities aside and emphasises 
pecuniary externalities instead. Although the strand of literature belongs to regional 
economics rather than international trade economics, it shares some common analytical 
elements with the latter. A key element in location choice theory is that in the presence of 
Samuelsonian iceberg-type transportation costs and a monopolistically competitive 
environment with scale economies, producers want to concentrate close to their potential 
customers. Consumers, in turn, also have incentives to co-locate with firms, because the 
clustering of economic activities bids up factor prices and lowers the overall price index 
through mill-pricing. Thus, forward linkages (the supply of more varieties of a good increases 
the workers real income) and backward linkages (a greater number of consumers attracts more 
firms) trigger a self-reinforcing process of spatial concentration which is the essence of 
Krugman’s model. It explains why two equivalent regions persistently diverge due to small 
historical accidents. Such a locked-in core-periphery structure is likely to occur under certain 
circumstances, namely if (i) transportation costs are positive, but low, (ii) goods are 
sufficiently differentiated and (iii) the share of the manufacturing sector (relative to the 
homogenous agricultural sector) is large. 
Interestingly, the proximity-concentration trade-off that is known from the recent FDI 
literature (see e.g. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004) offers very similar predictions as the 
NEG. While the former is confronted with a firm’s location decision between two countries, 
the latter is concerned with the location of economic activity between two regions within one 
country. The choice whether to produce at home (and export) or abroad (and set up a foreign 
affiliate) is in many respects only a special case of the geographical organization of markets: 
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first, scale economies make it profitable to concentrate production in a relatively small 
number of plants, so that increasing returns constitute a centripetal force in the NEG and a 
force towards extending production at home and exporting in the theory of the multinational 
firm. Second, the geographical extension of markets together with positive transportation 
costs implies that production is dispersed, which is called a centrifugal force in the NEG and 
induces the establishment of a production affiliate abroad via FDI in the theory of the 
multinational firm. Hence, in both fields, one can find a fundamental trade-off between scale 
economies and transportation costs. Recent research on the multinational firm’s location 
choice rely on integrated FDI and NEG models with the decision to invest at home or abroad 
and the decision where to invest abroad as two steps of one decision making process (Mayer, 
Méjean and Nefussi 2007). 
1.3 Empirical Overview 
After having provided some theoretical background, this chapter gives an overview of 
the gravity-based empirical literature on the trade effects of the EU integration of the CEECs 
(1.3.1) and of the adoption of the Euro as the single currency (1.3.2). It continues with 
discussing the available evidence on the determinants of inward FDI (1.3.3). 
1.3.1 Trade Effects of the EU Integration of the CEECs 
Not only on a theoretical basis, but also in the numerous empirical applications, have 
several adjustments been made since the original formulation of the gravity equation. Most 
studies nowadays include a wide range of dummy variables to capture cultural proximity 
(such as a dummy for a common language or colonial ties) or to better approximate the 
geographical distance between trading countries (e.g. through adjacency, island or landlocked 
dummies). Since Aitken (1973), dummy variables have also regularly been employed to 
quantify the effects of FTAs on the direction of trade. Over time, intra-bloc dummies have 
been supplemented by extra-bloc dummies to account for the possibility that the effects of a 
trade policy occur not only among participating countries but also between participating and 
non-participating countries, as discussed in Chapter 1.2.1. 
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The studies that explicitly assess the EU FTAs signed with the CEECs are listed in 
Table 1.1.12 Early analyses by Laaser and Schrader (2002) and Paas (2003) use cross-section 
estimation techniques and put a special focus on the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). The authors 
explain the strongly significant and positive estimate of the BSR dummy through the Baltic 
Sea as a means to save transport costs. Against this, Laaser and Schrader (2002) report an 
insignificant EU dummy in all of their specifications and Paas (2003) even goes further 
providing results that indicate that East-West trade flows are only 0.7 times as large as other 
trade flows under ceteris paribus conditions. 
The first gravity-like equation estimates of EU-CEEC trade from Martín and Turrión 
(2001) were based, however, on a panel data set and point into a different direction. The 
authors assess the share of exports of a country in the imports of the trading partner through a 
set of control variables, amongst these, a set of regional dummy variables. Their main result 
suggests that the rise of EU-15 exports in CEECs’ imports has been stronger than in other 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries’ imports. 
Reversely, the CEECs’ exports in EU-15 imports have also increased, but to a much lesser 
extent. 
Adam, Kosma and McHugh (2003) assess the impact of the EU-CEEC FTAs against 
the intra-CEEC FTAs, like the CEFTA and the BFTA. According to their estimates, the latter 
agreements performed comparably better and were able to outweigh potential trade-diverting 
effects due to the hub-and-spoke nature of the EU-CEEC FTAs. This result is confirmed by 
the study of De Benedicitis, De Santis and Vicarelli (2005) who come to a similar overall 
conclusion when employing a system GMM estimator. 
Using the same estimation technique, but a worldwide country sample Herderschee 
and Qiao (2007) find substantially higher estimates for the EU-CEEC FTA and the CEFTA 
dummy. As a robustness check, they additionally differentiate between the impacts of the 
agreements on individual countries. Among the CEECs-12, Poland benefited most and 
Slovenia least. The most recent study by Caporale, Rault, Sova and Sova (2008) applies the 
FEVD estimator13 to an EU-15 plus four CEECs dataset and reports a trade increase of 23% 
attributable to the agreements. 
 
                                                 
12 For studies assessing the general impact of the EU as a whole, see e.g. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) or for 
a more recent study, see Carrère (2006). 
13 For details on this estimator, see Appendix A2.4. 
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Table 1.1: Literature on the Trade Effects of the EU-CEEC FTAs 
Study Innovation Data Estimation technique Results 
Martín and Turrión 
(2001) 
First estimates of 
EU-CEEC FTAs’ 
effect on trade 
1988-1998, OECD 
plus Estonia and 
Slovenia 
Two-step panel 
Fixed Effects (FE) 
Increase of export 
share of the EU in 
CEECs’ imports is 
sharper than the 
other way around 
(coefficients of 
2.38 and 0.83 
respectively) 
Laaser and 
Schrader (2002) 
Baltic States’ trade 
relations 
1995 and 1999, 
EU-15 and twelve 
CEECs 
Cross-section 
Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) 
BSR dummy 
exhibits 
significantly 
positive influence 
on Baltic States’ 
ex- and imports, 
rest-EU dummy 
insignificant 
Adam, Kosma and 
McHugh (2003) 
Assessment of EU-
CEEC FTAs 
against Central 
European Free 
Trade Area 
(CEFTA) and 
Baltic Free Trade 
Area (BFTA) 
1996-2000, 37 
OECD, Eastern 
European and 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
(CIS) countries 
Two-step panel FE 
EU-CEEC FTAs 
stimulated trade, 
but to a lesser 
extent than CEFTA 
and BFTA 
Paas (2003) 
Assessment of EU-
CEEC trade against 
other special 
trading zones (e.g. 
the BSR) 
2000, EU-15 and 
twelve CEECs Cross-section OLS 
East-West flows on 
average 0.7 times 
as large as other 
trade flows. 
De Benedictis, De 
Santis and Vicarelli 
(2005) 
Approach allows to 
distinguish 
between centre-
periphery and intra-
periphery trade 
1993-2003, EU-15 
and eight CEECs 
System General 
Methods of 
Moments (GMM) 
FTAs boosted 
CEECs’ bilateral 
trade by 11% (14% 
for intra-periphery 
agreements) 
Herderschee and 
Qiao (2007) 
Impact of various 
trade agreements 
(over time) 
1990-2005, 
selection of world 
wide countries, not 
further specified. 
Panel FE and 
system GMM 
EU imports from 
the CEECs rise 
between 35 and 
55% depending on 
the estimation 
technique, Poland 
benefited most, 
Slovenia least 
Caporale, Rault, 
Sova and Sova 
(2008) 
Trade effect of EU-
CEEC-4 
agreements 
1987-2005, EU-15, 
four CEECs and 
Belarus, Russian 
Federation and 
Ukraine 
Panel FE, Random 
Effects (FE) and 
Fixed Effects 
Vector 
Decomposition 
(FEVD) 
EU trade with 
CEECs increases 
by 23%, no 
evidence for trade 
diversion 
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1.3.2 Trade Effects of the Introduction of the Euro 
Since Rose’s (2000) finding that members of currency unions trade over three times 
more with each other, a large body of literature emerged mainly preoccupied with reducing 
the effect through improved specifications. Possibly due to the contemporaneous event of the 
introduction of the Euro as the single currency of initially eleven EMU member states, much 
of this research has focused on Europe (see Table 1.2 for an overview). 
The first of the numerous EMU-specific estimates can be found in Micco, Stein and 
Ordoñez (2002) only three years after the official introduction of the common currency. The 
authors are doing well in reducing what has become known under the name “Rose effect” by 
providing estimates in the range of 5 to 20%. With the same data set, but a different 
estimation method, Faruqee (2004) reduces the effect further to 7 to 8%, where 2001 and 
2002 are identified as the years with the strongest impact. On an individual country level, 
Spain and the Netherlands experience the largest trade gain through their Euro adoption, 
while Portugal, Finland and Ireland underperformed over the time period considered. 
The subsequent studies attempted to give more insights either by differentiating across 
industries or by further improving the empirical specification. In the first class of studies, 
Baldwin, Skudelny and Taglioni (2005), Flam and Nordstrom (2006a) and De Nardis, De 
Santis and Vicarelli (2007) agree in attributing a positive, significant Euro effect in particular 
to sectors characterised by economies of scale and product differentiation. While also 
presenting sectoral estimates, the study by Baldwin, Skudelny and Taglioni (2005) is 
primarily interested in providing a rationale for a positive Euro effect even when exchange 
rate volatility is already brought down to zero. Their model shows that the Euro effect 
increases disproportionately when exchange rate volatility approaches zero, since more small 
firms that are especially affected by the uncertainty, enter the export markets. Thus, along 
with the sales per firm (intensive margin), the number of firms (extensive margin) increases 
(compare also Chapter 1.2.3). 
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Table 1.2: Literature on the Trade Effects of EMU Integration 
Study Innovation Data Estimation 
technique 
Results 
Micco, Stein and 
Ordoñez (2002) 
First estimates of 
the Euro effect on 
trade 
1992-2002, 22 
developed 
countries 
Panel FE  Positive EMU 
effect on intra-Euro 
Area trade in the 
range of 5 to 20%, 
no evidence for 
trade diversion 
Faruqee (2004) Trade effects at 
individual country 
level, panel 
cointegration 
technique 
As in Micco, Stein 
and Ordoñez 
(2002) 
Panel Dynamic 
Ordinary Least 
Squares (DOLS) 
Rising trade gains 
unevenly 
distributed, no 
trade diversion 
Baldwin, Skudelny 
and Taglioni 
(2005) 
Theoretical 
framework for 
Euro effect on 
trade 
1991-2002, EMU-
12, three EU 
countries plus 
Australia, Norway, 
Canada, Japan and 
the United States of 
America (USA), 
ISIC 2- and 3-digit 
manufacturing 
sectors 
Pooled Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(POLS) with 
importer, exporter 
and industry FE 
Convex trade-
volatility link, 
EMU exhibits trade 
effect on top of the 
one observed when 
exchange rate 
volatility is set to 
zero. 
Berger and Nitsch 
(2005) 
Control for general 
trend in economic 
integration 
1948-2003, 22 
industrialised 
countries 
POLS No EMU effect in 
the long-run 
Flam and 
Nordstrom (2006a) 
Unilateral exports 
on sectoral level to 
account for 
spillovers 
1989-2002, ten 
Euro and ten 
industrialised 
countries, nine 1-
digit sectors 
POLS Increasing trend, 
Euro effect in 
differentiated 
products 
Flam and 
Nordstrom (2006b) 
Euro effect at the 
extensive and 
intensive margin 
1995-2005, ten 
Euro and ten 
industrialised 
countries, >5000 
HS 6-digit product 
lines 
POLS Significant effects 
on the extensive 
margin, no trade 
diversion 
Baldwin and Di 
Nino (2006) 
Heterogeneous 
firms model to 
measure the Euro 
effect at the 
extensive and 
intensive margin 
1994-2003, EU-15 
plus Switzerland, 
Norway, Iceland, 
USA, Canada, 
Japan, 5000 HS 6-
digit product lines 
Tobit, Logit and 
POLS 
Support of new-
goods hypothesis, 
pro-trade effect for 
the Euro Area and 
the ROW 
Bun and Klaassen 
(2007) 
Country-pair-
specific time trend 
1967-2002, EU-15 
plus Switzerland, 
Norway, Japan, 
USA, Canada 
Panel FE and 
DOLS 
Euro effect drops 
to 3% 
De Nardis, De 
Santis and Vicarelli 
(2007) 
Sectoral analysis in 
dynamic setting 
1988-2004, 13 EU 
and ten OECD 
countries, 25 SITC 
2-digit sectors 
System GMM Positive Euro effect 
in scale-intensive 
industries 
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Berthou and 
Fontagné (2008) 
Firm-level data 1998-2003, 50 
countries, CN 8 
product lines are 
aggregated into 28 
ISIC sectors 
Panel RE and FE Positive effect of 
the Euro at the 
extensive margin 
unrelated to 
reduced exchange 
rate volatility 
The second class of studies (Flam and Nordstrom 2006b, Baldwin and Di Nino 2006 
and Berthou and Fontagné 2008) confirms the conjecture by Baldwin, Skudelny and Taglioni 
(2005) of significant positive Euro effects at the extensive margin.14 Berthou and Fontagné 
(2008), however, conclude that for France, the positive Euro effect on the number of exported 
varieties is independent of reduced nominal exchange rate volatility and rather attributable to 
lowered trade costs or increased price transparency. 
Finally, Berger and Nitsch (2005) and Bun and Klaassen (2007) account for a general 
trend in greater economic integration, whose omission in Rose’s (2000) study might have 
spurred the size of the estimate. Berger and Nitsch (2005) specify this common trend for the 
EMU-11, which causes the EMU effect to become insignificantly different from zero. Bun 
and Klaassen (2007) introduce a country pair-specific trend, which, as a nice side effect, helps 
to control for Anderson and van Wincoop’s price terms. In their preferred specification, the 
Euro effect drops to 3%. 
Common to the cited studies is not only that they succeeded in lowering the common 
currency effect for the Euro Area drastically to a nowadays widely accepted range of 3 to 
15%, but also that the remaining intra-EMU trade increases have not been at the expense of 
the ROW. This common finding gives rise to a very topical issue. A low Euro effect on intra-
EMU trade and at the same time, no evidence of trade diversion raises uncertainty about the 
right strategy for the CEECs as when to enter the currency union. 
The question whether the CEECs will benefit or lose from their adoption of the single 
currency in terms of trade with the EMU-12 is not widely explored (compare Table 1.3). The 
first study by Maliszewska (2004) uses the coefficients of a model fitted for the EU-15 
countries and plugs in the values of the explanatory variables for the CEECs. She finds that 
although some of the CEECs, namely the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Estonia and the Czech 
Republic already trade more with the EU-15 than predicted, the Euro brings additional trade 
gains to all CEECs in the range of 10.9 percentage points for Hungary and 45.5 percentage 
 
                                                 
14 Note, that the extensive margin is defined here according to the new goods hypothesis. In FDI studies, 
researchers rather refer to the entry of new firms when using the term. 
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points for Slovenia. By including also exchange rate measures, Brouwer, Paap and Viaene 
(2008), find generally lower trade gains for the CEECs spanning from 0.83% for Lithuania to 
10.72% for Poland. 
Table 1.3: Literature on the Trade Effects of EMU Enlargement 
Study Innovation Data Model Results 
Maliszewska 
(2004) 
Trade effects of 
EMU enlargement 
As in Micco, Stein 
and Ordoñez 
(2002), but limited 
to EU member 
states 
POLS Trade expansion 
for all CEECs, 
especially high for 
Slovenia 
Brouwer, Paap and 
Viaene (2008) 
Trade and FDI 
effects of EMU 
enlargement 
1990-2004, 29 
countries 
POLS, FE and RE Positive effect of 
EMU arising 
through the various 
channel 
1.3.3 The Determinants of Inward FDI 
In response to the theoretical advancements through the NEG, a number of empirical 
studies emerged that investigate the determinants of a firm’s location choice, many of which 
thereby laying a special focus on measuring agglomeration economies. In an influential study, 
Head, Ries and Swenson (1995) distinguish between domestic and foreign firm industry 
clusters and find that both substantially increase the probability of a US province being 
chosen as a plant location. While literature on Germany is scarce, a few studies deal with the 
location choice of multinational firms within individual European countries. To achieve 
comparability to the approach followed in Chapter 4, only studies using discrete choice 
models are discussed and listed in Table 1.4.15 
Studies that focus on individual Western European economies confirm the 
theoretically accentuated positive externalities that emerge from industry and knowledge 
clusters. Guimarães, Figuireido and Woodward (2000) assess various agglomeration variables 
on their impact on FDI to Portugal and find particularly strong cluster effects within the 
service sector. Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) show for France that domestic as well as 
foreign competitors increase the probability of a new investment. In addition to analysing the 
impact of agglomeration, Barrios, Görg and Strobl (2006) focus on the role of regional policy 
in Ireland. While policy measures mainly attract low-tech firms, specialised labour markets 
work as a pull factor for companies operating in the high-tech sector. 
 
                                                 
15 Cieslik (2005) and Basile (2004) address a similar problem by using count data models. 
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Table 1.4: Literature on the Determinants of Inward FDI 
Study Innovation Data Model Results 
Guimarães, 
Figuireido and 
Woodward (2000) 
First empirical 
estimates of 
agglomeration 
effects on FDI 
location 
1985-1992, 
Portugal, concelho 
level 
Conditional logit  Agglomeration 
variables and 
distance 
significant, no 
influence of local 
labour costs 
Crozet, Mayer and 
Mucchielli (2004) 
Detailed study of 
agglomeration 
effects by industry, 
country of origin 
and over time 
1985-1995, France, 
Nomenclature des 
Unités Territoriales 
Statistiques 
(NUTS) III 
Conditional and 
nested logit  
Impact of 
agglomeration 
varies by countries, 
industries and 
declines over time, 
no evidence for 
regional policies 
Barrios, Görg and 
Strobl (2006) 
Differentiation 
between low- and 
high-tech-firms 
1973-1998, Ireland, 
county level 
Nested logit Regional policy has 
an effect on low-
tech-firms, 
urbanization 
economies attract 
high-tech-firms 
Defever (2006) Functional 
fragmentation 
1997-2002, French 
investments in 23 
European countries 
Conditional and 
mixed logit 
R&D centres 
stimulate co-
location, 
headquarters 
independent 
Mayer, Méjean and 
Nefussi (2007) 
Two step-decision 
with entry as the 
first step and 
location as the 
second step 
1992-2002, French 
investments in 88 
countries 
Conditional and 
nested logit 
Larger and more 
productive firms 
invest abroad. 
There, the firms’ 
financial networks 
are decisive. 
Basile, Castellani 
and Zanfei (2008) 
EU-wide regional 
study 
1991-1999, 
investments in 50 
NUTS I regions in 
eight EU countries 
Mixed logit EU Structural and 
Cohesion funds 
play a role in 
attracting foreign 
multinationals 
Hilber and Voicu 
(2008) 
Focus on location 
choice within 
Romania 
1990-1997, 
Romania, NUTS 
III 
Conditional logit  Service 
agglomeration as 
the main driver of 
inward FDI 
Hafner (2008) Firms grouped by 
industries and 
department 
divisions 
2006, Germany, 
NACE 2-digit  
Logit Industry-specific 
agglomeration 
economies matter 
for low-tech-firms, 
skilled labour and 
technological 
spillovers are 
important at the 
department level 
Supporting the findings for the Western economies, Hilber and Voicu (2007) show 
that the investment decision of foreign firms in Romania depends also on positive spillovers 
within clusters that prevail in the service as well as in the manufacturing sector. Somehow 
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against previous expectations especially for Eastern Europe, wage differentials do not exhibit 
a significant influence in this study.16 However, Bellak, Leibrecht and Riedl (2008) stress that 
nominal wages and salaries are a poor indicator for labour market effects, since they do not 
only represent an additional cost factor, but mirror at the same time a region’s (in)abundance 
with human capital. 
The focus of the only study for Germany differs from the cited studies above and from 
the approach followed in Chapter 4 in the sense that it is survey-based. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire does not allow identifying the location of the interviewed firms at a regional 
level. Hafner (2008) concentrates instead on agglomeration economies at the industry versus 
agglomeration economies at the department level. He finds that spillovers within industries 
especially attract low-tech firms (which is in opposition to the Barrios, Görg and Strobl 
(2006) results), whereas spillovers between industries have in general a positive effect at the 
department level. 
Two other influential studies in the field do not focus on a single country but provide 
evidence for location choices by considering a number of European countries. Basile, 
Castellani and Zanfei (2008) investigate the role of the EU Cohesion policy at the NUTS I 
level across eight EU countries. They find that the EU funds have indeed helped laggard 
regions to attract foreign multinationals. Defever (2006) investigates the location choices 
among 23 European countries and indentifies substantial differences across individual 
functions, such as Research and Development (R&D) as a pre-production upstream activity 
and wholesale and retail trade as a post-production downstream activity. 
The most recent strand of literature does not only assess regional determinants of 
location choice but combines this analysis with the characteristics of the investing firms. Inui, 
Matsuura and Poncet (2008) find that less productive Japanese investors favour nearby 
locations in China over more distant locations in OECD countries and are also more sensitive 
to institutional quality, market access and existing informational networks than high 
productive firms. Mayer, Méjean and Nefussi (2007) formally integrate insights into the 
heterogeneity of firms à la Melitz (2003) into a location choice model. Firms decide in a first 
step whether to invest domestically or in a foreign country and in a second step where to 
locate given that their productivity is high enough to cover the higher fixed costs abroad. The 
 
                                                 
16 Cieslik (2005) finds the same for Poland using count data. 
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authors confirm that the propensity to invest abroad increases with productivity while 
financial interdependencies matter as well for domestic investments. 
1.4 Research Questions and Chapter Outline 
The recent developments in trade and FDI theory and empirics underline the 
importance of a proper specification of the empirical equation with the employed variables 
derived from a theoretical model. Only then, one can draw correct inferences that allow 
giving strong policy conclusions. To this end, the present thesis consists of three self-
contained essays that start with providing a theoretical framework and that aim at deriving 
thereof reliable answers to the proposed research questions. 
- The first two essays combine various aspects of trade creation and trade diversion 
in the process of European integration with recent improvements in gravity 
modelling. A special focus lays on avoiding the omitted variables problem that 
arises in studies ignoring Anderson and van Wincoop’s multilateral price terms. 
Accounting for these through a set of observable trade cost variables, the chapters 
provide consistent estimates that help answering two important questions which 
emerge in the light of the continuous elimination of trade barriers in Europe: first, 
has the regional integration process caused and will in the future cause positive 
trade effects for the participating countries? And second, have positive effects 
inside Europe been at the expense of the ROW? 
- The third essay builds upon a new trade theory model adapted to the location 
choice of foreign multinational firms within Germany. The model assumes that 
firms decide for a certain location in dependence of its underlying profits, which 
are, in turn, influenced by a set of regional characteristics. The conditional and the 
nested logit model fit this decision-making process well. The results of the 
estimation endorse policy makers with new information when reflecting about 
ways to increase a region’s relative competitiveness by shedding light on the 
question: which are the main characteristics that drive inward FDI flows into the 
German federal states? 
To answer these questions, this thesis proceeds as follows: in Chapter 2, a new version 
of a theory-based gravity equation is developed to properly account for the relative price 
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indices initially proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The partially time-varying 
character of the multilateral resistance variables overcomes the bias present in earlier studies 
that solely rely on country or country pair fixed effects. Applying the augmented gravity 
equation to the process of EU integration during the 1990s, robust evidence is found that the 
FTAs with the CEECs have substantially increased intra-group trade, in the case of the Czech 
and Slovak Republic and Slovenia at the expense of the ROW. Since decreasing multilateral 
trade resistance negatively influences a country’s bilateral imports but may be positively 
correlated with a bilateral FTA, earlier East-West studies, which ignore the relative price 
term’s time-varying character, tend to be downward biased. Indeed, the results indicate that 
once we correct for the omitted variable bias, the FTAs with the CEECs created between 7 
and 20 percentage points more new trade compared to the scenario where only time-invariant 
country pair effects were included. 
Chapter 3 highlights the trade effects of monetary integration in Europe. The purpose 
is to assess the implications of the EMU accession of eight CEECs on their share of EMU-12 
imports. Overcoming biases related to endogeneity, omitted variables and sample selection, 
the results indicate that the common currency has boosted intra-EMU imports by 7%. Under 
the assumption that the same relationship between the explanatory variables and imports will 
hold for EMU-CEEC trade, one can predict the future impact of the Euro. The findings of this 
exercise suggest that except for the least integrated countries, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, 
all CEECs can expect increases in the EMU-12 import share. 
Chapter 4 assesses the determinants of location choices of foreign multinational firms 
at the level of German federal states. Based on a monopolistic competition model, firms 
decide for a certain location if the expected profits are higher than the profits associated with 
all other available locations. A conditional and a nested logit model resemble the structure of 
the location choice process of individual investors well. By using affiliate-level data between 
1997 and 2005, the results confirm that firms react positively to local demand, a common 
border and existing firm networks, while unit labour costs exhibit the expected negative 
impact. These effects vary in their relevance across manufacturing and service affiliates, and 
between upstream and downstream activities. 
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CHAPTER 2 TRADE EFFECTS OF THE 
EUROPE AGREEMENTS: 
A THEORY-BASED 
GRAVITY APPROACH17 
2.1 Introduction to Chapter 2 
Since 1989 Europe has been the stage of an ongoing process of regional integration 
involving 15 EU member states and ten CEECs. The EU admission of eight CEECs on 1st 
May 2004 represented a temporary peak in the integration process, but it was not the end of it. 
Bulgaria and Romania also joined the EU in January 2007 after almost 15 years of 
preferential trade relations guided by FTAs that became known to the public as the EAs. 
Since the EAs had to go through a long process of ratification by each individual member 
state, the European Community (EC) gave provisions on trade and trade-related measures 
effective by means of IAs at an earlier stage.18 Subsequent to the gradual reduction of trade 
barriers, one could observe a relative increase in the EU’s total imports from the CEECs as 
compared to its imports from the ROW.19 This relative boost raised questions about the extent 
to which the geographical restructuring of trade flows has taken place and how much of it can 
actually be attributed to the FTAs signed and implemented in the course of the 1990s. 
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, economists started to examine the “natural” trade 
patterns of the CEECs (see e.g. Bussière, Fidrmuc and Schnatz 2005 for an overview and 
 
                                                 
17 This chapter goes in parts back to Spies and Marques (2008). Originally published on 
www.informaworld.com.   
18 As being subject to Art. 133 of the EU treaty (Common Trade Policy), the IAs fell under the Community’s 
Competence (see Box 2.1). Details on the exact dates of entry into force of the agreements are provided in Table 
A2.1 in Appendix A2.1. 
19 Compare also Figure 2.1. 
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Egger, Pfaffermayr and Schmidt 2007 for a recent contribution to this stream of literature) 
without explicitly quantifying the impact of FTAs. Other studies attempted to assess the 
impact of the arrangements directly through the use of dummy variables. The reported 
coefficients on the intra- and extra-group trade impact of East-West integration are within a 
wide range (compare Table 1.2 and Table 2.6). With the exception of the analysis by De 
Benedictis, De Santis and Vicarelli (2005), a major shortcoming of all of these studies is that 
they suffer from an omitted variable bias. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) stress that bilateral trade does not only depend on 
bilateral trade costs but also on a trading pair’s resistance to trade with the ROW. In this 
chapter, a new version of a theory-based gravity equation is employed to correct for biases 
stemming from the omission of Anderson and van Wincoop’s relative price terms. The results 
indicate that earlier East-West studies that solely rely on country pair fixed effects 
underestimate the trade-promoting effect of the EU’s FTAs. Describing multilateral trade 
resistance through all factors that also influence the bilateral resistance to trade, it turns out 
that the FTAs with the CEECs have boosted EU imports from the CEECs by 72% (up to 80% 
for the new members Bulgaria and Romania), whilst not decreasing imports from the ROW 
by more than 13%. 
In Chapter 2.2, the process of East-West integration and the evolution of trade flows 
during the 1990s are briefly sketched. Chapter 2.3 develops the theoretical model, which 
builds the basis for the estimated equation. Chapter 2.4 discusses this study’s approach of 
measuring multilateral trade resistance in the context of other approaches known in the 
literature. Chapter 2.5 deals with econometric and data issues. The estimation results are 
presented and interpreted in Chapter 2.6. Chapter 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 Trade Flows and East-West Integration  
Soon after the end of the cold war, policy makers and economists developed an 
increased interest in the trade integration of the CEECs into the EU (see Box 2.1 for an 
abstract of the history of the integration process). Especially at the beginning of this process, 
authors have frequently used the gravity model to predict the ‘normal’ or ‘expected’ level of 
trade between the CEECs and the EU. While early studies on East-West integration detect 
highly unexhausted trade potentials of the CEECs’ trade with the EU (see e.g. Hamilton and 
Winters 1992; Baldwin 1994), more recent studies state that the CEECs have meanwhile 
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returned to their “natural” trade patterns (see e.g. Egger, 2002; Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 2003 
and Bussière, Fidrmuc and Schnatz 2005). 
The political distortions in place at the start of the liberalisation process make it 
difficult to analyse the geographical restructuring of trade flows after the fall of the iron 
curtain in the framework of the Vinerian terms of trade creation and trade diversion. 
Nevertheless, most studies formally assessing the ex-post impact of any kind of integration 
arrangement implement different sets of dummy variables into a gravity equation to measure 
the effects of preferential liberalisation on intra- and extra-group trade (see e.g. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen 1995 or for a more recent study Carrère 2006).20 
A few authors have employed this method to assess the effect of the FTAs signed and 
implemented between the CEECs and the EU in the 1990s. Early cross-sectional studies that 
specifically point at the geographical restructuring of trade flows arising from the 
implementation of the EAs report insignificant or even negative coefficients for East-West 
integration (Laaser and Schrader 2002 and Paas 2003). Studies relying on panel data, 
however, find significant positive estimates in the range of 11% to 130% (Martín and Turrión 
2001; Adam, Kosma and McHugh 2003; De Benedictis, De Santis and Vicarelli 2005 and 
Herderschee and Qiao 2007). Although these studies provide a wide range of estimates, they 
find, when using panel estimation techniques a positive impact of East-West integration on 
trade (compare Table 1.1 and Table 2.6). 
 
                                                 
20 For a survey on other methods to measure the EU’s trade effects, see e.g. Marques (2008). 
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Box 2.1: The CEECs’ Long Way into the EU 
While the various sectoral agreements and special arrangements during the state of cold war were restrictive, 
a first step paving the way towards freer trade was a joint EC-Comecon declaration in 1988 followed by the 
conclusion of Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements in the period until 1992. With these first 
generation agreements quantitative restrictions on imports from the formerly centrally planned economies 
were removed and the CEECs were hence treated under the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause. Despite of 
this effort, the European Council in Strasbourg in 1989 affirmed that the bilateral trade relations should be 
strengthened beyond the already existing agreements. 
At the Dublin meeting in 1990 the European Council found the EAs to be the most suitable instrument to 
develop the relations first with the Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland which were thought to be closer to 
the objectives of democracy and a market-orientated economy than the other CEECs (van der Klugt 1993: 1-
2). The EAs’ objectives were trade liberalisation, political dialogue, legal approximation and cooperation in 
the areas of industry, environment, transport and customs. Although signed with each CEEC separately, the 
agreements’ structures were almost identical with some minor differences in the details of certain provisions. 
With respect to trade, the EAs aimed at establishing a free trade area by the year 2002. They foresaw a 
reciprocal but asymmetric liberalisation process for manufacturing products spread over a period of ten years 
with liberalisation always being more rapid on the part of the EU. While quotas and duties on less sensitive 
products were eliminated on both sides immediately, tariffs on the most sensitive industrial goods, i.e. textiles 
and iron and steel manufactures were upheld longest. Since the EAs were so-called mixed agreements 
including commitments under the scope of the authority of both the Community and its member states they 
had to go through a longsome process of ratification by the European Parliament and the parliament of each 
individual member state. 
Pending on the completion of these formalities, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) gave provisions on trade and trade-related measures effective by means of 
IAs already at an earlier stage. As being subject to Art. 133 of the EU treaty (Common Trade Policy), the IAs 
fell under the Community’s exclusive competence. In order to avoid disruptions of the trade relations, the 
parties agreed that the IAs should apply until the entry into force of the EAs. A major shortcoming of the IAs 
and EAs was seen in their hub-and-spoke nature. The bilateral liberalisation could turn the CEECs into 
satellite economies around the EU centre with little intra-regional trade and a high vulnerability to adverse 
shocks (see e.g. De Benedictis, De Santis and Vicarelli 2005 or Baldwin and Wyplosz 2004). 
This hesitancy concerning East-West integration from the side of the EU changed when the European Council 
explicitly sanctioned EU membership for the CEECs and defined the criteria a candidate country must meet 
(“Copenhagen Criteria”) at its Copenhagen summit in 1993 (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2004: 23). The 
“Luxembourg Group” comprising Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia started 
negotiations in late 1997 whereas the other CEECs – among those Romania and Bulgaria – had to wait until 
the Helsinki summit in 1999 (“Helsinki Group”) (De Benedictis, De Santis and Vicarelli 2005: 7). 
Negotiations on EU accession officially terminated with Bulgaria on 16 June 2004 and with Romania on 16 
December 2004.  
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A simple calculation allows for a first insight into the relative change in the aggregate 
imports of EU-15 countries from the CEECs and from the ROW during the EU integration 
process of the candidate countries.21 To render the sizes of the two geographical regions 
comparable, the yearly import values have been normalised with respect to the base year 
(1991). Taking the quotient allows then to assess relative changes. To be precise, the relative 
imports from the CEECs ( CEECsM ) with respect to the ROW ( ROWM ) in each sample year
22 
measured with 1991 as the base year has been calculated as follows: 
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Figure 2.1: Relative Changes in EU-15 Imports 
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Source: Own calculations. Data from OECD. 
Looking at Figure 2.1 it can be readily seen that the growth of EU-15 imports from the 
CEECs has been over three times higher than the growth of imports from the ROW. 
Moreover, the relative boost seems to have taken place steadily and continuously since the fall 
 
                                                 
21 Clearly, the EU-15 is much more important for the CEECs than the other way around. Due to restrictions 
concerning the availability of trade data, this study is constrained to look at EU-15 imports from the CEECs. 
Theoretically, such an approach does not differ from taking CEECs’ exports to the EU-15. Import data is, 
however, found to be more reliable (Baldwin 2006a). 
22 The sample period is 1991-2003. 
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of the iron curtain until the eve of the CEECs’ EU membership. These stylised facts match the 
findings of the empirical literature on this subject. The questions whether part of the higher 
import growth can actually be attributed to the IAs and EAs and whether these have deflected 
trade with the ROW have to be assessed within a formal framework. 
2.3 Theoretical Foundation of the Gravity Equation 
Even though the gravity equation’s initial success stemmed from its good empirical 
properties, it possesses nowadays “more theoretical foundations than any other trade model” 
(Baldwin 2006a). The repeated ignorance of which has, however, produced a number of 
commonly accepted mistakes in gravity model estimation, so that some importance is attached 
to laying out briefly the derivation of the equation, which will be tested.23 
Assuming identical, homothetic CES preferences and “iceberg” type transport costs, 
country i’s aggregate total value of imports from country j can be expressed as 
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with jN  representing the variety of products sold by country j and iY  being country i’s 
nominal expenditure. 
i
ij
P
p
 is the relative price determining the share of country i’s expenditure 
spent on country j’s goods with iP  being country i’s price index for all import-competing 
goods and ijp  standing for the ‘landed’ price. σ  is the above-unity elasticity of substitution 
between goods originating from country i and country j.24 Since prices on individual goods 
are hardly available, the landed price is defined as 
 
ijjijij ePtp = , (2.3) 
 
                                                 
23 Appendix A2.2 describes the case for a restricted country sample. 
24 Usual estimates of σ  range from 5 to 8. Consequently a rise in the relative prices by 1% would cause the total 
import value to fall by 4 to 7%. 
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a function of bilateral trade costs ijt  and country j’s producer price index jP . Besides these 
traditional components of the landed price, the nominal exchange rate ije  (in price quotation) 
is modelled here as an additional trade cost determinant.25 Substituting (2.3) into (2.2) yields 
 
( ) σ−= 1ijijijij retYNM           with     
i
jij
ij P
Pe
re =  (2.4) 
 
as the real exchange rate. Equation (2.4) already looks close to commonly estimated gravity 
equations. However, as stated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), bilateral trade does not 
solely depend on bilateral trade costs, but also on the average resistance to trade with the 
ROW. Only by considering these multilateral terms, it can be explained why a certain region 
is pushed towards trading with a given partner when barriers towards all trade partners 
increase. Employing general equilibrium conditions has the convenient side effect of 
eliminating the number of varieties jN , for which data is not available. Producer prices in 
country j must then adjust, such that the market clearing condition is satisfied, 
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Substituting the import demand equation (2.4) into the market clearing condition (2.5), 
one can solve for jN  as follows: 
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25 An exchange rate variable was for the first time formally introduced into the gravity equation by Bergstrand 
(1985). 
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Plugging (2.6) into (2.4) leads to the testable gravity equation, 
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If we further define world income as 
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where country i’s total imports from country j are not only dependent on the relative incomes 
of the two countries and on their bilateral exchange rate and trade costs, but also depend on 
the importers’ share of world income and on their average trade costs and exchange rate with 
respect to all exporters. 
2.4 Measuring Multilateral Trade Resistance in Gravity Equations 
Before turning to this chapter’s approach to capture Anderson and van Wincoop’s 
price terms (2.4.2), the biases introduced by their omission together with conversant ways of 
accounting for them are discussed (2.4.1). 
2.4.1 Common Ways of Capturing Multilateral Trade Resistance  
The existence of unobservable and omitted factors that simultaneously influence 
imports and the explanatory variables on the Right Hand Side (RHS) introduces an 
unobserved heterogeneity bias (Cheng and Wall 2004). Baier and Bergstrand (2007a) specify 
that the FTA coefficient tends to be underestimated in cross-sectional studies if there are e.g. 
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welfare-reducing domestic policy regulations that induce countries to select into FTAs. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) drew attention to the biases resulting from ignoring 
multilateral trade resistance and modelled it using price terms (compare equations (1.11) and 
(1.12) in Box 1.1). 
The empirical measurement of price effects is tricky and has so far been addressed in 
four ways. First, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) approximate the relative price terms through 
GDP deflators. Since published price indexes do not reflect most factors that influence a 
country’s multilateral trade resistance, the coefficient estimate is close to zero and thus 
economically not important in explaining the growth in bilateral trade. Second, Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003) themselves propose to measure the terms directly with a nonlinear least-
squares estimator. Since this method proves to be computationally costly, Feenstra (2002) 
proposed a third approach to capture price effects via importer and exporter dummies that has 
become most popular. Introducing an individual or bilateral fixed effect allows to control for 
time-invariant variables that simultaneously affect trade flows and RHS variables. 
Baldwin (2006a) formally demonstrates that only including country (pair) fixed effects 
is in a panel setting, however, an insufficient solution to the omitted variable bias, since the 
time-varying part of the multilateral trade resistance is still ignored. This time-varying 
residual may well be correlated with other time-varying trade cost measures causing a bias 
that becomes more important with the length of the sample. In which direction does the bias 
go? Ex-ante predictions are difficult: if the omitted term is positively correlated with the 
probability to select into an FTA (e.g. a high multilateral trade resistance increases a country’s 
incentive to form an FTA) and positively correlated with the dependent variable (high 
multilateral resistance pushes a country towards trading with a specific partner), one would 
expect an upwardly biased FTA coefficient in conventional estimations. Since every 
implemented FTA alters not only the bilateral but also the multilateral trade resistances (by 
lowering the trade costs ijt  and the relative price terms jP  and iP ) and lessens thereby the 
positive effect on the bilateral trade volume, it is also possible that omitting these effects 
downward biases the estimated trade impact over time. 
Recently, various authors suggested a fourth approach that accounts for the overall 
trade resistance through time-varying exporter and importer dummies (see e.g. Baltagi, Egger 
and Pfaffermayr 2003 and Broto, Ruiz and Vilarrubia 2006). Whilst this method allows 
capturing all the unobserved characteristics in a very intuitive way, the amount of dummies 
needed makes the estimation for the full sample computationally unfeasible. Furthermore, the 
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time-country interactions absorb the GDP effect, such that one cannot estimate the trade 
impact of these traditional gravity variables. A similar difficulty occurs with Bun and 
Klaassen’s (2007) suggestion to include country pair-specific time trends: the dummies 
absorb explanatory power of other bilateral time-varying variables. 
2.4.2 A Novel Way to Capture Multilateral Trade Resistance 
In fact, equation (2.8) introduces a novel way of modelling multilateral trade 
resistance in gravity equations that presents several advantages with respect to the existing 
literature. Hence, a fifth approach is proposed where, in contrast to the work by Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003), multilateral resistance is not directly described through relative price 
terms, but through all variables that also influence the bilateral resistance to trade. Their 
partially time-varying character overcomes the bias present in earlier estimations that solely 
rely on country (pair) fixed effects to proxy for the multilateral resistance terms. At the same 
time standard panel data estimation techniques can be applied on the full sample. Note, 
however, that to the extent that there are unobserved or unobservable sources of time-varying 
multilateral trade resistance, the applied procedure does not fully correct the omitted variable 
bias. The loss is, however, believed to be minor since the most common trade cost variables 
are explicitly captured. 
The multilateral terms in the denominator of equation (2.8) are defined as averages 
over all partner countries to account for the fact that when estimating the equation there will 
be a number of importers (i countries). Hence, the joint share of the importers’ income in 
world income is defined as ∑
=
I
i
W
i
Y
Y
1
 and the real exchange rate of each importer’s currency 
against the average of all exporters’ currencies takes the form ire
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The first two terms on the RHS represent the multilateral trade resistances of the 
respective trading partners. Holding bilateral trade costs constant, a rise in these terms implies 
a lower ratio of bilateral to multilateral trade costs and thus a boost of bilateral trade. The last 
term, however, resembles the world’s resistance to trade and as such, lowers the trade value 
between every pair of countries.26 The opposite interpretation of the multilateral and world 
resistance terms holds, of course, true for trade stimulating factors, like cultural proximity or 
trade arrangements. 
In line with the basic idea behind gravity models, that the intensity with which a pair 
of countries trades is subject to pull and push factors, a broad interpretation of the bilateral 
and multilateral trade resistance terms is adopted. Hence, the unobservable trade cost variable 
ijt  is defined as a function of a set of observable variables that influence trade costs,
27 
 
][)( 7654321 iijijijijij FTAFTADEPCLBLLijij eDt
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with ijD  as the great-circle distance between the importing and the exporting country, ijLL  as 
a dummy variable equalling 1 if one country and 2 if both countries in a trading pair are 
landlocked and 0 otherwise, and ijB  as a dummy variable controlling for the length of the 
common border between countries i and j. Supposing that cultural proximity beats down the 
landed price through transaction cost savings, the dummy variable ijCL  equals 1 when the 
importer and the exporter have the same official language and 0 otherwise. Finally, ijDEP  is a 
dummy taking the value of 1 whenever country j is a non-independent entity being legally 
associated with an independent state and 0 otherwise.28 To separate the ex-post effects of the 
FTAs with the individual CEECs, a set of stepwise dummy variables has to be included into 
the theoretically derived gravity equation (compare Box 2.1). ijFTA  equals 1 for the 
contracting parties for the years following the entry into force of the IAs and 2 for the years 
 
                                                 
26 To give an example, for the distance variable this means that a higher distance of the trading partners i and j 
towards all other countries in the sample increases country i’s imports from j, whilst a high world distance 
(everyone is far away from everyone) lowers trade between every country pair. In the case of dummy variables, 
the relevant economic interpretation is given by the proportion of “1” versus the proportion of “0” values of the 
dummies for the various country pairs. 
27 Compare Melitz (2007) for a similar interpretation of the bilateral trade cost variable. 
28 This includes French Polynesia and New Caledonia for France, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles for the 
Netherlands and Bermuda and the Cayman Islands for the United Kingdom (UK). 
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following the entry into force of the EAs to capture the impact of the FTAs on intra-group 
trade (intra-bloc bias).29 iFTA  equals 1 for non-contracting parties for the years following the 
entry into force of the IAs and 2 for the years following the entry into force of the EAs to 
capture the impact of the FTAs on trade of group members with non-members (extra-bloc 
openness).30 
Following this specification, we will be able to examine whether the FTAs signed in 
the 1990s between the EU-15 and the CEECs increased trade between the EU and the 
associated countries at the expense of lower trade with third countries while overcoming the 
biases present in earlier East-West studies. Taking into account the modifications of the 
theoretically derived equation discussed above, the log-linearised31 reduced-form gravity 
equation is given by 
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29 This estimation method is sometimes called the difference-in-difference approach, where one group gets 
treatment (the CEECs) and the other group not (the ROW). The estimate therefore gives the before-and-after 
difference of the treated compared to the before-and-after difference of the control group (Baldwin 2006a). 
30 The countries are grouped by dates of entry into force of the IAs and EAs. See Table A2.1 in Appendix A2.1 
for details. 
31 The brackets after 4β  and 7β  indicate that the dummy variables included in ijt  and ijMWR will not be log-
linearised whereas distance of course, will. 
32 Please find the complete list of variables in Table A2.2 in Appendix A2.3. 
33 Since WY  is constant, we implicitly assume no world growth although countries i and j may grow. As a 
consequence, we assume that the positive growth of some countries is cancelled out by the negative growth of 
others so that the world as a whole does not grow. 
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Finally, this study controls for a possible selection bias by including three variables 
that approximate the Heckman correction term: HC1 is a variable containing the number of 
years of a trading pair in the sample; HC2 and HC3 are dummies, taking the value of 1 if the 
trading pair is observed over the entire period 1991 to 2003 and if the trading pair is present in 
the sample in t-1, respectively (and 0 otherwise).34 
2.5 Econometric Issues 
For the empirical implementation, this chapter considers the EU-15 countries’ imports 
from a worldwide sample of 204 countries35 over the period 1991-2003, forming an 
unbalanced panel data set with roughly 32245 observations. In order to capture relevant 
relationships between variables over time and in order to monitor unobservable country pair 
heterogeneity, static (2.5.1) and dynamic (2.5.2) panel data methodology will be applied. 
2.5.1 Static Panel Estimation 
As outlined in Chapter 2.4.1, not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity yields 
biased estimates. In principle, these unobserved effects can be modeled either as random and 
hence, stochastically fluctuating across countries or as fixed and therewith specific to a certain 
country or country pair. Since the random effects model only produces consistent estimates 
when the unobservable bilateral effects are not correlated with the error term, a Hausman test 
is conducted to test for that correlation. As the test clearly rejects the null hypothesis of no 
correlation, the country pair effects will be treated as fixed. The relevant Fixed Effects (FE) 
regression thus gives unbiased estimates of the time-varying variables (reported in columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 2.1). Nevertheless, to provide comparability, this chapter also presents the 
estimated parameters of the Random Effects (RE) in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.1. The 
use of fixed effects still presents another problem as it does not allow for the estimation of 
time-invariant variables. To overcome this constraint, we use the Fixed Effects Vector 
Decomposition (FEVD) regression method (reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.1). 
The FEVD estimator equals a stepwise fixed effects estimation technique as developed by 
 
                                                 
34 The empirical estimation also contains an EU dummy, controlling for the accession of Austria, Sweden and 
Finland in 1995. The data sources and definitions of all variables entering the tested gravity equation are listed in 
Table A2.2 in Appendix A2.3. 
35 For the complete country list, see Appendix A2.5. 
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Plümper and Troeger (2007), which disentangles observed from unobserved heterogeneity 
and renders thereby the estimation of the time-invariant variables possible (econometric 
details are provided in Appendix A2.4). An additional advantage of the FEVD estimator as 
compared to the basic fixed effects estimator comes from the estimation of hardly time-
varying variables, such as, for example, the FTA dummies. Plümper and Troeger (2007) argue 
that although the within-groups transformation does not eliminate these variables, their 
estimation becomes inefficient in the FE approach, leading to too high standard errors. 
Another estimator that has recently gained popularity in the context of gravity 
modelling is the Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator (Hausman and Taylor 1981). Since the 
estimator instruments possibly endogenous variables, it accounts for the potential problem of 
reverse causality between FTAs and trade flows. A drawback, however, is the selection of 
valid instruments. Since the instruments simultaneously have to fulfil the conditions of 
correlation with the endogenous variables and independence from the unit effects, their 
quality is sometimes poor. This results in efficiency losses. With little success, we have 
looked for high quality instruments to perform an HT estimation. The most likely problem in 
the present case of models is that the variables determining FTAs and trade flows are to a 
large extent the same (see also Baier and Bergstrand 2007a). When specifically looking at the 
process of European integration of the CEECs, however, an economic explanation seems 
plausible as well: whilst the EU-15 has been the biggest trading partner for the CEECs, their 
relevance for the EU-15 was only minor at the start of the transformation process. Hence, high 
trade intensity was potentially not the basis for decision-making when signing the IAs.36 
2.5.2 Dynamic Panel Estimation 
A valuable extension to the static approach is a dynamic specification of the gravity 
equation. By including lagged imports as an additional explanatory variable, one can account 
for potential inertia of trade flows related to sunk costs. The dynamic version of equation 
(2.11), 
 
ijtijttijijt xMM εβδα +++= ∑− (ln)lnln 1,           with     ijtijijt νμε +=  (2.12) 
 
 
                                                 
36 For an application and description of the HT estimator, see Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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cannot be estimated by standard static panel estimation techniques, because even if the ijtν  
were serially uncorrelated, the lagged dependent variable 1, −tijM  in first-differenced 
2,1,1, −−− −=Δ tijtijtij MMM  (or mean-deviated ( )ijTijtijtij MMTMM ++−−= −− ...11~ 21,1, ) 
correlates with the transformed error in 1, −−=Δ tijijtijt ννν  ( ( )ijTijijtijt T νννν ++−−= ...11~ 2 ), 
eventually leading to biased and inconsistent estimates. With the first difference transform, 
however, deeper lags of the regressors remain orthogonal to the error term, and thus, available 
as instruments. Hence, first-differencing the model and using 2, −tijM  as an instrument for 
1, −Δ tijM  leads to consistent estimates, but as shown by Arellano and Bond (1991), the 
efficiency can be considerably improved by exploiting all the orthogonality conditions that 
exist between lagged levels of ijtM  and the disturbances ijtν . In their difference GMM 
estimator lagged levels of the dependent variable and first differences of the strictly 
exogenous variables are used as instruments. One potential drawback of the estimator is, 
however, that lagged levels are poor instruments for first differences in the case that the 
dependent variable follows a random walk (Blundell and Bond 1998).37 
This chapter therefore proceeds with testing for a unit root. Maddala and Wu (1999) 
propose to take the average of the p-values for N independent unit root tests. The single test 
statistic provided can either be based on individual augmented Dickey-Fuller or Phillips-
Perron tests. In both cases, the single test statistic rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root in 
the dependent variable at the 1%-significance level. However, for the analysis and data at 
hand the test has two serious drawbacks. First, it assumes under the null hypothesis that all 
individual series are non-stationary against the alternative that at least one series is stationary. 
Second, the assumption of cross-sectional independence is likely to be violated in gravity 
models. Trade data reflect the economic situation in the reporter and the partner country and 
their GDPs enter in all trading pairs that involve a respective individual country. The 
parametric testing procedure proposed by Pesaran (2004) confirms the presumption of 
dependence of the error terms across the cross-sectional units in the sample. There are, hence, 
some reasons to test for a unit root in the individual series by trading pair.38 Both the 
 
                                                 
37 Specifically, the difference GMM exhibits a downward bias and low precision in short panels when the 
autoregressive parameter is high. 
38 Bond, Nauges and Windmeijer (2005), however, state that in the cases where T is treated as fixed, the 
presence of non-stationary integrated series does not distort the nature of the asymptotic distribution results in 
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augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron test find imports to be stationary at the 
10%-significance level for around one quarter of the individual series. 
As a consequence and following the proposition by Blundell and Bond (1998), the 
system GMM estimator should be employed instead, which adds the equation in levels to the 
first-differenced equation and identifies more moment conditions by additionally using the 
lagged differences of the predetermined variables as instruments.39 In simple words, instead 
of instrumenting differences with levels as in the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, 
Blundell and Bond (1998) instrument levels with differences. In situations where the 
dependent variable follows a unit root process, it is plausible to assume that past changes are 
more predictive to current levels than past levels to current changes, so that substantial 
efficiency gains can be achieved over the basic difference GMM estimator. The estimation 
technique does, however, not come without restrictions either. Roodman (2006) explains that 
introducing fixed effects or any other dummy variable that equals zero or one for almost all 
individuals violates the orthogonality assumptions in the level equation. This is a heavy 
concern since our main variable of interest, the EA dummy, is specified only for a small 
number of countries (the dummy equals zero for 96% of all observations). Hence, the level 
equation will be excluded from the estimation, which yields difference instead of system 
GMM results. 
2.6 Results 
This chapter starts with commenting the results of estimating equation (2.11), while 
laying a special focus on the effect of including multilateral resistance terms. The basic 
regressions (2.6.1) and the robustness checks (2.6.2) provide evidence that the FTA 
elasticities move up, once the time-varying part of the relative price terms is appropriately 
accounted for. This finding is finally put into the context of earlier studies in the field of East-
West integration (2.6.3). 
 
 
                                                 
the same way as done for long time-series. Fidrmuc (2006) studies unit roots in gravity models and comes to the 
conclusion that the possible bias due to non-stationarity is small and that the estimates of the fixed effects model 
are close to the ones obtained by employing panel cointegration techniques. 
39 A variable is said to be predetermined if it is correlated with past error terms. In contrast, endogenous 
variables are correlated with past and present error terms. 
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2.6.1 Regression Results 
The results of the regressions with and without the multilateral and world resistance 
terms are presented in Table 2.1. For each regression method explained in Chapter 2.5.1, the 
first column shows the regression results omitting the multilateral terms. Except for some 
FTA dummies, all parameter estimates of the FE model show the expected signs and are 
highly significant. As for the traditional gravity variables, the positive parameter estimates for 
GDP indicate that the import value increases with the importer’s GDP, owing to a higher 
import demand, and with the exporter’s GDP, owing to a higher export supply. The 
coefficients are, however, somewhat away from the theoretically predicted unitary elasticity.40 
Note that the theoretically justified inclusion of the real exchange rate exhibits empirical 
importance as well. A 10% depreciation41 of the importing country’s currency against its 
trading partner’s currency reduces the import value from the latter by 2.8%. 
Moving to the FEVD regression in column (5), we find that the distance coefficient of 
-1.30 lies within the usual range.42 When at least one of the countries in a trading pair is 
landlocked, bilateral imports decrease by 74%.43 Being legally dependant on the importing 
country and sharing a common language significantly boost the propensity to trade. EU 
membership does not have a significant influence on imports in this setting. Since there is 
little time variation in the EU dummy (only for Austria, Finland and Sweden, the variable 
jumps from 0 to 1 in 1995), most explanatory power is already absorbed in the country pair 
FEs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Anderson (1979) shows that the presence of non-tradable goods implies coefficients lower than unity. The fact 
that the coefficient of the importer’s GDP is lower than that of the exporter’s GDP suggests a larger non-
tradables sector in the EU-15 than in the ROW, on average. Given the large number of developing countries in 
the sample, this implication is realistic. 
41 Please note that throughout this thesis, price quotation is used. A rise in the real exchange rate implies 
consequently a depreciation of country i’s currency against country j’s currency and lowers its import demand. 
42 The elasticity of transport costs to distance is usually associated with an estimate in the range of 4.02.0 1 << δ  
(Limão and Venables 2001). Combined with an average estimate of 7=σ , a distance coefficient between -1.2 
and -2.4 would be suggested. 
43 Since being landlocked is captured by a dummy variable, the import elasticity is given by exp(-1.33)-1=74%. 
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Table 2.1: Estimation Results 
Dependent variable: ijtMln  
FE RE FEVD  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 w/o MWR with MWR w/o MWR with MWR w/o MWR with MWR 
itYln  0.22** 
(0.10) 
0.43*** 
(0.13) 
1.02*** 
(0.03) 
1.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.43*** 
(0.01) 
jtYln  0.67*** 
(0.08) 
0.71*** 
(0.08) 
1.14*** 
(0.01) 
1.15*** 
(0.01) 
0.67*** 
(0.00) 
0.71*** 
(0.00) 
ijtreln  -0.28*** 
(0.07) 
-0.37*** 
(0.07) 
-0.08*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.28*** 
(0.00) 
-0.37*** 
(0.00) 
ijDln    -0.85*** (0.05) 
-1.82*** 
(0.20) 
-1.30*** 
(0.01) 
-2.31*** 
(0.03) 
ijB    0.00 (0.00) 
-0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
ijLL    -0.56*** (0.07) 
-0.90 
(3.59) 
-1.33*** 
(0.02) 
-0.81 
(0.50) 
ijDEP    0.75* (0.45) 
1.69*** 
(0.56) 
0.98*** 
(0.12) 
1.21*** 
(0.14) 
ijCL    1.39*** (0.14) 
0.77*** 
(0.15) 
1.07*** 
(0.03) 
0.94*** 
(0.03) 
ijtEU  -0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.06) 
0.26*** 
(0.07) 
-0.14** 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
itEU  -0.30*** 
(0.08) 
-0.32*** 
(0.08) 
-0.24*** 
(0.06) 
-0.28*** 
(0.06) 
-0.30*** 
(0.05) 
-0.32*** 
(0.05) 
irobutFTA  0.47*** 
(0.08) 
0.59*** 
(0.09) 
0.27*** 
(0.06) 
0.14** 
(0.07) 
0.47*** 
(0.07) 
0.59*** 
(0.08) 
ihupotFTA  0.26** 
(0.10) 
0.31*** 
(0.11) 
0.24*** 
(0.08) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
0.31*** 
(0.09) 
iczsltFTA  0.39*** 
(0.10) 
0.47*** 
(0.11) 
0.16** 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
0.39*** 
(0.08) 
0.47*** 
(0.09) 
isvtFTA  0.04 
(0.04) 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.15*** 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.11* 
(0.05) 
ibalticstFTA  0.49*** 
(0.08) 
0.58*** 
(0.09) 
0.56*** 
(0.07) 
0.66*** 
(0.07) 
0.49*** 
(0.06) 
0.58*** 
(0.08) 
itFTA (Ro, Bu) 0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
itFTA (Hu, Po) -0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.10 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
itFTA (Cz, Sl) -0.14** 
(0.06) 
-0.14** 
(0.06) 
-0.27*** 
(0.06) 
-0.31*** 
(0.06) 
-0.14* 
(0.08) 
-0.14* 
(0.07) 
itFTA (Sv) -0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.22*** 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
itFTA (Baltics) 0.14*** 
(0.05) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
0.26*** 
(0.04) 
0.14** 
(0.06) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
∑
=
I
i
its
1
ln   0.07 (0.23)  
-1.56*** 
(0.12)  
0.07 
(0.14) 
∑
=
J
j
itreJ 1
1ln   1.00*** (0.23)  
-0.30*** 
(0.05)  
1.00*** 
(0.02) 
ijMWRDln     1.16*** (0.21)  
1.46*** 
(0.04) 
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ijMWRLL     0.32 (3.62)  
-0.45 
(0.51) 
ijMWRB     0.00* (0.00)  
0.03*** 
(0.00) 
ijMWCL     2.09*** (0.29)  
1.90*** 
(0.08) 
ijMWRDEP     -12.74*** (3.50)  
0.35 
(1.26) 
ijtMWRFTA   -0.24*** (0.09)  
0.18*** 
(0.06)  
-0.24*** 
(0.08) 
ijtMWREU   -0.04 (0.08)  
0.36*** 
(0.11)  
-0.04 
(0.06) 
HC1   0.47*** (0.04) 
0.43*** 
(0.04) 
0.61*** 
(0.01) 
0.52*** 
(0.01) 
HC2   -1.85*** (0.20) 
-1.45*** 
(0.20) 
-1.82*** 
(0.05) 
-1.74*** 
(0.05) 
HC3 0.11 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
0.14 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
Observations 32245 32245 32245 32245 32245 32245 
Wald test  8.69***  175.60***  1506.04*** 
R² 0.91 0.91 0.71 0.72 0.91 0.91 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of equation (2.11). The dependent variable is the log of imports 
of the individual EU-15 countries from 204 countries between 1991 and 2003. The independent variables are as 
described in Chapter 2.4.2 and based on the variables listed in Table A2.2 in Appendix A2.3. Columns (1) and 
(2) report the panel fixed effects, columns (3) and (4) the panel random effects and columns (5) and (6) the panel 
fixed effects vector decomposition regression results. The respective first columns are without multilateral terms, 
the respective second columns include multilateral terms. The R² in columns (3) and (4) is calculated as the 
squared correlation between the observed and the predicted response. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
with significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
Looking at the results of the regressions, including the multilateral terms, we find that 
the relative size of the importing EU-15 countries is not significantly different from zero. The 
average exchange rate variable shows a positive sign and a unit coefficient, indicating that 
imports from a certain trading partner increase proportionally to a depreciation of the 
importing country’s currency against all currencies. Column (6) reveals that a 10% rise in 
country i’s geographical distance from all trading partners (remoteness) pushes it to trade 15% 
more with country j. Dependency and being landlocked does not seem to matter on a 
multilateral basis and border effects also play quantitatively a minor role in this sample. The 
coefficient on the multilateral language variable does not show the expected opposite sign of 
its bilateral counterpart. This may be due to the last term on the RHS of equation (2.9), the 
world resistance term, dominating the multilateral terms. Thus, in the world as a whole, there 
are many common languages facilitating trade between every pair of countries and 
outweighing possible negative consequences for bilateral trade of the multilateral language 
variables. 
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Turning to the interpretation of the FTA coefficients, the results display the 
meaningfulness of the agreements for the CEECs’ integration into the EU. In the FE 
regression without the multilateral terms, four out of five dummy variables argue for a 
significant boost of the EU-15 countries’ imports brought about by the agreements. Most 
trade has been created by the FTAs signed with the Baltic countries (63% above the normal 
level), closely followed by the Romanian and Bulgarian FTAs (60% above the normal level). 
These arrangements are also the ones featuring extra-bloc openness. They increased EU 
imports from the ROW by 12% and 15%, respectively.44 The result for the Czech and Slovak 
Republic agreement is somewhat mixed. While it led to 48% more imports than what would 
have been predicted by the baseline scenario gravity model, it has reduced imports from third 
countries by 13%. For the agreements with Hungary, Poland and Slovenia effects on third 
countries could not be detected. 
In general, the results keep holding true when the multilateral resistance terms are 
included. The Wald test confirms their joint relevance at the 1%-significance level. 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the coefficients of the FTA dummies (as well as the GDP 
and distance measures) move up in the second set of regressions. As laid out by Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2006), estimates of currency union dummies are likely to be biased if the relative 
price terms are omitted. Since we rely on a FEs model, even in the first regression, only the 
time-variant part of Anderson and van Wincoop’s price terms is ignored. Not accounting for 
their time-varying character means, however, that the omitted variables enter into the error 
term. Since the ignored multilateral variables are correlated with their bilateral counterparts 
they bias the estimates of the latter.45 The results presented in Table 2.1 confirm this 
hypothesis. The two time-varying multilateral FTA terms are negatively correlated with 
bilateral trade, but may indeed exhibit a positive impact on the decision to form an FTA. The 
average exchange rate, in turn, has a positive effect on the dependent variable. Moving to the 
estimation results of the full model in columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 2.1, this chapter finds 
that the agreements with the CEECs actually have created between 7 and 20 percentage points 
more trade than suggested by the regression, ignoring the time-varying component of the 
relative price terms (plus the coefficient for the FTA with Slovenia becoming significant). In 
 
                                                 
44  Note, however, that the itFTA (Ro, Bu) coefficient is not significant in the FEVD estimation (for the 
specification without multilateral terms). 
45 Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) find that only the fully specified model with importer and exporter 
time-varying effects does not underestimate the impact of summed GDP and income similarity on trade. They 
stress the possibility of misleading inference in underspecified models. 
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the case of Slovenia, we also find stronger evidence for reduced EU-15 imports from the 
ROW. For the FTAs with Romania and Bulgaria and with the Baltic States, there is no 
evidence that the large trade creation with the EU-15 was at the expense of third countries. To 
the contrary, in both specifications, the ROW also gained import shares in the course of the 
implementation of the two arrangements. 
2.6.2 Robustness Checks 
Although the country groupings used in Table 2.1 follow the historical criterion of 
signing and entry into force of the IAs and EAs (see Table A2.1 in Appendix A2.1), it could 
be argued that an economic criterion, based on structural similarity, might be more 
appropriate. Such a criterion would point towards the three country groupings commonly used 
in the East-West European trade literature: the Visegrad (Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Hungary and Poland) countries, the Balkans (Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia) and the Baltic 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) states. 
Table 2.2 shows the trade effects obtained from the regression results for these 
alternative country groupings, allowing thereby for a better comparison to previous studies.46 
The parameter estimates of the explanatory variables underline the robustness of the previous 
estimation results shown in Table 2.1. In both country groupings, the FTA coefficients move 
up with the inclusion of the again jointly significant multilateral resistance terms. For all 
CEECs taken together (column (2)), the IAs and EAs boosted EU imports from that region 
72% above the otherwise predicted level without negatively affecting third countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 In order to save space the full results table for the robustness check is not presented here, but can be made 
available upon request. 
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Table 2.2: Estimation Results – Alternative Country Groupings 
Dependent variable: ijtMln  
 FTA: all CEECs FTA: 3 CEEC groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 w/o MWR with MWR w/o MWR with MWR 
iCEECstFTA  0.42*** 
(0.02) 
0.54*** 
(0.04)   
itFTA (CEECs) 0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.06*** 
(0.02)   
ivisegradtFTA    0.38*** (0.05) 
0.54*** 
(0.06) 
ibalkantFTA    0.32*** (0.03) 
0.44*** 
(0.05) 
ibalticstFTA    0.39*** (0.04) 
0.48*** 
(0.05) 
itFTA (Visegrad)   -0.06 (0.04) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
itFTA (Balkan)   0.10*** (0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
itFTA (Baltics)   0.04 (0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Observations 32245 32245 32245 32245 
Wald test  1472.41***  1520.44*** 
R² 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Note: This table presents estimation results based on the panel fixed effects vector decomposition estimator. In 
columns (1) and (2), the CEECs are taken as a group, in columns (3) and (4), the Visegrad countries comprise 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republic, the Balkans comprise Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia and 
the Baltics comprise Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The respective first columns are without multilateral terms, 
the respective second columns include multilateral terms. Other coefficients are omitted but the full list is as in 
Table 2.1. Since the dates of entry into force of the agreements differ for the countries in the aggregate, we took 
the “mean” years in assigning the values of 1 and 2 to the dummies measuring the extra-bloc openness. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses with significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
For the purpose of comparing the proposed approach to recent studies that account for 
Anderson and van Wincoop’s price terms via time-varying dummy variables, the regression 
was repeated including country pair-specific time trends as suggested by Bun and Klaassen 
(2007) instead of the multilateral trade cost variables. In order to make the regression 
computationally possible, we had to restrict the sample to OECD countries and limit the 
dummies to take triannual steps. Since this transformation dropped the number of 
observations considerably, a comparison can only be made to a FEs regression with MWR 
terms on an identical sample. 
Table 2.3 contains the estimation results of the specification with a country pair-
specific time trend (column (1)) as compared to the specification with multilateral trade 
resistance terms (column (2)). 
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results – Country Pair-Specific Time Trend 
Dependent variable: ijtMln  
 Country pair-
specific trend  
MWR 
 (1) (2) 
itYln  0.73*** 
(0.08) 
1.03*** 
(0.12) 
jtYln  0.31*** 
(0.08) 
0.66*** 
(0.06) 
ijtreln  0.01 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
ijtEU  -0.01 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
itEU  -0.16*** 
(0.06) 
-0.10* 
(0.06) 
iCEECstFTA  0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.26*** 
(0.04) 
itFTA (CEECs)  0.13*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
∑
=
I
i
its
1
ln  
 -1.21*** 
(0.19) 
∑
=
J
j
itreJ 1
1ln  
 0.39* 
(0.20) 
ijtMWREU   -0.04 
(0.08) 
ijtMWRFTA   -0.13 
(0.08) 
HC3  -0.05** 
(0.02) 
Observations 5826 5826 
R² 0.82 0.52 
Note: This table presents estimation results based on the panel fixed effects estimator. Column (1) reports the 
results with a country pair-specific time trend, column (2) with multilateral resistance terms. The dependent 
variable is the log of imports of the individual EU-15 countries from OECD and CEE countries between 1991 
and 2003. Time-invariant variables are included into the regression, but not reported. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses with significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
With a time trend, the coefficient of the ijtFTA  variable is reduced to 0.16 (0.26 for the 
FE estimation with MWR variables). Since both the FTA variables and the country pair 
dummies are defined bilaterally and time-variant, the dummy might partly absorb the 
explanatory power of the FTA variables. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) mention in this context 
that time-varying pair dummies will make it impossible to estimate factors that affect bilateral 
trade costs even if they are time-varying as well. Note also that the MWR specification 
indicates trade losses of the EU-CEECs agreement for OECD countries. 
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To investigate further how income, distance and adjacency interact with signing and 
implementing an FTA, multiplicative terms between the trade dummies and some of the 
gravity variables are included in the next robustness check. For the CEECs (FTA=1), the FTA 
effect is given by the sum of the coefficient of the FTA dummy and of the coefficient of the 
interaction term (Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4: Estimation Results – Interaction Terms 
Dependent variable: ijtMln  
 Basic  Distance  Border  GDP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itYln  0.43*** 
(0.01) 
0.43*** 
(0.01) 
0.43*** 
(0.01) 
0.42*** 
(0.01) 
jtYln  0.71*** 
(0.00) 
0.71*** 
(0.00) 
0.71*** 
(0.00) 
0.71*** 
(0.01) 
ijDln  -2.28*** 
(0.03) 
-2.25*** 
(0.04) 
-2.29*** 
(0.03) 
-2.29*** 
(0.03) 
ijB  -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
iCEECstFTA  0.54*** 
(0.04) 
-0.40** 
(0.17) 
0.54*** 
(0.04) 
-1.13*** 
(0.23) 
itFTA (CEECs)  0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.50*** 
(0.09) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
ijiCEECst DFTA ln*   0.13*** 
(0.02) 
  
itFTA (CEECs)*
ijDln  
 -0.05*** 
(0.01) 
  
ijiCEECst BFTA *    -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
 
itFTA (CEECs) ijB*    0.00** 
(0.00) 
 
jtiCEECst YFTA ln*     0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Observations 32245 32245 32245 32245 
R² 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Note: This table presents estimation results based on the panel fixed effects vector decomposition estimator. 
Column (1) reports the results of the basic regression, the other columns report the results on the interaction of 
the FTA dummy variable with distance (column (2)), border (column (3)) and GDP (column (4)). Other 
coefficients are omitted but the full list is as in Table 2.1. The interaction term between itFTA (CEECs) and itYln  
has been dropped due to collinearity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses with significance at the *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
The results prove to be robust to the introduction of these interactions, indicating that a 
rise in exporter GDP and geographical distance lowers the trade gain of an FTA. This is a 
sensible result, as small economies typically gain the most from liberalising trade and higher 
distances among integrating partners increase trade costs, thus lowering trade gains. 
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Finally, in addition to the static approach, the dynamic specification of equation (2.11) 
is adopted as a last robustness check, where the lagged dependent variable is included among 
the regressors to control for the persistence of import flows (Table 2.5). 
Table 2.5: Estimation Results – Dynamic Specification 
Dependent variable: ijtMln  
 (1) (2) 
 w/o MWR with MWR 
1,ln −tiM  0.28*** 
(0.03) 
0.28*** 
(0.03) 
itYln  0.21** 
(0.09) 
0.25*** 
(0.09) 
jtYln  0.54*** 
(0.06) 
0.55*** 
(0.06) 
ijtreln  -0.24*** 
(0.05) 
-0.30*** 
(0.05) 
ijtEU  0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
itEU  -0.25*** 
(0.05) 
-0.25*** 
(0.05) 
iCEECstFTA  0.27*** 
(0.04) 
0.40*** 
(0.05) 
itFTA (CEECs)  0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
∑
=
I
i
its
1
ln  
-0.04 
(0.13) 
0.36** 
(0.15) 
∑
=
J
j
itreJ 1
1ln  
 0.62*** 
(0.16) 
ijtMWREU   0.01 
(0.06) 
ijtMWRFTA   -0.36*** 
(0.08) 
Observations 25778 25778 
Wald test  32.58*** 
R² 0.75 0.68 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of the dynamic version of equation (2.11). The estimations are 
based on the difference GMM estimator. Column (1) is without multilateral terms, column (2) includes 
multilateral terms. Time-invariant variables are included in the regressions, but dropped due to collinearity. The 
R² is calculated as the squared correlation between the observed and the predicted response. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses with significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2.5.2, inferences have to be drawn with caution, since the 
detected non-stationarity introduces a weak instruments problem.47 In addition to this, the 
results are not directly comparable to the static results at least for two reasons: first, first 
differencing magnifies gaps in unbalanced panels and causes a loss of about 6500 
observations. Second, differencing the stepwise (0/1/2) FTA dummy variable wipes out the 
trade liberalising effects except for the years the IAs and the EAs entered into force. The 
estimated coefficient of 0.40 (49%) for the ijtFTA  and 0.05 (5%) for the itFTA  variable 
represent therefore only the initial impact their implementation had on changes in EU imports, 
but can to a large extent not capture the gradual nature of tariff reductions under the 
agreements (Herderschee and Qiao 2007: 15). Nevertheless, the results reveal that the current 
imports depend on their previous levels, which provides a rationale for a dynamic approach. 
The remaining coefficients generally behave similarly in both, the static and the dynamic 
specifications. 
2.6.3 Comparison to Earlier Studies 
To allow for comparison to other East-West studies, we refer to the overall (static) 
FTA impact as reported in Table 2.2, column (2). The estimated FTA coefficient for all 
CEECs of 0.54 (thus, indicating a trade creation elasticity of 72%) lies at the upper bound of 
previous parameter estimates (compare Table 2.6). 
Table 2.6: Trade Creation Elasticities in Previous Studies 
  TC elasticity Estimation technique 
This chapter 72% FE and FEVD 
Martín and Turrión (2001) 130% Two-step FE 
Laaser and Schrader (2002) 286%a/14%b Cross-section 
Paas (2003) -30% Cross-section 
Adam, Kosma and McHugh (2003) 32% Two-step FE 
De Benedictis, De Santis and Vicarelli (2005) 11% System GMM 
Herderschee and Qiao (2007) 35% FE and system GMM 
Caporale, Rault, Sova and Sova (2008) 23% FE and FEVD 
Note: a Baltic States’ exports to members of the Baltic sea region, b Baltic States’ exports to the rest-EU (estimate 
not significant). 
 
                                                 
47 As OLS estimation gives an upward biased coefficient and within-groups estimation a downward biased 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, the consistent estimate is expected to lie in between. Since the 
difference GMM estimate of 0.28 in columns (1) and (2) is even below the within-groups estimate of 0.34, the 
weak instruments problem seems severe. The detailed results of these robustness checks are not presented but 
can be made available upon request. 
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The differences in the trade creation elasticities seen in Table 2.6 stem from different 
specifications of the gravity equation, varying estimation techniques, country samples and 
time spans. Paas (2003) and Laaser and Schrader (2002) use cross-sectional data and find that 
integration among the members of the BSR is more intense than between the CEECs and the 
EU. Ignoring the time dimension results, however, in a substantial loss of information. This is 
especially true for FTAs that rather imply a gradual than an all-at-once liberalisation process. 
In an early panel data study, Martín and Turrión (2001) estimate a coefficient of 0.83 
for intra-group and 1.99 on extra-group export shares. Close to our procedures appear the 
approaches of Adam, Kosma and McHugh (2003), Caporale, Rault, Sova and Sova (2008) 
and Herderschee and Qiao (2007). The studies rely, however, on time-invariant country (pair) 
specific fixed effects to account for the multilateral resistance terms. Since part of the 
resistance, namely the multilateral FTA variable, is time-varying and negatively correlated 
with the dependent variable, the results are likely to be downward biased. Herderschee and 
Qiao (2007) also provide evidence of trade developments on an individual country level. In 
line with our estimated impact of the individual FTAs, the authors find that Poland, Romania 
and Estonia experience the biggest trade gains whereas the EA with Slovenia is measured to 
have had the lowest impact on the country’s exports to the EU. 
De Benedictis, De Santis and Vicarelli (2005) – looking on a sample of the EU-15 and 
eight CEECs – appropriately account for multilateral trade resistance by including a country 
pair-specific time trend. Part of their lower estimate of 11% may be explained by the small 
country sample (compare the respective robustness check in Table 2.3) and the exclusion of 
Romania and Bulgaria. The FTAs with the two countries lead to a 60% and 80% increase in 
EU imports in our regressions without and with MWR, respectively (see Table 2.1). Equally 
important should be the estimation properties. First, the authors’ use of a bilateral time trend 
may absorb some of the explanatory power of the time-varying bilateral FTA variables. 
Second, the study applies a system GMM estimator reasoning that taking orthogonal 
deviations helps to circumvent the loss of observations when first-differencing. By subtracting 
the average of all future observations, the effect on the FTA variable is, however, essentially 
the same – it cancels out at all but one point in time. Depending on the exact specification, the 
estimate that De Benedictis, De Santis and Vicarelli (2005) provide may only capture the 
trade effect in 2003, the last year of their sample.48 
 
                                                 
48 In case, the authors impeded the transformation of the FTA dummy, the last point does not apply. 
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2.7 Conclusions of Chapter 2 
This chapter has paid particular importance to theoretically deriving a new version of a 
correctly specified gravity equation to avoid biases present in previous studies. The 
specification proposed gives important insights. First, it can be shown that the exchange rate 
variables frequently employed empirically do stand on a sound theoretical ground and exhibit 
econometric importance. Second, new measures for multilateral trade resistance are 
introduced which mostly show the expected coefficient signs in the empirical estimation. 
Third, looking at the agreements on an individual country basis, we conclude that the FTAs 
have supported and accelerated the CEECs’ integration into the EU. The process has not been 
free of charge, however, as we also find evidence that although each FTA created new trade 
within the trade bloc, the increase has in the case of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia been at the expense of imports from the ROW. Finally, as for the aggregate trade 
effects of the IAs and EAs, the result is at the upper bound of previous estimates. However, 
we believe that earlier studies relying on fixed effects underestimate the agreements’ effect 
since they only partly eliminate the omitted variable biases. 
In a modern application of Viner’s theory, other issues arise which go beyond the 
scope of this chapter. For example, it has to be questioned to what extent the classic concepts 
of trade creation and trade diversion, which have been conceived in a world without capital 
mobility, do make sense in a scenario in which the fastest growing component of trade is the 
one stemming from capital mobility, i.e. from foreign affiliates of MNEs. The EU 
Commission (2006) now recognises that trade re-orientation is in large part led by the 
international fragmentation of production of EU multinationals, which have delocalized 
labour-intensive parts of their production processes in the East, and then re-imported 
intermediates through special custom regimes (OPT). These issues (vertical FDI, trade in 
intermediates, OPT), are points still to be empirically analysed when talking about trade 
effects of regional integration, but were not the main focus of the present analysis. 
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A2 Appendix 
A2.1 Schedule of Signature and Entry into Force of EU-CEECs Agreements 
Table A2.1: Dates of Entry into Force of the Interim and the Europe Agreements 
Dummy Country Interim Agreement Europe Agreement 
Hungary March 1992 February 1994 
hupoFTA  
Poland March 1992 February 1994 
Czech Republic March 1992 February 1995 
visegradFTA  
czslFTA  
Slovakia March 1992 February 1995 
Romania December 1993 February 1995 
robuFTA  
Bulgaria May 1993 February 1995 balkanFTA  
svFTA  Slovenia July 1997 February 1999 
Estonia January 1995 February 1998 
Lithuania January 1995 February 1998 
CEECsFTA  
balticsFTA  balticsFTA  
Latvia January 1995 February 1998 
Source: Council of the European Union. 
A2.2 Adjusting the Model to a Limited Number of Importing Countries 
For this chapter, the theoretical framework has to be adapted to the case of EU-15 
countries’ imports (countries i) from a worldwide sample of countries (countries j). Say, that 
there exist r other importing countries ∑∑∑
===
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j
j
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r
r countrycountrycountry
111
, whose import 
prices can be described analogously to country i as 
 
rjjrjrj ePtp = . (A2.1) 
 
Under general equilibrium conditions, output in country j must then equal the 
aggregate expenditure spent by countries i and r on varieties produced in j, 
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Making a few mathematical transformations, we can solve for jN  
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Plugging (A2.3) into (4), country i’s imports arise as 
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For our empirical estimation this means that ( )
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 will be absorbed 
in the constant. This is equivalent to assuming (i) a co-movement of the sum of “r” countries’ 
GDPs, average exchange rates and trade costs against j and of the sum of “i” countries’ GDPs, 
average exchange rates and trade costs against j and (ii) a constant world growth. 
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A2.3 Variable List and Definitions 
Table A2.2: List of Variables – Chapter 2 
Variable Definition Source 
ijtM  Yearly imports of country i from country j OECD ITCS 
tjiY )(  Importer and exporter GDP (in current US$) UN NAMAD 
ijtre  Bilateral real exchange rate  UN NAMAD (nom. 
exchange rates), IMF IFS 
(price indices and GDP 
deflators), own 
calculations 
ijD  Great circle distances between the respective trading pairs  CIA World Factbook, 
own calculations based 
on the haversine formula 
ijLL  Dummy = 1 if one and = 2 if both countries in a trading pair are 
landlocked 
CIA World Factbook 
ijB  Dummy controlling for the border length between countries i and 
j 
CIA World Factbook 
ijDEP  Dummy = 1 if country j legally depends on country i CIA World Factbook 
ijCL  Dummy = 1 if the trading partners share a common official 
language 
CIA World Factbook 
ijtEU  Dummy = 1 for EU member states  
itEU  Dummy = 1 for non-EU member states  
ijtFTA  Dummy = 1 for contracting parties for the years following the 
entry into force of the Interim and = 2 for the years following the 
entry into force of the Europe Agreements  
Council of the European 
Union 
itFTA  Dummy = 1 for non-contracting parties for the years following 
the entry into force of the Interim and = 2 for the years following 
the entry into force of the Europe Agreements 
Council of the European 
Union 
its  Share of country i’s GDP in world GDP (in current US$) UN NAMAD 
Note: When available the producer price index has been used for the calculation of the real exchange rate. This 
has been the case for 65 out of 204 countries, among those the ten CEECs. In all other cases we reverted to the 
consumer price index or the GDP deflator. 
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A2.4 The Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition Estimator 
In the first stage the FEVD procedure estimates a standard FE model by conducting a 
within-groups transformation, 
 
ijtijtijt XM εδ ~~~ +=  (A2.5) 
 
which removes the bilateral effects ijμ  and the time-invariant variables ijT . From this, one 
obtains the estimated unit effects ijμˆ , including all time-invariant variables, the overall 
constant term and the mean effects of the time-varying variables. In the second stage, ijμˆ  is 
decomposed into an explained part (by the observed time-invariant and rarely changing 
variables) and an unexplained part ijh , 
 
ijijij hT += λμˆ . (A2.6) 
 
In the last stage, the full model including the residual ijh  from stage two but leaving 
out ijμ  is re-estimated using POLS, 
 
ijtijijijtijt hTXM ευλδα ++++= ˆ . (A2.7) 
 
Hence, if the orthogonality assumption between the time-invariant variables and the 
unobserved bilateral effects is correct, the estimator is consistent. 
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A2.5 Country List 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
American Samoa 
Andorra 
Angola 
Antigua & Bar. 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Aruba 
Australia 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas  
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia-Herz. 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Cayman Islands 
Central Afr. Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo D. Rep. 
Congo Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Faeroe Islands 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
French Polynesia 
Gabon 
Gambia  
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Greenland 
Grenada 
Guam 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong  
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran Islamic Rep. 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea Dem. Rep. 
Korea Rep. 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao PDR 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macao 
Macedonia FYR 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mayotte 
Mexico 
Micronesia  
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
Netherlands Ant. 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
N. Mariana Isl. 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Palau 
Panama 
Papua New G. 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Fed. 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
San Marino 
S. Tome & Pr. 
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Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia-Mont. 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tob. 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Em. 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Virgin Isl. (U.S.) 
W. Bank & Gaza 
Yemen Rep. 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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CHAPTER 3 ENLARGING THE EMU TO 
THE EAST: 
WHAT EFFECTS ON 
TRADE?49 
3.1 Introduction to Chapter 3 
As a result of the European Commission’s convergence report in May 2006, Slovenia 
was the first of the new EU member states to adopt the Euro. Other countries will follow in 
years to come. While research into exchange rate regimes traditionally focused on 
consequences for the macroeconomic performance of countries (see Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 
2002 for an exhaustive overview and Belke and Gros 2002 and Belke and Setzer 2003 for 
labour market effects), a more recent line of research draws attention to the real impacts of 
exchange rate issues (see Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992 and 1998 and Frankel and Rose 
1998 for the effects on business cycle synchronisation). In a controversial but highly 
influential paper, Rose (2000) assessed the contribution of currency unions in promoting 
international trade. His point estimate of a 3.35 times higher trade volume with a common 
currency compared to the baseline scenario without a common currency has been subject to 
much critique. In a recent paper, Baldwin (2006a) summarises follow-up studies and 
specifically points his critique at possible estimation biases related to omitted variables, 
endogeneity and sample selection. 
Among the numerous papers trying to reduce the “Rose effect”, a few deal explicitly 
with the Euro Area. The first studies by Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2002) and Flam and 
 
                                                 
49 This chapter goes in parts back to Belke and Spies (2008). Originally published on www.springerlink.com.  
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Nordstrom (2006a) estimate respectively 6% and 9% more trade among EMU members 
compared to other EU member states.50 Controlling for the general trend of greater economic 
integration among the Euro Area countries over the past five decades, Berger and Nitsch 
(2005) even find that the EMU effect disappears completely. In the most recent study, Bun 
and Klaassen (2007) introduce a time trend and estimate a Euro effect of only 3%. 
However, very few authors point at the trade effects of the forthcoming EMU 
enlargement.51 While trade barriers between the old and new EU member states were already 
removed during the 1990s52, sharing a common currency may further deepen real economic 
integration – directly through reduced trade costs and indirectly through intensified 
competition due to enhanced price transparency. The question as to whether these changes 
have indeed led to an additional geographical restructuring of trade flows, involving trade 
creation and trade diversion, is, however, an empirical one. Empirical findings on intra-EMU 
trade effects of the introduction of the Euro by the CEECs53 are of great interest for politicians 
and for researchers in the field of Optimum Currency Areas (OCAs) at least for two reasons: 
first, they may have important policy implications. If a common currency boosts trade even 
among highly integrated regions, currency unions become more attractive, and hence, the 
ECB and government authorities may encourage applicants to execute all necessary steps for 
an early adoption of the Euro.54 Second, any increase in the Euro Area trade resulting from an 
EMU enlargement provides empirical support for Rose’s finding that establishing a common 
currency stimulates trade among union members substantially. 
This chapter starts by applying a specification that accounts for recent insights into the 
theoretical foundation as well as the appropriate econometric set-up of gravity models. While 
earlier studies only use time-invariant country pair fixed effects to address the price terms, as 
emphasised by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the remaining omitted variable bias is 
corrected for by also incorporating time-variant multilateral resistance to trade.55 As 
suggested by Egger (2002) and Carrère (2006), we apply the HT instrumental variables 
 
                                                 
50 In this chapter, the terms EMU and Euro Area are used as substitutes and refer throughout the chapter to the 
twelve EMU member states that introduced the common currency in 1999 and 2001. 
51 We are only aware of the studies by Maliszewska (2004) and Brouwer, Paap and Viaene (2008) dealing with 
this issue empirically. 
52 Trade and trade-related measures became effective by means of the IAs, ratified between 1992 and 1995 
(compare Chapter 2). 
53 In this chapter, we conceive the CEECs as the group formed by the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania), the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
54 Breuss, Fink and Haiss (2004) discuss the desirability of enlarging the EMU to the East in the context of 
different interpretations of the OCA theory. 
55 Compare Chapter 2 for details on this method. 
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estimator to account for any possible endogeneity of RHS variables, and specifically the EMU 
dummy. Further, we use the FEVD estimator developed by Plümper and Troeger (2007), 
which has – to our knowledge – hardly been applied before in the context of gravity 
modelling.56 Both techniques have the great advantage of allowing for an estimation of the 
traditional time-invariant gravity variables, such as distance and language while controlling 
for the unobserved individual effects in an efficient way. 
Based on the estimates of the early impact of the Euro on intra-EMU imports, this 
chapter aims to assess the implications of the EMU accession of eight CEECs on their share 
in the twelve Euro Area member states’ imports as of end-of-year 2004. Assuming that the 
same relationship between income, distance, common borders and other country 
characteristics and bilateral trade will hold for future EMU member states, we calculate the 
potential import increases following the accession of the CEECs to the Euro Area. The 
predictions based on the parameters estimated out-of-sample suggest that except for the least 
integrated countries, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, all CEECs can expect further gains in the 
EMU-12 import share once they adopt the Euro. 
After developing some stylised facts and linking them to the predictions of the OCA 
theory in Chapter 3.2, the chapter continues with the specification of the gravity equation that 
is going to be tested (Chapter 3.3). Chapter 3.4 contains the description of the applied 
econometric methods and the data set. Chapter 3.5 starts with the presentation of the baseline 
estimation results (Chapter 3.5.1) and proceeds with reporting the trade predictions for an 
enlargement of the Euro Area (Chapter 3.5.2). Chapter 3.6 contains a summary as well as 
policy implications of the obtained results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 Compare Chapter 2 for an application of the FEVD estimator in the context of East-West integration. 
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3.2 Development of Trade Flows and the Role of Monetary Integration 
To give a first intuition of the trade consequences of currency unions, this chapter 
presents some preliminary facts (3.2.1) and links them to the two different versions of OCA 
theory (3.2.2). 
3.2.1 Stylised Facts 
We start with some stylised facts concerning trade flows between the Euro Area and 
the Central and Eastern European EU member countries. For this purpose, Figure 3.1 plots the 
EMU-12 and the EU-15 imports from the CEECs between 1991 and 2004. The figure 
conveys initial empirical evidence of a parallel increase in the import values of the EU-15 and 
the EMU-12 from the CEECs over the past 15 years.57 While there has been a steady rise in 
the import value over the 1990s, one can observe a higher growth rate imminently prior to the 
EU accession of the eight CEECs. 
Figure 3.1: EU and Euro Area Imports from the CEECs 
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Source: Own calculations. Data from OECD. 
Even though most obstacles to free trade have been fully removed, sharing a single 
currency may stimulate real integration further through various channels (see Chapter 3.2.2). 
 
                                                 
57 For reasons of data availability (see Chapter 2.2), we look here at EMU-12 imports from the CEECs. 
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A simple calculation helps to portray the relative change in intra-EMU trade and intra-EU 
trade. To render the sizes of the two geographical regions comparable, the respective yearly 
import values have been normalised with regard to the base year (1997). Taking the quotient 
then allows us to assess relative changes. To be precise, the development of intra-EMU 
imports ( EMUM ) and intra-EU imports ( EUM ) since 1997 has been calculated as follows: 
 
97
97
/
/
EUEUt
EMUEMUt
MM
MM
. (3.1) 
 
Figure 3.2 clearly shows that the increase of intra-EMU imports was over 5% higher 
than the rise in intra-EU imports during the same period. After an initial slowdown in 1999, 
the EMU experienced an especially strong relative increment in 2001, when Greece entered 
the currency union, and in 2003. The graph also suggests an announcement effect, since intra-
EMU imports already increased relative to intra-EU imports in the two years before the 
common currency was formally adopted. 
Figure 3.2: Increase in Intra-EMU Imports Relative to Intra-EU Imports 
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Source: Own calculations. Data from OECD. 
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The crude figure seems to roughly confirm prior studies which provide estimates 
mostly in the range of 5 to 10% (Baldwin 2006a). However, the graph also shows that it is 
crucial to include the most recent year available, since much of the increase in imports has 
only occurred since 2002. 
Seen on the whole, the stylised facts match our a priori expectations well. While the 
imports of the EU-15 and the Euro Area from the CEECs have developed synchronously up 
to now, those EU member states that share a common currency seem to trade relatively more 
with each other than with Denmark, Sweden and the UK. This result at the outset argues in 
favour of a similar development in the case of the EMU accession of the CEECs, thus calling 
for a more formal investigation. 
3.2.2 Optimum Currency Areas and Trade 
The theoretical question as to whether a single currency is beneficial for the 
participating countries dates back to Mundell (1961).58 On the one hand, he proposed that a 
single medium of exchange should reduce transaction costs and thereby facilitate international 
trade. On the other hand, he also stated that a single currency may be problematic in the case 
of coexisting asymmetric shocks and nominal rigidities. He therefore suggested perfect labour 
mobility as an indispensable condition to lowering the stability losses associated with giving 
up monetary independence. Mundell himself challenged his early proposal of a small currency 
union by introducing the foreign exchange market and international risk sharing (Mundell 
1973). In his later model this means that the greater the number of countries involved, the 
better they can mitigate shocks by reserve pooling and portfolio diversification. There are, 
consequently, theoretical arguments speaking in favour of an enlargement of the Euro Area.59 
McKinnon (1963) specifically suggested small open economies as being suitable candidates 
for currency unions. 
Based on the ratio of Euro Area imports over the CEECs’ GDPs, Figure 3.3 gives a 
visual impression of the degree of Euro Area openness of the CEECs in the year 2004. 
 
 
                                                 
58 For a comprehensive discussion, see Breuss, Fink and Haiss (2004) and Gros and Thygesen (1998). 
59 Another strand of arguments points towards the importance of institutional quality. Alesina and Barro (2002) 
show that countries opt into currency unions in order to facilitate trade when participation allows them to 
upgrade the quality of their monetary institutions. 
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Figure 3.3: EMU Openness of the CEECs in 2004 
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Source: Own calculations. Data from OECD and UN. 
In accordance with the traditional OCA theory arguments mentioned above, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary should benefit most from their individual EMU accession 
since the Euro Area displays a high trade exposure towards them. However, the seminal study 
by Frankel and Rose (1998) challenged the OCA textbook view by stressing the possibility of 
endogenous currency unions. They argue that two countries would move even closer to 
matching the OCA criteria once they share a common currency. There are several 
transmission mechanisms that can spur this effect: in addition to the traditional trade cost 
reduction, the efficiency gains studied within the OCA framework also include higher price 
transparency, which stimulates competition and eventually leads to higher trade volumes. 
Finally, one may argue that the EMU and its pro-competitive effects have served as a catalyst 
for structural reforms.60 The cost savings related to monetary integration can be viewed like 
any other reduction of bilateral non-tariff trade barriers. Changes in intra- and extra-EMU 
trade should therefore also be interpreted against the background of trade creation and trade 
diversion. Trade creation implies that lower cost suppliers inside the currency union substitute 
 
                                                 
60 Although there is no obvious link between monetary and institutional integration, one may argue that the 
commitment shown by adopting a common currency may have signalling effects towards greater harmonisation 
in other areas as well. 
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higher cost domestic producers as a result of diminished trade costs. Trade diversion takes 
place when low cost suppliers outside the currency union are replaced by higher cost Euro 
Area producers (Viner 1950).61 
In accordance with the possible ex-post trade effects of currency unions, it seems 
equally apt to argue a priori that the rise of imports due to the adoption of the Euro is expected 
to be higher for countries that have not yet exploited their full trade potential with the EMU-
12 member states. Based on this different variant of OCA theory, Figure 3.3 indicates that 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were, in 2004, relatively less open towards trading with the 
EMU-12 and may therefore expect a bigger trade effect from the Euro. Which view is correct 
is above all an empirical question. The answer is left to the econometric investigation. 
3.3 Empirical Specification 
To disentangle the effects of a single currency from other factors influencing trade 
flows, we estimate a log-linearised reduced-form gravity equation for country i’s imports 
from country j ( ijtM ) of the form 
 
ijtijijijtjtitijt EMUZdreYYM 654321 lnlnlnlnln ββββββα ++++++=
 ijtijtijijijt avEMUavZavdavre εββββ +++++ 10987 lnln  (3.2) 
 
where itY  is the importer’s GDP influencing its import demand and jtY  is the exporter’s GDP 
influencing its export supply.62 ijtre  stands for the real exchange rate of country i’s currency 
vis-à-vis country j’s currency and allows us to control for changes in the value of the currency 
which induce expenditure shifts not directly attributable to the EMU. ijd , the great-circle 
distance between the importing and the exporting country, is generally used as a proxy for 
transportation costs. ijZ  represents a set of dummy variables serving as proxies for additional 
trade costs. To be precise, we consider whether country i or j is landlocked ( ijLL ) and 
whether they share a common border ( ijB ) or language ( ijCL ) as factors hampering or 
 
                                                 
61 For details, see Chapter 1.2.1. 
62 See Table A3.1 in Appendix A3.1 for variable definitions and sources. 
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facilitating trade. By including dummies for EU and EA participation, we additionally control 
for integration efforts other than monetary integration.63 
Finally, ijtEMU  represents a dummy variable measuring the intra-EMU trade effects 
of the single currency. Specifically, the variable captures all transaction cost savings due to 
the eliminated exchange rate uncertainty, namely the absence of exchange controls, foreign 
exchange transactions and currency hedging. It additionally picks up the lower mark-ups 
suppliers are expected to set because of increased competition and higher price transparency. 
As in the trade liberalisation literature, these savings may lead to trade creation inside the 
currency union. Therefore, ijtEMU  is defined to take the value of 1 for both countries of a 
trading pair being EMU members and 0 otherwise. We set this variable equal to 1 in the first 
set of regressions (Table 3.1) – also accounting for a possible announcement effect – over the 
period 1998-2004. In the second set of regressions (Table 3.2), we introduce yearly EMU 
dummies to see in which year the common currency impact was strongest. 
As stated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), bilateral trade does not solely depend 
on bilateral trade costs, but also on the average resistance to trade with the ROW. To account 
for this finding, we introduce the correspondent multilateral term to all variables that facilitate 
or hamper bilateral trade. To be precise, multilateral resistance ( ijMR ) is given by the sum of 
average bilateral resistances ( ijBR ) of countries i (j) towards all trading partners except for the 
specific trading partner j (i). 
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Since the ijtavEMU  variable is supposed to capture the trade effects of the common currency 
on outside countries, it is set to 0 for all EMU member states. If one interprets the saved 
transaction costs of the single currency as a discriminatory liberalisation of trade, it involves a 
trade-diverting switch of supply sources – like in any other Preferential Trade Arrangement 
(PTA). 
 
                                                 
63 The multilateral counterparts of these two variables are defined in the same way as the average EMU dummy. 
CHAPTER 3   ENLARGING THE EMU TO THE EAST: 
WHAT EFFECTS ON TRADE? 
 
68 
The parameter coefficients of the multilateral trade cost variables are expected to take 
the opposite sign of their bilateral counterparts. Hence, the bigger a trading pair’s joint 
resistance to trade with the ROW, the lower the bilateral trade costs relative to the multilateral 
trade costs and the larger country i’s imports from country j. E.g., for the ijtavre  this means 
that, holding the bilateral real exchange rate between country i and country j constant, a 
depreciation of country i’s currency with respect to all other currencies in the sample, leads 
country i to import more from country j.64 Similar arguments apply to the variables ijavd  and 
ijavZ . Since a part of the multilateral variables does not only change from a cross-sectional 
perspective but also over time (e.g. the average exchange rate), we are able to remove those 
biases which are present in studies that only include country (pair) fixed effects to describe 
Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) price terms. To summarise, the expected coefficient 
signs are 
.0,0,0,0
,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
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Finally, we overcome a possible selection bias by including three variables that 
approximate the Heckman correction term: HC1 is a variable containing the number of years 
of a trading pair in the sample while HC2 and HC3 are dummies taking the value of 1 if the 
trading pair is observed over the entire period 1991 to 2004 and if the trading pair is present in 
the sample in t-1, respectively (and 0 otherwise). 
3.4 Estimation Methodology and Data 
The estimations are based on a panel data set containing all countries which were 
members of the OECD over the period 1991 to 2004 – also including those CEECs which 
have already joined (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) – plus Romania and 
Bulgaria and the four CEECs (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia) that have not yet 
become full OECD members. 
 
                                                 
64 Since taking the sum of the average exchange rates of both trading partners would have offsetting effects, we 
consider in this case simply the average exchange rate of country i towards all trading partners except the 
particular trading partner j. 
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The advantages of using panel data in the context of this chapter are straightforward. 
They allow us to capture relevant relationships between variables over time and to monitor 
unobservable country pair individual effects. In column (1), Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the POLS 
estimation of equation (3.2) is displayed as a starting point. Cheng and Wall (2004) 
demonstrate that not controlling for country pair heterogeneity yields biased estimates. In the 
further estimations, the country pair effects are treated as fixed, since the RE model only 
yields consistent estimates when the unobservable bilateral effects are not correlated with the 
error term. The conducted Hausman test, however, rejected the null hypothesis of no 
correlation. The relevant FE regression thus gives unbiased estimates of the coefficients of the 
time-varying variables (reported in column (2) of Tables 3.1 and 3.2). The first drawback of 
this procedure is well known: since the within-groups estimator ignores the between-groups 
variance, estimates for the coefficients of the time-invariant explanatory variables cannot be 
provided. Only very recently, researchers have started discussing a second drawback: 
although coefficients are provided for variables that hardly change over time, the FE absorbs 
most of their explanatory power and estimates of these variables become inefficient (Plümper 
and Troeger 2007). A third problem is related to the possible endogeneity of preferential 
arrangements. Thinking in terms of the traditional OCA theory, this way of reasoning may 
hold for monetary arrangements even to a larger extent than for trade arrangements. Fearing 
the loss of the exchange rate and an autonomous monetary policy as tools to respond to 
external shocks, policy makers might only opt into a currency union when the level of 
integration (here reflected by the level of imports) is already high beforehand.  
We address these problems via two estimation techniques we apply in addition to the 
FE estimator. Both the FEVD estimator and the HT estimator (reported in columns (3) and (4) 
of both tables, respectively) allow for an estimation of time-invariant (e.g. distance) and 
almost time-invariant variables (e.g. the EMU dummy).65 Furthermore, the FEVD estimator 
explicitly addresses the problem of inefficiency. The HT estimator is an instrumental variable 
panel estimator capable of correcting for any bias caused by the mentioned reverse causality. 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 Please find a detailed description of the FEVD estimator in Appendix A2.4 and of the HT estimator in 
Appendix A3.2. 
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3.5 Results 
This chapter starts by estimating equation (3.2) to provide ex-post evidence on the 
effect of the single currency on the intra-EMU-12 imports. The basic regression results on the 
full sample are presented in Chapter 3.5.1, followed by various robustness checks discussed in 
Chapter 3.5.2. The trade predictions of a Euro adoption by the CEECs can be found in 
Chapter 3.5.3. 
3.5.1 Trade Effects of the Euro  
The outputs from the regressions on the full country sample are displayed in Table 3.1, 
columns (1)-(4). In the out-of-sample estimation in column (5), the CEECs were not included 
in the regressions when fitting the model. The full sample estimates in columns (3) and (4) are 
consistent and efficient, so we refer to them when interpreting the results. In the FEVD 
estimation all coefficients, except for the bilateral real exchange rate and the multilateral 
landlocked and border variable, show the expected sign and are highly significant.66 Once the 
correlation between the regressors and the unobservable country pair effects is properly 
accommodated, the HT estimator turns the coefficients of some of the time-invariant variables 
(specifically, the bilateral border, landlocked, common language and the multilateral common 
language variable) insignificant.67 
The estimates of the traditional gravity variables GDP and distance lie within the usual 
range. While a 10% rise in bilateral distance lowers imports by 14.1% (17.5% in the HT 
estimation), the same increase in multilateral distance (or remoteness) induces country i to 
import 9.3% more from a certain trading partner j (14.5% in the HT estimation). The 
unexpected positive sign of the bilateral real exchange rate (a rise of the variable reflects a 
depreciation of the importing country’s currency) may be due to temporarily irreversible 
import contracts and reflect a J-curve effect.68 This effect does not seem to be important on a 
multilateral basis. A 10% depreciation of country i’s currency against all but country j’s 
 
                                                 
66 It is noteworthy that the multilateral common language variable has in the OECD country sample considered 
here the expected negative impact. This finding strengthens the argumentation of Chapter 2.6.1 that in the world 
as a whole, there are numerous common languages facilitating trade at a global level. In this chapter, where due 
to the smaller country sample, world resistance to trade is not accounted for, the reduced multilateral resistance 
exhibits the theoretically predicted negative impact on bilateral imports. 
67 Among others, Egger (2002) finds a similar effect when applying the HT estimator. 
68 Including up to two lags of the exchange rate variable to investigate the possibility of a J-curve effect further 
turns the coefficient of the exchange rate variable and of all of its lags insignificant. The results of this exercise 
are not reported here but can be made available upon request. 
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currency pushes it to import from country j 4.5% more. The other multilateral counterparts of 
the bilateral variables are also significant at the 1%-level in the FEVD regression and indicate 
their relevance for the gravity estimation. 
Table 3.1: Estimation Results with EMU Dummy for the Entire Period (1998-2004) 
Dependent variable: ijtMln  
 POLS FE FEVD HT 
 Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Out-of-sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
itYln  0.88*** 
(0.04) 
0.68*** 
(0.11) 
0.68*** 
(0.01) 
0.68*** 
(0.10) 
0.71*** 
(0.09) 
jtYln  0.89*** 
(0.03) 
0.71*** 
(0.07) 
0.71*** 
(0.00) 
0.71*** 
(0.07) 
0.49*** 
(0.07) 
ijtreln  -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.13*** 
(0.00) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
ijDln  -1.27*** 
(0.11) 
 -1.41*** 
(0.01) 
-1.75*** 
(0.16) 
-1.29*** 
(0.18) 
ijB  -0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
ijLL  -0.16* 
(0.10) 
 -0.23*** 
(0.02) 
-0.15 
(0.13) 
-1.18*** 
(0.17) 
ijCL  0.23* 
(0.12) 
 0.13*** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
0.36** 
(0.16) 
ijtEU  0.08 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
ijtEA  0.16* 
(0.10) 
0.22*** 
(0.06) 
0.22*** 
(0.02) 
0.22*** 
(0.05) 
0.33*** 
(0.07) 
ijtEMU  0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
∑
=
J
j
itreJ 1
1ln  
1.22*** 
(0.41) 
0.45** 
(0.23) 
0.45*** 
(0.10) 
0.45** 
(0.22) 
0.36* 
(0.18) 
ijMRD  0.55*** 
(0.15) 
 0.93*** 
(0.02) 
1.45*** 
(0.23) 
0.76*** 
(0.21) 
ijMRB  0.00*** 
(0.00) 
 0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
ijMRLL  -0.10*** 
(0.03) 
 -0.14*** 
(0.01) 
-0.18*** 
(0.05) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
ijMRCL  -0.02 
(0.26) 
 -0.40*** 
(0.04) 
-0.45 
(0.34) 
0.23 
(0.41) 
itjMREMU  
0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.69*** 
(0.09) 
0.69*** 
(0.04) 
0.69*** 
(0.08) 
0.45*** 
(0.08) 
ijtMREU  -0.74*** 
(0.21) 
-0.22* 
(0.12) 
-0.22*** 
(0.06) 
-0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
ijtMREA  0.34 
(0.23) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
HC1 0.09*** 
(0.03) 
 0.10*** 
(0.00) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.16*** 
(0.05) 
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HC2 0.00 
(0.00) 
    
HC3 -0.18*** 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Observations 5262 5262 5262 5262 4103 
R² 0.89 0.98 0.98 0.83 0.80 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of equation (3.2). The dependent variable is the log of imports of 
the individual EMU-12 countries from OECD and CEE countries between 1991 and 2004. The independent 
variables are as described in Chapter 3.3 and based on the variables listed in Table A3.1 in Appendix A3.1. 
Column (1) reports the pooled OLS, column (2) the panel fixed effects, column (3) the panel fixed effects vector 
decomposition and column (4) the Hausman-Taylor regression results. In column (5), the CEECs are excluded 
from the sample. The R² in columns (3) and (4) is calculated as the squared correlation between the observed and 
the predicted response. Robust standard errors are in parentheses with significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
Source: Own calculations. 
The consistent EMU estimate indicates 7% more imports attributable to savings in 
transaction costs and lower mark-ups. The result is well in line with our preliminary analysis 
(compare Figure 3.2) and amidst the range of estimates found in other post-Rose studies. Bun 
and Klaassen’s (2007) preferred estimate suggests a Euro effect of only 3% more imports. 
However, their use of time-varying trading pair dummies makes it “impossible to estimate 
factors that affect bilateral trade costs even if they are time varying”. (Baldwin and Taglioni 
2006: 23). Indeed, the Euro estimate jumps up to 6% when the authors employ country-
specific time-varying dummies, suggesting that the pair dummies absorb at least some of the 
variation of the EMU variable. The results are also believed to be reliable with an eye on the 
fact that the inclusion of multilateral variables enables us to remove not only the time-
invariant part of the omitted variable bias, but to address additionally the time-varying 
character of Anderson and van Wincoop’s relative price terms. Interestingly enough, the 
significant positive multilateral EMU estimate indicates that the common currency did not 
divert trade from non-members – on the contrary, outside countries profited highly from 
trading with the currency bloc. This result does not come unexpectedly. Many of the 
empirical studies, including Baldwin and Di Nino (2006) and Baldwin (2006b), also find 
significant pro-trade effects of a unilateral Euro usage. The empirical evidence therefore 
suggests that the EMU has so far acted like a unilateral rather than a preferential 
liberalisation.69 This finding contradicts the OCA theory insofar as the latter asks a country to 
give up its monetary autonomy to be able to benefit from the efficiency gains in a currency 
 
                                                 
69 Transitory factors, like the appreciation of the Euro since 2002 or the relative strength of the US and some of 
the Eastern and Asian economies help explain why imports from outside the Euro Area have even grown faster 
than intra-EMU imports over the underlying timeframe, but should already be captured by the exchange rate and 
GDP variables. 
 
3.5 Results 73 
 
 
union (see Chapter 3.2.2). If countries can, however, get better market access without 
sacrificing their main macroeconomic tool then the UK and Denmark took the right decision 
voting against EMU membership. This may have important policy implications for the 
CEECs as well, even though they do not have the possibility to opt out. 
Turning to the regression results with yearly EMU dummies (Table 3.2), conducted 
again for the full country sample in columns (1)-(4) and out-of-sample in column (5), one can 
readily become acquainted with the robustness of the coefficient estimates. Both the FEVD 
and the HT estimator confirm the presumption of an announcement effect. In 1998, the 
prospect of a common currency had already boosted intra-EMU-12 imports by 8%. The 
results further suggest a positive impact of the Euro across all years until 2002, with the 
strongest effect on trade in 2001, the year Greece entered the currency union and one year 
before the physical notes and coins were introduced.70 
In contrast to the descriptive statistics illustrated in Figure 3.2, the formal econometric 
analysis shows that the Euro did not stimulate trade significantly further since 2003. On the 
contrary, the FEVD estimator even yields significant coefficients indicating a negative impact 
of the Euro in last two sample periods. The observation of no further gains for member 
countries in 2003 and 2004 suggests that the Euro’s trade-creating potential has already been 
fully exploited.71 Further efficiency gains may be realised with the accession of new member 
states. 
Generally, the out-of-sample estimates reported in column (5) of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
confirm the sign and magnitude of the full sample regressions. It is noticeable, however, that 
eliminating the CEECs from the control group, the EMU coefficient moves up.72 Hence, the 
current Euro Area member states did not gain as much from introducing the Euro relative to 
the full country sample including the CEECs as compared to the OECD sample without the 
CEECs. 
 
 
                                                 
70 Faruqee (2004) reports 2001 and 2002 as the years with the strongest Euro effect. See Chapter 1.3.2. 
71 Despite the correspondence with the appreciation of the Euro, it would be incorrect to interrelate this period 
with the non-positive 2003 and 2004 EMU estimates. The real exchange rate controls for any expenditure shift 
attributable to exchange rate movements. For the impact of the Euro appreciation on trade, see also the report by 
the European Commission (2007). 
72 The result fully holds when the fixed exchange rate regimes of the CEECs is controlled for by including a 
volatility measure. The results of this exercise are not reported here, but can be made available upon request. 
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results with Yearly EMU Dummies 
Dependent variable: ijtMln  
 POLS FE FEVD HT 
 Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Out-of-sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
itYln  0.88*** 
(0.04) 
0.75*** 
(0.12) 
0.75*** 
(0.01) 
 0.75*** 
(0.11) 
0.74*** 
(0.10) 
jtYln  0.90*** 
(0.03) 
0.75*** 
(0.07) 
0.75*** 
(0.00) 
0.76*** 
(0.07) 
0.53*** 
(0.07) 
ijtreln  -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.13*** 
(0.00) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
ijDln  -1.27*** 
(0.11) 
 -1.38*** 
(0.01) 
-1.68*** 
(0.16) 
-1.27*** 
(0.18) 
ijB  -0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
ijLL  -0.16 
(0.10) 
 -0.20*** 
(0.02) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
-1.14*** 
(0.17) 
ijCL  0.23* 
(0.12) 
 0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.15) 
0.37** 
(0.16) 
ijtEU  0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
ijtEA  0.15 
(0.10) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.02) 
0.23*** 
(0.05) 
0.34*** 
(0.07) 
1998ijEMU  0.24*** 
(0.05) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
1999ijEMU  0.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
2000ijEMU  0.33*** 
(0.06) 
0.15*** 
(0.03) 
0.15*** 
(0.03) 
0.15*** 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.03) 
2001ijEMU  0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.16*** 
(0.03) 
0.16*** 
(0.03) 
0.16*** 
(0.03) 
0.19*** 
(0.03) 
2002ijEMU  0.14** 
(0.06) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
2003ijEMU  0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
2004ijEMU  -0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
∑
=
J
j
itreJ 1
1ln  
1.14*** 
(0.41) 
0.47** 
(0.23) 
0.47*** 
(0.10) 
0.48** 
(0.22) 
0.36* 
(0.19) 
ijMRD  0.54*** 
(0.15) 
 0.82*** 
(0.02) 
1.29*** 
(0.23) 
0.70*** 
(0.21) 
ijMRB  0.00** 
(0.00) 
 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
ijMRLL  -0.10*** 
(0.03) 
 -0.41*** 
(0.04) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
ijMRCL  -0.01 
(0.26) 
 -0.13*** 
(0.01) 
-0.40 
(0.33) 
0.22 
(0.40) 
itjMREMU  0.24** 
(0.12) 
0.63*** 
(0.09) 
0.63*** 
(0.04) 
0.63*** 
(0.08) 
0.42*** 
(0.08) 
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ijtMREU  -0.75*** 
(0.21) 
-0.28** 
(0.13) 
-0.28*** 
(0.06) 
-0.27** 
(0.12) 
-0.02 
(0.13) 
ijtMREA  0.30 
(0.23) 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
HC1 0.09*** 
(0.03) 
 0.09*** 
(0.00) 
0.08* 
(0.05) 
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
HC2 0.00 
(0.00) 
    
HC3 -0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.05** -0.05* 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Observations 5262 5262 5262 5262 4103 
R² 0.89 0.98 0.98 0.85 0.81 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of equation (3.2), but with yearly EMU dummies. Column (1) 
reports the pooled OLS, column (2) the panel fixed effects, column (3) the panel fixed effects vector 
decomposition and column (4) the Hausman-Taylor regression results. In column (5), the CEECs are excluded 
from the sample. The R² in columns (4) and (5) is calculated as the squared correlation between the observed and 
the predicted response. Robust standard errors are in parentheses with significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
3.5.2 Robustness Checks 
In order to place the finding of positive trade effects for non-member states in the 
context of earlier studies, the ijtMREMU  variable is replaced by a traditional (0/1) dummy 
variable, which takes the value of 1 if only one country of the trading pair belongs to the Euro 
Area and 0 otherwise. Table A3.2 in Appendix A3.3 shows the results of this exercise. The 
estimate for the itEMU  dummy broadly confirms the results from Tables 3.1 and 3.2 that 
excluded countries are not harmed by the currency club and that they enjoy, on the contrary, 
even higher increases in exports to the EMU. 
Baldwin (2006a) emphasises the importance of the correct choice of the control group 
in difference-in-difference estimations. Since there are many unobservable factors that cannot 
be controlled for by the econometrician, he argues, the control group should be as close as 
possible to the treatment group. To account for this, in Table A3.3 in Appendix A3.3 the 
sample has been gradually reduced. In column (1), estimations are based on the EU-25 and in 
column (2) on the EU-15 member states. In addition, in column (3), the first two years have 
been taken out in order to avoid disruptions related to a change in data collection by the EU 
(see Baldwin 2006a). First of all, it is important to note that the key gravity variables remain 
stable in sign and significance level. Interestingly and in contrast to the findings by Micco, 
Stein and Ordoñez (2002), the coefficient of the EMU dummy variable moves up once the 
control group is downsized. This result confirms the out-of-sample estimations from Tables 
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3.1 and 3.2 and suggests that the boost in intra-Euro Area imports has been stronger as 
compared to the EU-15 member states than as compared to all OECD countries. The 
observation that the increase in the EMU coefficient is accompanied by a significant negative 
impact of the exchange rate in the reduced samples of columns (2) and (3) may deliver an 
argument for the UK, Denmark and Sweden to think about a Euro adoption. Furthermore, 
even though trade diversion cannot be detected here either, the multilateral EMU variable 
turns out to be insignificant. Against the background of the strong positive influence the 
variable exhibits in column (1), this may give a hint that it is especially the CEECs that 
unilaterally benefit from trading with the common currency area. 
Another point of discussion in the literature is the role of exchange rate volatility in 
such kind of models. The inclusion of a variable measuring exchange rate volatility comes 
along with both virtues and drawbacks. On the one hand, a volatility measure allows 
controlling for the exchange rate regimes the CEECs had up to the end of the covered time 
period. On the other hand, the variable may pick up part of the common currency effect 
otherwise captured by the EMU dummy. As a robustness check, equation (3.2) has been re-
estimated including a bilateral as well as an average exchange rate volatility variable. The 
results are presented in column (1) of Table A3.4. in Appendix A3.3. Contrary to what might 
have been expected, the influence of volatility on trade is significantly positive in this 
sample.73 Increasing the average volatility by one standard deviation around its mean raises 
EMU imports by 3.8%. Also, against previous expectations the average volatility measure is 
significantly negative. To investigate this further, the multilateral resistance terms are omitted 
in column (2). Here, the results indicate no (significant) influence of exchange rate volatility. 
How can this be explained? Interestingly, Clark, Tamirisa and Wei (2004) also find a change 
in coefficient when moving from a simple country pair FE regression to a specification with 
time-varying FE or alternatively, when including the sum of the effective exchange rate 
volatility of the country pairs. They argue that exchange rate volatility is not robust to broader 
aspects of exchange rate volatility, especially those related to multilateral resistance. Although 
the bilateral volatility measure does not exhibit the expected influence on trade, the overall 
 
                                                 
73 Empirical findings on the trade-volatility link are mixed (see e.g. Tenreyro 2004 and Baldwin, Skudelny and 
Taglioni 2005). Clark, Tamirisa and Wei (2004) discuss the possibility that advanced economies with developed 
and liquid foreign exchange markets can more easily hedge against exchange rate risks. When reducing the 
country sample to the EU-15, imports become less associated with volatile exchange rates (the variable is only 
significant at the 10%-significance level and the coefficient drops). The results of this exercise are not reported 
here, but can be made available upon request. 
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impact is still negative (0.28+(-0.34)=-0.06). The Wald test indicates that the multilateral 
variables are jointly significant and hence, the full model is preferred on statistical grounds. 
3.5.3 Trade Effects of the Euro Area Enlargement 
Although some of the insights gained through a downsized sample in the last chapter 
are very useful for evaluating the common currency’s effects, the trade predictions for the 
CEECs in this chapter are based on the full sample and out-of-sample estimates of Tables 3.1 
and 3.2. This is simply for the reason that the average of all OECD countries should be a 
better control group for the “treated” CEECs than the advanced economies of the EU-15. 
When calculating predictions, two approaches of simulation can be distinguished: in 
in-sample predictions the countries under consideration, i.e. the CEECs, are included in the 
regression. This approach is appropriate when the parameters of the CEECs do not 
substantially differ from those of the other OECD member states. The method has been 
subject to critique by Egger (2002) who states that systematic differences between predicted 
and observed trade flows are likely due to a misspecification of the model. An alternative is 
out-of-sample predictions, where the countries under consideration are left out when fitting 
the model. This approach seems justified when the parameters of the two country samples 
differ and was, for that reason, frequently used in the early stages of transition. Methods using 
FE bear limitations when it comes to the calculation of out-of-sample trade flow predictions. 
Much information needed to predict accurately EMU imports from the CEECs is contained in 
the country pair-specific terms. The determination of this term for the countries not included 
in the sample when fitting the model is arbitrary. This problem can be circumvented by 
applying the HT estimator, which is, hence, used for the further analysis. 
In order to predict the impact of EMU accession for the CEECs based on the full 
sample as well as out-of-sample, two scenarios are constructed and investigated over the time 
frame 1991-2004. In the baseline scenario we predict the EMU-12 imports from the CEECs in 
a world without the Euro while in the counterfactual scenario, we base our import predictions 
on the estimated model controlling for the EMU. In order to measure the EMU impact 
correctly, a few adjustments have to be made: in the counterfactual scenario, the bilateral and 
the multilateral EMU variables take the value of 1 and 0, respectively. In addition to this, we 
adjust the real exchange rate variable, such that from the time of the Euro adoption only real 
changes are allowed whereas the nominal exchange rate is held constant. Under the 
assumption that the same relation between the explanatory variables and imports will also 
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hold for future EMU members, we take the coefficients from the fitted model and apply these 
to the CEEC dataset. To be precise, by using the saved parameter estimates from the 
estimation based on the full country sample (columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.3) and from the 
estimation based on the country sample excluding the CEECs (columns (3) and (4) in Table 
3.3) and combining these with the observations on the CEECs, we obtain the corresponding 
values for the import variable. Comparing the 2004 simulations on EMU-12 imports of the 
baseline (without the Euro) with the counterfactual scenario (with the Euro), we obtain a 
prediction of the extent to which a future EMU accession of the CEECs will further stimulate 
trade. 
Table 3.3: Euro Impact in 2004 
Estimations based on  the full country 
sample 
Estimations based on non-CEEC 
country sample (Out-of-sample) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
in % in bns US$ in % in bns US$ 
Czech Republic 1.34 0.38 10.91 1.37 
Estonia 18.54 0.30 20.16 0.75 
Hungary 17.75 2.1 40.75 2.04 
Latvia -21.59 -0.60 -19.93 -1.29 
Lithuania -15.26 -0.57 -8.78 -0.65 
Poland -34.24 -13.74 -19.00 -8.13 
Slovak Republic -4.39 -0.31 11.21 0.43 
Slovenia 52.12 4.23 66.51 8.34 
Note: This table presents the results of the full sample and out-of-sample predictions based on the regression 
results of columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.1, respectively. The table entries display the cumulated imports of the 
Euro Area from a specific CEEC as listed in column (1). The differences are calculated as the result of the 
counterfactual scenario with Euro minus the result of the baseline scenario without Euro. The percentages are 
calculated as the percentage change between the counterfactual and the baseline scenario. 
Source: Own calculations. 
Table 3.3 shows the results of the calculation of the impact of introducing the Euro in 
eight CEECs. The figures represent the additional cumulative EMU-12 imports from them. 
The full sample estimation indicates that EMU membership will boost EMU-12 imports from 
four CEECs beyond the level attained through their EU accession – however, Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovakia cannot expect further gains when adopting the Euro.74 Given the 
results for the multilateral EMU dummy variable of Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the relative low or 
even negative impact of the Euro adoption for some countries does not come as a surprise. 
 
                                                 
74 This result is in contrast to a study by Maliszewska (2004), who finds – based on a POLS model – positive 
impacts of the Euro throughout. 
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Since trade is not diverted from third countries – on the contrary, they benefited even more 
from the common currency area – the passage to full EMU membership may, in this setting, 
have a negative effect on their performance. 
Figure 3.4 reports the results of the same exercise with yearly EMU dummies. As the 
coefficients in Table 3.2 indicate, the Euro effect reaches its peak two to three years after the 
introduction of the common currency. After that, the curves follow a flat or even falling 
course for all CEECs with a continuous negative performance for Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland. 
Figure 3.4: Euro Impact – Yearly Dummies 
-1
00
-5
0
0
50
-1
00
-5
0
0
50
-1
00
-5
0
0
50
1998 2000 2002 2004
1998 2000 2002 2004 1998 2000 2002 2004
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary
Latvia Lithuania Poland
Slovak Republic Slovenia
Full sample
Out-of-sample
E
ur
o 
im
pa
ct
 in
 %
year
 
Note: This figure shows the results of the full sample and out-of-sample predictions based on the regression 
results of columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.2, respectively. For each CEEC, the lines display the evolution of the 
Euro impact between 1998 and 2004. 
Source: Own calculations. 
Comparing these results with the fitted models in columns (4) and (5) from Tables 3.1 
and 3.2, the higher out-of-sample predictions (i.e., those based on parameter estimates gained 
from a country sample which does not include the CEECs) in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.4 are not 
surprising. The Euro impact for current Euro Area member states is estimated to be higher, 
when the CEECs are excluded from the control group. In Table 3.3, Slovakia is additionally 
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found to benefit from adopting the Euro through an 11% gain in EMU-12 imports. The 
overall performance of the CEECs is also slightly better: while the simple average of the out-
of-sample estimates yields a gain in EMU-12 imports of 12.7%, the full sample calculation 
predicts only a 1.8% increase on average.75 The trade-weighted averages report a slightly 
lower Euro effect of 12.4% and -2.8% for the out-of-sample and the full sample calculations, 
respectively.76 The illustrated predictions in Figure 3.4 confirm the calculations based on the 
results reported in Table 3.3.77 
The finding that countries with a higher share in EMU-12 imports have to settle for a 
lower Euro effect may, at first sight, contradict the old OCA theory; however, one has to keep 
in mind that trade integration should be related to country size as done in Figure 3.3. Table 
3.3 and Figure 3.4 give some intuition with respect to the hypothesis that the EMU impact is 
higher for well-integrated economies. The negative prediction for the less-open Polish, 
Latvian and Lithuanian economies in both regressions clearly speaks in favour of the validity 
of the classical OCA theory. In contrast, the simulation results for the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, the countries with the highest imports-over-GDP ratios reveal a relatively low EMU 
impact and strengthen, therefore, the validity of the OCA endogeneity hypothesis (compare 
Figure 3.3). 
To elucidate this further, we also investigate the issue on a more formal level. For this 
purpose, we conduct a statistical Spearman rank correlation analysis of the relation between 
the rank order of the CEECs concerning trade openness in 2004 and the rank order of these 
countries with respect to their fictitious gains from adopting the Euro in 2004 (Table 3.4). The 
first two rows represent the correlation when the EMU is set over the whole period the last 
two rows correspond to the predictions with yearly EMU dummies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Note that the growth effects due to the introduction of the Euro are long-run equilibrium effects and not annual 
growth rates. 
76 We used the 2004 share of each CEEC in total EMU-12 imports from all CEECs as weights. 
77 Given these findings, a deeper analysis of the characteristics of the CEECs and the other non-EMU-12 OECD 
member states would be needed to finally evaluate the appropriateness of the control group when the EMU-12 
countries are treated. Such an exercise would include a close look at geographical, demand and supply, trade 
costs and other conditions and goes beyond the scope of this analysis. However, although the points of critique 
on in-sample and out-of-sample approaches discussed above limit the detail of the conclusions, the out-of-
sample results head in the same direction as the full sample estimation. 
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Table 3.4: Spearman Rank Correlation between Openness and EMU Effect 
  Full sample Full sample excl. CEECs (Out-of-sample) 
  (1) (2) 
2004 0.45 0.55 EMU dummy 
1991-2004 0.54*** 0.54*** 
2004 0.47 0.67** Yearly EMU dummies 
1991-2004 0.56*** 0.57*** 
Note: This table presents the results of the Spearman rank correlation analysis between the CEECs’ trade 
openness and their predicted gains from the Euro adoption. Column (1) reports the results based on the full 
sample estimation, column (2) reports the results of the out-of-sample estimation. In rows (1) and (2), the EMU 
dummy is set equal to one for the whole period, in rows (3) and (4), yearly EMU dummies are introduced. The 
respective first rows give the results for 2004, the respective second rows give the results for the whole period 
1991-2004. Significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
For both the full country sample and the out-of-sample scenario, we do not find a 
significant relationship with the exception of yearly EMU dummies in the out-of-sample 
estimations (see row (1) and row (3) in Table 3.4). Only by calculating the rank correlation 
coefficient over the entire time span (1991-2004) do we find a significant positive relation 
between the CEECs’ openness and their gain in the EMU’s import share. Hence, there is some 
evidence that a high degree of openness beforehand determines a positive trade impact of 
EMU membership. This result does not only give support to the traditional OCA theory, but 
also has important implications for the timing of the CEECs’ accession to the Euro Area. 
While the open economies should opt for an early introduction of the single currency, Poland, 
Latvia and Lithuania may prefer to concentrate first on stronger real integration. 
3.6 Conclusions of Chapter 3 
This chapter’s motivation has been twofold: first, it attempted to address all the 
commonly accepted mistakes in gravity estimation to obtain unbiased currency effects on 
trade. Using the HT estimator the possibility of reverse causality between membership in a 
currency bloc and the import value was taken into account. By including multilateral time-
variant variables we corrected for the omitted variable bias present in earlier studies that only 
rely on country pair FEs. Finally, with the proxies for the Heckman correction term, we 
addressed the possibility of selection bias. With this specification, we obtained a point 
estimate for the EMU dummy of 0.07, much lower than Rose’s result but well in line with 
Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2002) and Flam and Nordstrom (2006a).  
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Second, the procedure allows us to derive some policy implications. As the yearly 
EMU estimates for 2003 and 2004 indicate that the Euro did not contribute to any increase in 
imports in these years, it seems that the EMU-12 has already exhausted its trade-creating 
potential. The important announcement effects appear to have been consumed to a large 
extent by now without many further gains to be expected. For the EMU candidates, it might 
be worthwhile noting that these announcement effects could also be reversed again if EMU 
membership were suddenly not be implemented. On the one hand, this fact may deliver an 
argument for current members to opt for a quick entry of the CEECs, once they have fulfilled 
the Maastricht criteria, although their importance for the EMU-12 is by far lower than the 
other way around. On the other hand, the Spearman rank correlation suggests that gains from 
EMU membership are larger if openness towards the Euro Area was substantial beforehand. 
The predictions finally indicate that the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary (as well 
as Slovakia in the out-of-sample estimation) can expect further gains in the EMU-12 import 
share once they adopt the Euro. Therefore, these countries, too, may put efforts into fulfilling 
the accession criteria in the near future. The fact that outside countries even benefit more from 
trading with a currency union suggests that the less-open economies, Poland, Latvia and 
Lithuania, may do better not to enter the EMU in the near future. 
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A3 Appendix 
A3.1 Variable List and Definitions 
Table A3.1: List of Variables – Chapter 3 
Variable Definition Source 
ijtM  Yearly imports of country i from country j (in current US$) OECD ITCS 
tjiY )(  Importer and exporter GDP (in current US$) UN NAMAD 
ijtre  Bilateral real exchange rate in price quotation UN NAMAD (nom. 
exchange rates), IMF IFS 
(producer price index) 
ijtvol  
Standard deviation of the first differences of the logs of monthly 
nominal bilateral exchange rates  
IMF IFS 
ijD  Great circle distance between the two countries of a trading pair  CIA World Factbook 
(latitudes and 
longitudes), own 
calculations based on the 
haversine formula 
ijLL  Dummy = 1 for one country and = 2 for both countries of the 
trading pair being landlocked 
CIA World Factbook 
ijB  Dummy controlling for the length of a common border CIA World Factbook 
ijCL  Dummy controlling for the number of common official languages CEPII 
ijtEMU , 
ijtEU , ijtEA  
Dummy = 1 for both countries of a trading pair being EMU, EU 
or EA members  
 
A3.2 The Hausman and Taylor Estimator 
By using instrumental variables to address the problem of correlation of the 
unobservable bilateral effects with some of the explanatory variables (as detected by the 
Hausman test), the estimator additionally allows us to control for potential endogeneity biases 
caused by RHS variables. In an RE model of the form 
 
ijtijijijijtijtijt TTXXM εμλλδδ +++++= 22112211   (A3.1) 
 
ijtX 1  and ijT1  are 11 k×  and 11 g×  vectors of observations on exogenous variables and 
ijtX 2  and ijT2  are 21 k×  and 21 g×  vectors of observations on endogenous variables, causing a 
bias in the standard RE estimation. Hausman and Taylor (1981) therefore propose the use of 
information already contained in the model to instrument the endogenous variables. In the 
CHAPTER 3   ENLARGING THE EMU TO THE EAST: 
WHAT EFFECTS ON TRADE? 
 
84 
first step, the consistent 1δ  and 2δ  are used to obtain the within residuals. Regressing these 
on ijT1  and ijT2 , using ijtX 1  and ijT1  as instruments, yields intermediate, even though 
consistent estimates of 1λ  and 2λ . With the two sets of residuals (within and overall) it is 
possible to estimate the variance components, which are used to perform the General Least 
Squares (GLS) transform. The model is identified as long as 21 gk ≥ . Since the estimator is 
consistent but not efficient, we correct the variance-covariance matrix at this stage by using 
standard errors that are robust to arbitrary autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The HT 
estimator is then obtained by 
 
ijtijijijijtijtijt TTXXM εμλλδδ ((((((( +++++= 22112211  (A3.2) 
 
using ijtX 1
~ , ijtX 2
~ , ijtX 1 , ijtX 2  and ijT1  as instruments, where ω(  represents the GLS transform 
of a variable, ω  stands for the within-groups mean and ω~  for the within transform of a 
variable ω . 
The selection of variables included in ijtX 2  and ijT2  is not straightforward. We follow 
the proposition by Hausman and Taylor (1981) and use economic intuition.78 First, and in 
response to the critique by Baldwin (2006a), we treat the dummy variables for membership in 
a preferential arrangement as endogenous, including the variable reflecting EMU 
membership. In reference to the possibility of export-led growth, a second source of 
endogeneity bias may stem from the exporter’s GDP variable. Its simultaneous 
instrumentation with the bilateral exchange rate variable improves the model so much that the 
over-identification test can no longer reject the null hypothesis of the orthogonality conditions 
being satisfied (the instruments are valid) ( 56.1)11(2 =χ ). However, we find that 
instrumenting the importer’s GDP variable improves the model further and fully eliminates 
the endogeneity bias. 
 
                                                 
78 The validity of the instruments can be tested. When the null hypothesis of ∑
=
∞→ =
n
i
ijijtn Xn
p
1
1 0,
1lim μ  and 
∑
=
∞→ =
n
i
ijijn Tn
p
1
1 0,
1lim μ  cannot be rejected, ijtX 1 and ijT1  are uncorrelated with the random effect ijμ  and no 
further instrumentation is needed. 
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In the respective robustness check, the exchange rate volatility may also induce an 
endogeneity bias. On the one hand countries hedge against exchange rate risks to increase 
bilateral trade, on the other hand a higher trade volume encourages authorities to take 
measures against currency fluctuations. Indeed, the instrumentation of the volatility measures 
is necessary since the over-identification test can no longer reject the null hypothesis of non-
systematic difference between the FE and the HT estimator ( 10.0)13(2 =χ ).79 
A3.3 Robustness Checks 
Table A3.2: Trade Diversion Dummy 
Dependent variable: ijtMln  
 TD dummy 
itYln  0.69*** 
(0.11) 
jtYln  0.71*** 
(0.07) 
ijtreln  0.13** 
(0.06) 
ijtEU  0.03 
(0.05) 
ijtEA  0.21*** 
(0.06) 
ijtEMU  0.06** 
(0.03) 
itEMU  0.22*** 
(0.03) 
∑
=
J
j
itreJ 1
1ln  
0.47** 
(0.23) 
ijtMREU  -0.23* 
(0.12) 
ijtMREA  -0.09 
(0.11) 
HC3 -0.03 
(0.03) 
Observations 5262 
R² 0.98 
Note: This table presents estimation results based on the panel fixed effects estimator. The regression includes a 
trade diversion dummy instead of a multilateral EMU variable. Time-invariant variables are included in the 
regressions, but not reported. The full list of variables is as in Table 3.1. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses with significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
                                                 
79 Since the instrumentation of the trade cost variables could not further improve the model, the time-invariant 
HC1 variable is treated as endogenous. 
 
CHAPTER 3   ENLARGING THE EMU TO THE EAST: 
WHAT EFFECTS ON TRADE? 
 
86 
Table A3.3: Reduced Sample 
Dependent variable: ijtMln  
 EU-25 EU-15 EU-15, t>1992 
 (1) (2) (3) 
itYln  0.56*** 
(0.16) 
0.46*** 
(0.10) 
0.47*** 
(0.11) 
jtYln  0.84*** 
(0.13) 
0.67*** 
(0.11) 
0.63*** 
(0.13) 
ijtreln  0.08 
(0.30) 
-0.73*** 
(0.19) 
-0.62*** 
(0.22) 
ijtEU  0.08 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
ijtEA  0.10 
(0.08) 
  
ijtEMU  0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
∑
=
J
j
itreJ 1
1ln  
0.39 
(0.35) 
0.85*** 
(0.19) 
0.63** 
(0.26) 
itjMREMU  0.86*** 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
ijtMREU  0.27 
(0.20) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
-0.01 
(0.18) 
ijtMREA  0.05 
(0.18) 
0.17 
(0.11) 
0.25** 
(0.12) 
HC3 -0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
Observations 3209 2050 1810 
R² 0.98 0.99 0.99 
Note: This table presents estimation results based on the panel fixed effects estimator. The dependent variable is 
the log of imports of the individual EMU-12 countries from the EU-25 countries (column (1)) and the EU-15 
countries (column (2)) between 1991 and 2003 and from the EU-15 countries between 1993 and 2003 (column 
(3)). Time-invariant variables are included in the regressions, but not reported. The full list of variables is as in 
Table 3.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses with significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
level.  
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table A3.4: Exchange Rate Volatility 
Dependent variable: ijtMln  
 FE FE w/o MR 
 (1) (2) 
itYln  0.69*** 
(0.11) 
0.68*** 
(0.10) 
jtYln  0.68*** 
(0.07) 
0.89*** 
(0.08) 
ijtreln  0.14** 
(0.06) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
ijtvol  0.28*** 
(0.10) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
ijtEU  0.04 
(0.05) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
ijtEA  0.28*** 
(0.06) 
0.32*** 
(0.06) 
ijtEMU  0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
∑
=
J
j
itreJ 1
1ln  
0.42* 
(0.23) 
 
ijtMRvol  -0.34*** 
(0.10) 
 
itjMREMU  0.78*** 
(0.09) 
 
ijtMREU  -0.28** 
(0.13) 
 
ijtMREA  -0.17 
(0.11) 
 
HC3 -0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Observations 5114 5114 
Wald test 20.66***  
R² 0.98 0.98 
Note: This table presents estimation results based on the panel fixed effects estimation. In addition to the list of 
variables as in Table 3.1, exchange rate volatility is included, measured as the standard deviation of the first 
differences of the logs of monthly nominal bilateral exchange rates. Column (1) is with multilateral terms, 
column (2) excludes multilateral terms. Time-invariant variables included in the regressions, but not reported. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses with significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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CHAPTER 4 NETWORK AND BORDER 
EFFECTS: WHERE DO 
FOREIGN 
MULTINATIONALS 
LOCATE IN GERMANY? 
4.1 Introduction to Chapter 4 
The reunification of the formerly separated Eastern and Western German states in 
1990 entailed exceptional interregional differences within one country. Today, almost 20 
years after the fall of the Berlin wall, a huge rift persists along various characteristic lines: low 
productivity, high unemployment and low network effects keep drawing down the 
attractiveness of the East German federal states for private investment in general, and for FDI 
in particular. Over the period 1997-2005, only around 10% of all MNE affiliates were 
established in East Germany, half of which in Berlin. Buch and Toubal (2008) confirm a low 
integration of East Germany into international markets with respect to trade and migration as 
well. Although these measures report a considerable dispersion also across West German 
federal states, it seems fair to state that multinational activity has not yet contributed to 
closing the East-West gap. 
In response to the NEG framework by Krugman (1991), a range of empirical studies 
emerged investigating the regional and urban determinants in the location decisions of firms 
(e.g. Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli 2004 for France; Barrios, Görg and Strobl 2006 for 
Ireland and Basile 2004 for Italy). In Germany, media and academic research have been 
heavily concerned with firms shifting their production facilities to low cost countries while 
staying comparably silent about the determinants and effects of inward FDI. Although recent 
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papers find a significant positive impact of inward FDI on domestic firms (e.g. Arndt and 
Mattes 2008) and on the local economy (e.g. Bitzer and Görg 2008), there exists – to the best 
of my knowledge – no study investigating the regional determinants of the location choices of 
foreign multinationals in Germany. 
In accordance with advances in location choice theory, this chapter adopts a 
monopolistic competition framework and assumes that a firm decides for a certain location if 
the achievable profits outweigh the profits that can be gained in all other available locations 
(for similar approaches compare also Head and Mayer 2004; Inui, Matsuura and Poncet 2007 
and Mayer, Méjean and Nefussi 2007). Among the variables influencing a firm’s profit, the 
fixed costs of market entry have often been ignored. Most studies that are based on a NEG 
framework refrain from specifying this term of the profit function despite the notion of 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) that the fixed costs of establishing an affiliate abroad 
involve a plant- and a country-(or region-)level part. As shown by Fujita and Thisse (1996), 
the location choice of an MNE might depend crucially on information spillovers arising from 
industry clusters. Although the authors originally thought of spillovers as improving the 
production function, they can – if specific to each German federal state – drive a wedge 
between the entry costs into the potential markets. In addition to network effects, adjacency to 
the source country may drive down fixed costs through information advantages. Thus, if fixed 
costs are a decisive parameter for market entry of foreign multinationals and vary across 
German federal states, they might explain part of the regional dispersion of the locations of 
MNEs’ affiliates. Hence, this chapter lays some importance on identifying these costs. 
The fixed costs specification through nation clusters and common borders suggests 
that the determinants of inward FDI vary among investors from different countries of origin 
as well as across sectors. Recent studies support a more differentiated examination of MNE 
activity. In particular, the distinct role of trade affiliates (as opposed to foreign production 
plants or to other export modes) has called a lot of attention in the theoretical (compare 
Krautheim 2007 and Felbermayr and Jung 2008) and the empirical literature (Hanson, 
Mataloni and Slaughter 2001). Interregional differences may, consequently, also translate into 
a distinct sectoral composition of multinational activity. 
This chapter aims at explaining the regional dispersion of foreign multinationals’ 
affiliates by exploiting the firm-level Micro database Direct Investment (MiDi) of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. The MiDi is a full sample survey of foreign firms’ affiliates in 
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Germany.80 Merging the FDI data at the level of individual affiliates with information on 
German federal states extracted from the Federal Statistical Office gives a very rich database 
that allows assessing the impact of the theoretically derived regional drivers of inward FDI. 
The conditional logit and the nested logit model are employed to estimate the relative 
probability with which a multinational investor chooses a certain location. By relaxing the 
restrictive Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption the nested logit is able to 
account for expected differences between East and West German federal states as location 
alternatives. 
The analyses of Chapter 4 add to the existing literature in three aspects: first, the 
combination of FDI data at the affiliate-level with regional data at the level of German federal 
states allows for a thorough assessment of the determinants of location choices of MNEs 
within Germany. Second, by explicitly modelling the fixed costs of firm entry, a border 
dummy and agglomeration variables are formally included into the empirical set-up. Third, 
the empirical evidence equips policy makers with useful information on how to attract MNEs 
in general and MNEs that have specific home countries and that operate within certain 
sectors. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Chapter 4.2 lays out the theoretical model which 
motivates the empirical specification. Chapter 4.3 describes the estimation strategy with the 
conditional logit (Chapter 4.3.1) and the nested logit (Chapter 4.3.2) model. After presenting 
some descriptive statistics on the dependent variable in Chapter 4.4.1, the independent 
variables are explained in Chapter 4.4.2. Chapter 4.5 discusses the results of the empirical 
examination. Chapter 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Theoretical Background 
Multinational firms face a set of location options when deciding to undertake an 
investment abroad. The selection of a particular location depends on the potential profits 
associated with that location exceeding the potential profits associated with all other available 
locations. This chapter follows Redding and Venables (2004), Amiti and Javorcik (2008) and 
Mayer, Méjean and Nefussi (2007) in adopting a Dixit-Stiglitz-type monopolistic competition 
 
                                                 
80 Investments below a certain threshold do not need to be reported. Since 2002, this threshold corresponds to a 
balance sheet total up to and including three million €. 
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model and extends it with regard to the specification of fixed costs and internal market access. 
The total profits of a single representative firm located in region i but selling in all potential 
markets j can be described as81 
 
[ ]∑ −−−=Π
j
ikijijiijii fxcpt ))(1( φ  (4.1) 
 
with ijp  representing the prices to which the firm sells its output ijx  in the j available 
markets. The firm’s profits are reduced by the taxes it  a firm has to pay in region i, by the 
marginal costs of production βα iii rwc =  (with labour and land as the two production factors 
and wages and land rents as their prices), by the iceberg-type transport costs ijφ  and by the 
sunk fixed costs of the investment, ikf . According to Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), 
fixed costs are higher for foreign than for domestic firms, because the former face an 
informational disadvantage when entering a new market.82 The fixed costs 
 
σσ −−= 1
1
1 )( iikik ZNf  (4.2) 
 
depend on the inverse of the costs of entry into a foreign market iZ  and on the costs of 
duplicating overhead production ikN . Variables in iZ  are region- and origin country specific, 
whereas the number of firms, ikN , may also vary among industries (the index of the source 
country is omitted for the sake of simplicity). Both variables are assumed to reduce the 
informational disadvantage of foreign firms and facilitate thereby the entry into a specific 
market i.83 In line with the propositions of Fujita and Thisse (1996) (compare Chapter 1.2.4), 
ikN  is an agglomeration variable that entails spillovers among firms from the same sector and 
 
                                                 
81 Firm heterogeneity with respect to location choice cannot be assessed with the available information in the 
MiDi. For this reason, the simple model assumes one representative firm. 
82 In contrast to the proximity-concentration literature, firms have to cover fixed costs only when setting up an 
additional affiliate abroad; exporting the output to any other market is only subject to variable transport costs. 
83 A high number of firms in an industry also reflects low plant-level economies of scale. This interpretation 
corresponds more closely to Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple’s definition of the plant-level part of fixed costs. 
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the same country of origin. In the present set-up, a high elasticity of substitution )1( >σσ  and 
thus, intense competition will, however, reduce each firm’s willingness to share information 
with new entrants. Hence, the positive externalities among firms in a certain location decrease 
with σ . 
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is the effective demand level for the products sold by an affiliate on all potential markets 
depending positively on the expenditure shares iE  and lE  and negatively on the mill price 
ip . It is assumed that a multinational firm can either sell its output in the chosen region i or in 
all other regions L (l ∈ L), but not abroad. In either case, goods face iceberg-type trade costs 
)( ilii φφ  before reaching their final destination. With the underlying demand curve, a firm will 
charge the prices 
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in the home market i and in all other markets L respectively; the mark-up over the marginal 
costs depending negatively on the elasticity of substitution. A few mathematical 
transformations lead to the following testable equation 
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which motivates the following log-linear empirical specification where variables are allowed 
to vary over time 
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Equation (4.6) subsumes the demand and the price indices into an internal and an 
external market access variable ( itMA  and ltMA ). It also includes region dummies to account 
for unobserved heterogeneity among location alternatives such as the competition intensity 
σ . 
Although equation (4.6) describes the profits of a representative firm, the magnitude of 
the independent variables may in fact vary for investors from different countries and operating 
in different sectors. In an empirical paper, Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2001) emphasise 
that the motives underlying the establishment of wholesale and manufacturing affiliates differ 
and propose, therefore, a distinction of distribution- and production-related FDI activities. In 
this spirit, Krautheim (2007) shows that the decision between various entry modes (in 
particular, these are exports and FDI through wholesale affiliates or through production 
plants) depends on their distinct cost structures. Although the present analysis assumes that 
the fundamental investment decision has already been taken, and that the only choice that has 
to be made is the affiliates’ location, a sectoral view seems appropriate. A simple 
discrimination of manufacturing from service industries misses out the specific role of 
wholesalers and retailers. In line with Defever (2006), this study additionally distinguishes 
upstream and downstream activities. Downstream activities correspond to the post-production 
distributional activities of wholesalers and retailers. Upstream activities subsume the pre-
production stage activities of R&D centres and headquarters. Weichenrieder and Mintz (2007) 
argue that, apart from taxes, the economically efficient bundling of activities in one country 
motivates the existence of holdings. In this sense, holdings act as local or third country 
headquarters and can be perceived as undertaking upstream activities. Despite of the notion of 
Weichenrieder and Mintz (2007), their classification as a pre-production service is at best an 
approximation of upstream activities. In fact, their heterogeneous nature would require a more 
detailed information about actual occupations and tasks for which data is not available in the 
MiDi. 
In sum, in the profit-maximising location choice of a firm, this chapter assumes fixed 
costs to play a predominant role. The adopted specification assumes that existing firm 
networks and adjacency to the country of origin mitigate the information disadvantages of 
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foreign over domestic firms and facilitate thereby the entry into a specific regional market. As 
such, the determinants are expected to vary across different source countries and across 
sectors. Against the background of the recently raising interest in occupational and sectoral 
differences in firm internationalisation, manufacturing and services and upstream and 
downstream activities will separately be examined. 
4.3 Empirical Methodology 
After formally deriving a testable equation, the identified push and pull factors with a 
special focus on the fixed costs of market entry will be assessed empirically. To this end, the 
following chapter introduces the econometric concepts of the conditional (4.3.1) and the 
nested logit model (4.3.2). Both estimation procedures fit the present questions particularly 
well since they allow presenting the choice of a certain location as the profit maximising 
decision of a multinational firm. 
4.3.1 The Conditional Logit Model 
While the actual profits associated with each location cannot be observed, information 
about the location choice and regional characteristics is available. The derived observable and 
unobservable variables (compare equation (4.6)) influence the profit of each alternative 
location and therefore the probability to invest in region i. The firm-level database MiDi 
contains information about the federal state, in which an MNE’s affiliate is located, about its 
sector and the source country of the investment. Since it does not contain any information 
about the foreign mother, the location choice is assumed to be made upon regional 
characteristics only (for a more detailed description of the dependent and explanatory 
variables see Chapter 4.4). The conditional (fixed effects) logit model resembles well a firm’s 
location decision in a particular market by estimating the relative probability of choosing a 
certain location i in dependence of its own characteristics ix  and of the characteristics lx  of 
all alternative locations L (see e.g. Train 2003 for a detailed description), 
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The iid error terms follow an extreme value distribution which ensures the somewhat 
restrictive IIA property. Equation (4.7) reveals that the ratio of probabilities of investing in 
two locations is independent of the characteristics of the other alternatives. Hence, all 
alternatives exhibit the same degree of substitutability. This assumption is likely to be 
violated with data on location decisions in Germany since the motives for undertaking a direct 
investment in different regions could differ. E.g., investors may take advantage of the 
persistent gap between Eastern and Western federal states to pursue differing strategies with 
affiliates in the two regions. Hence, it seems apt to assume that these investors do not perceive 
all German federal states as being equal substitutes one to another. If this assumption was 
true, the standard conditional logit model would, due to its IIA property, underestimate the 
probability of investing in some states and overestimate the probability of investing in other 
states. Although region-specific fixed effects help to mitigate unobserved correlations among 
alternatives, the strategy is costly and does not resolve problems associated with cross-
sectoral, cross-country or inter-temporal differences in the perceived attractiveness of German 
federal states (see Chapter 4.5.1 for a discussion). 
4.3.2 The Nested Logit Model 
The restrictive IIA property inherent to the conditional logit model calls for a more 
flexible approach that allows for at least some correlation of the error terms. The nested logit 
model relaxes the IIA assumption by partitioning the set of alternatives into subsets. Within 
the specified nests, the unobserved factors iε  are allowed to be correlated while independence 
continues to hold across nests. A plausible nesting structure for the present analysis is the 
division of the entire set of alternatives into Eastern and Western federal states. Investors 
choose then between East and West Germany in the upper level and between regions within 
the two subsets in the lower level model.84 The probability of choosing region i then depends 
on the product of two probabilities: the probability of choosing region i conditional on having 
decided for nest n ( niP | ) times the marginal probability of choosing nest n ( nP ). This can 
formally be expressed as 
 
 
                                                 
84 The division into an upper and a lower level decision does not imply a sequential decision making process. 
Even when investors have decided for a certain nest, they still have some probability to choose a region from 
another nest, although this probability decreases in the preference towards the chosen nest. 
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where ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∑
∈ni
n xIV )exp(ln lnγ is called the Inclusive Value (IV) and gives the expected profit 
an average investor receives from choosing a location i within nest n. Its estimated parameter 
nλ  reflects the degree of independence between the unobserved portions of the profit 
functions. For 1=nλ , the alternatives are completely independent and the nested logit model 
collapses into the conditional logit model described above. For 0=nλ , alternatives within 
nests are perfect substitutes and only the nest choice matters for the location decision. 
McFadden (1978) shows that the nested logit specification is consistent only with random 
utility maximisation if mλ  is significantly estimated to lie in the range of [0;1] m∀ . 
A potential problem arises with respect to the availability of data. By construction, the 
sample is restricted to multinational firms and excludes domestic firms and exporters. Hence, 
it is not possible to model a discrete choice process with a first step decision on the entry 
mode and a second step decision on the chosen location as proposed by Mayer, Méjean and 
Nefussi (2007). As Basile, Castellani and Zanfei (2008) point out, however, this shortcoming 
does not affect the explanatory variable coefficients if the error terms of the two nests (entry 
mode and location choice) are uncorrelated. In this case, changes in the profitability of one 
entry mode entail proportional changes in the profitability of each location choice without 
affecting the odds ratios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4   NETWORK AND BORDER EFFECTS: WHERE DO FOREIGN 
MULTINATIONALS LOCATE IN GERMANY? 
 
98 
4.4 Data and Variables 
Chapter 4.4.1 provides a short description of the MiDi and how the dependent variable 
has been extracted from the database. It continues with giving some descriptive evidence of 
the distribution of MNE affiliates across German federal states. Chapter 4.4.2 explains the 
construction of the explanatory variables measuring the location choice determinants. 
4.4.1 The Dependent Variable 
The data on inward FDI come from the firm-level MiDi provided by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (for details on this database see Lipponer 2008). The MiDi is a full sample 
survey of foreign firms’ affiliates in Germany. Investments with a volume below a certain 
threshold (currently three million €) need not be reported, and the reporting limits have 
changed over time. To avoid changes in the explanatory variables resulting from changes in 
reporting limits, all observations that are not covered by the most restrictive reporting 
requirements are dropped. At the regional level, this study distinguishes FDI projects into 16 
German federal states which correspond to the Nomenclature des unités territoriales 
statistiques (NUTS) I regions of the EU. Note, that firms report their FDI to the regional 
branches of the Bundesbank in the state where they are headquartered. Yet, the location of the 
firms’ headquarters may not coincide with the state in which they have their main production 
units.85 While this fact may lead to incorrect inferences with respect to the intensive margins 
of FDI activity, the extensive margin is less affected. Hence, this chapter focuses on the 
location choices of the MNEs’ regional headquarters and refrains from making statements 
about the affiliates’ sales or employment levels. 
In addition to the chosen federal state, information on the sector groups of the 
affiliates can be retrieved from the MiDi. The over 100 NACE Rev. 1 sectors are, for the 
purpose of this study aggregated into 37 broader industries. In order to capture the initial 
location choice, each affiliate enters the estimation sample only once – in the founding year. 
Thus, if an affiliate has parents from several countries, it is attributed to the country of origin 
of the first investor. For this reason, the original worldwide country sample reported in MiDi 
reduces here to 79 countries that have established an affiliate in Germany within the 
considered time frame 1997-2005. In principle, the MiDi is a panel dataset since 1996. To 
 
                                                 
85 For Germany as a whole (foreign and domestic firms), headquarters and affiliates are located in the same state 
in about 76% of the cases (Monopolkommision 2006: 119). 
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ensure, however, that only newly established affiliates are considered, affiliates already 
present in 1996 are excluded from the calculations. 
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the distribution of foreign affiliates within Germany. 
The left map plots the percentage of affiliates established in each federal state over the period 
1997-2005. 
Figure 4.1: Spatial Distribution of Affiliates (1997-2005) 
 
Note: NRW: North Rhine Westphalia; BY: Free State of Bavaria; BW: Baden-Wurttemberg; HE: Hesse; HH: 
Hamburg; NI: Lower Saxony; B: Berlin; RP: Rhineland Palatine; SH: Schleswig-Holstein; SN: Free State of 
Saxony; BR: Brandenburg; HB: Bremen; SL: Saarland; TH: Thuringia; SA: Saxony-Anhalt; MV: Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania. 
Source: Own calculations. Data from Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Three regional groups can be distinguished. North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Baden-
Wurttemberg and Hesse hosted between 1997 and 2005 over 70% of all foreign 
multinationals’ affiliates. In contrast, the nine lowest ranked states together did not even 
attract 10% of all investment objects. Although there is some variation also within West and 
East Germany, the observation translates into an East-West disruption.86 While foreign 
 
                                                 
86 Note that Berlin is attributed to East Germany throughout the analysis. 
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investors established between 1997 and 2005 766 affiliates in an average Western German 
federal state, they founded during the same time only 141 affiliates in an average Eastern 
German federal state.87 This observation holds generally true for the percentage of per capita 
investments, plotted in the map on the right. With the exception of Berlin, each East German 
federal state hosted between 1997 and 2005 less MNEs’ affiliates per capita than each West 
German federal state. 
The regional distribution looks similar for the five most important countries of origin 
(see Figure A4.1 in Appendix A4.1), which account for 67% of all affiliate set ups in 
Germany over the period 1997-2005. It is striking that Switzerland and the Netherlands invest 
disproportionately into the adjacent federal states of Baden-Wurttemberg and North Rhine-
Westphalia, respectively. In contrast, out of the six East German federal states, only Berlin 
and Saxony appear among the top ten locations of the biggest investors. Eastern and Western 
German federal states do not only differ in terms of the total number of established MNE 
affiliates but also in terms of the sectoral composition of inward FDI. Four sectoral groups are 
considered in this chapter: service affiliates, manufacturing affiliates and as complementing 
the latter, upstream (R&D and holdings) and downstream (wholesale and retail) activities. 
Figure 4.2 indicates that manufacturing activities make up for a larger part of inward FDI into 
East Germany, while services and especially downstream activities such as wholesale and 
retail affiliates are a major factor in West Germany. This seems surprising at first sight since 
one might expect high-tech manufacturers to be located close to high-skilled human capital in 
West German industry clusters and downstream activities that do not rely on a specialised 
labour force to be spread across the country. Becker, Ekholm and Muendler (2008) find, 
however, that offshoring of German MNEs has changed the task composition towards non-
routine and interactive tasks more drastically in the service than in the manufacturing sector. 
The discussions of Chapter 4.2 also suggest that market access is of predominant importance 
for downstream activities, which is arguably higher in the West German federal states. 
The descriptive analyses support the theoretically derived location choice 
determinants. Investors prefer large markets in the West, where a common border and existing 
firm networks also facilitate their entry. The tendency towards investing where the sales 
potential is high gets support from the sector composition of investments. Downstream 
 
                                                 
87 Buch and Toubal (2008) report similar gaps for the degree of trade openness and immigration. 
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activities make up for a large part of total foreign investment in the West, while the East hosts 
mainly manufacturing affiliates. 
Figure 4.2: Sectoral Composition of the Total Number of Affiliates in East and West 
Germany (1997-2005) 
Services
Downstream
Upstream
Manufacturing
(30.04%)
(3.93%)
(30.24%)
(35.79%)
Services
Downstream
Upstream
Manufacturing
(57.61%)
(35.00%)
(4.88%)
(2.51%)
West East
 
Note: The service sector is defined as excluding wholesale, retail and R&D affiliates as well as holdings. 
Source: Own calculations. Data from Deutsche Bundesbank. 
4.4.2 The Explanatory Variables 
Information on German federal states is extracted from the Federal Statistical Office.88 
In a first set of regressions, the variables derived from equation (4.5) are considered. The 
taxes itt  are expected to lower a firm’s profit in a location. For the present analysis, only those 
tax rates that vary at the federal state level are included – namely the real estate and the 
business tax. Wages and land rents are the prices of the two input factors. Following the 
critique by Bellak, Leibrecht and Riedl (2008), gross wages are not an adequate measure for 
labour costs, so that unit labour cost are defined instead as 
 
 
                                                 
88 For a complete list of explanatory variables, see Table A4.1 in Appendix A4.2. 
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with itemp  as the total employment and itgva  as the gross value added in region i at time t. 
The unit labour cost measure bears the advantage of being more directly linked to the 
profitability of FDI.89 Regions lose competitiveness (and are therefore expected to attract less 
FDI) if wages are high and/or if productivity is low. Market access in the chosen location i, a 
pull factor for foreign investors, is represented by the GDP of market i. Low internal transport 
costs guarantee a good attainability of potential customers. iitφ  is therefore approximated by a 
local infrastructure index, constructed out of the relative length of motorways, roads, rivers 
and the number of airway passengers. Not only the local sales potential, but also the access to 
other markets influences the location choice of a foreign investor. The external market 
potential is calculated in accordance with Harris (1954), as the inverse distance-weighted sum 
of incomes, 
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With respect to the fixed cost specification, two variables are employed. As it is 
assumed that investing in an adjacent region entails informational advantages, a border 
dummy serves as a proxy for the regional-level part of fixed costs. The number of plants with 
the same country of origin within an industry approximates the plant-level part of fixed 
costs.91 In order to test whether network externalities are still present among competitors from 
different countries of origin, a non-nation specific agglomeration variable will additionally be 
 
                                                 
89 In the absence of a regional price deflator, the unit labour costs are measured in nominal terms. Profitability 
therefore depends also on a firm’s ability to pass on increasing labour costs to the consumer. 
90 Harris (1954) assumes the price indices to equal zero. Redding and Venables (2004) propose a market 
potential measure that is more rigorously derived from theory. Their approach requires the estimation of a trade 
equation to obtain the trade cost parameters. Since data on bilateral trade flows among German federal states is 
not available, market potential is, in this chapter, calculated according to Harris (1954). Head and Mayer (2004) 
stress that Harris’ measure outperforms the approach by Redding and Venables (2004), particularly if national 
borders do not matter. 
91 To avoid an endogeneity bias in the empirical estimations, variables measuring the costs of the production 
factors, the market potential and the clustering of firms are lagged by one period. The count of affiliates is then 
increased by one unit in order to avoid loosing many observations by taking the log of zero. 
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included. Both cluster variables are expected to facilitate the market entry and attract new 
investors, but to different extents as information fluctuates better within nation-specific 
networks. 
In a second set of regressions, a number of control variables are added to the baseline 
specification. With these policy variables, the possibilities of federal state governments to 
actively undertake measures in order to attract foreign multinationals can be assessed. One 
important policy field, which remains conducted under the governance of the federal states in 
Germany, is education policy. Regions compete for the best educational system and 
substantial differences in the performances are regularly confirmed by the OECD’s 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) study (compare e.g. Heller and 
Ziegler 2007). Specifically, I include public R&D expenditures, the share of university 
graduates and the share of school leavers without a degree to evaluate the importance of 
research and education for the attractiveness of a region. It has to be noted that the ongoing 
emigration of young skilled East Germans to the West (see e.g. Buch and Toubal 2008) might 
considerably weaken the tool of education policy to attract investors. Since the causality 
between migration, education and employment opportunities is, however, not clear ex-ante, it 
seems worthwhile to assess these additional controls. Finally, a variable measuring the 
population density of a federal state will be included. Even more than for the whole sample, 
this variable is, in the light of the discussions of Chapters 4.2 and 4.4.1, expected to provide 
new insights at the sector level. Investors seeking for new sales opportunities may prefer to 
locate their wholesale and retail affiliates in highly populated areas. Manufacturers, in 
contrast, could even be deterred by a high degree of urbanisation. 
4.5 Results 
This chapter presents the results of the conditional and nested logit estimations of the 
location choices of MNEs in Germany. First, the estimations on the whole sample will be 
discussed (4.5.1). Second, this exercise will be repeated for the most important sectors in 
order to account for potential differences among them (4.5.2). Third, the five most important 
countries of origin will be assessed individually (4.5.3). In all regressions, the continuous 
variables are taken in logs, which permits an interpretation of the estimated coefficients as the 
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approximate elasticities of the probability of an average investor choosing region i (Train 
2003).92 
4.5.1 Estimations on the Whole Sample 
The results from the nested logit estimation are displayed in Table 4.1. For the 
regressions in columns (1)-(4), the IV parameters are significantly estimated to lie in the range 
of [0;1]. The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test rejects the null hypothesis of the IIA, hence, the 
conditional and the nested logit model cannot be perceived as equivalent. One possibility to 
mitigate the IIA problem characteristic to the conditional logit model is to include federal 
state dummies as is done in column (6) of Table A4.2 in Appendix A4.3. This strategy is valid 
as long as investors have uniform perceptions about the attractiveness of regions. Table A4.2, 
column (6) reveals that the inclusion of federal state dummies leads to substantial changes in 
the estimated coefficients. While the signs and magnitudes of the agglomeration variables and 
the border dummy remain stable, taxes, factor prices, and the infrastructure variable become 
insignificant. By contrast, the coefficients on the local and the external market potential 
increase dramatically. This result is not entirely surprising and in line with the findings of 
Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) for inward FDI into French departments. As in their 
study, differences in market potential may be more important over time than across federal 
states. For the other explanatory variables, in contrast, the time-invariant cross-sectional 
component explains location choices better than the time series variation, an effect, which is 
in the specification of column (6) already absorbed by the fixed effects. Since the adopted 
nesting structure is valid, I refrain from further commenting the conditional logit results (see 
Table A4.2 in Appendix A4.3).93 
 
 
                                                 
92 In fact, the presented coefficients are slight overestimates of the elasticities of location choice probabilities. It 
can be shown that )1( i
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for the nested logit model. Hence, the higher the number of alternatives (and nests), the closer is the estimated 
coefficient to the actual elasticity. 
93 Note, however, that overall the nested logit coefficients seem to be equal in sign, but smaller in magnitude and 
less statistically significant than their conditional logit counterparts in Table A4.2 in Appendix A4.3. This 
finding suggests that inside East and West Germany the push and pull forces of the explanatory variables are 
weak compared to the situation where the federal states are chosen independently of the nests. 
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Table 4.1: Nested Logit Estimations 
Dependent variable: choice between federal states 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
bus
ittln  -1.03*** 
(0.31) 
-0.60 
(0.37) 
-0.53 
(0.39) 
-1.27** 
(0.60) 
est
ittln  0.70*** 
(0.17) 
0.30 
(0.20) 
0.28 
(0.21) 
0.61 
(0.51) 
itulcln  -2.26*** 
(0.25) 
-1.51*** 
(0.33) 
-1.55*** 
(0.34) 
-0.91* 
(0.48) 
itrln   0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.14** 
(0.06) 
itMAln  0.47*** 
(0.03) 
0.46*** 
(0.03) 
0.42*** 
(0.03) 
0.51*** 
(0.08) 
iitφln  0.35*** 
(0.12) 
0.23* 
(0.14) 
0.21 
(0.14) 
0.36 
(0.25) 
ltMPln  0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.06* 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
c
iktNln  0.50*** 
(0.02) 
0.51*** 
(0.03) 
0.37*** 
(0.03) 
0.37*** 
(0.03) 
f
iktNln    0.12*** 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.02) 
c
iZ  0.16*** 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.03) 
0.24*** 
(0.03) 
0.26*** 
(0.04) 
itRDln     -0.08 
(0.07) 
itunigradsln     0.11* 
(0.06) 
itnongradsln     0.18 
(0.14) 
itpopdensityln     -0.03 
(0.08) 
IV parameters     
East  0.40*** 
(0.03) 
0.44*** 
(0.04) 
0.48*** 
(0.05) 
0.48*** 
(0.06) 
West 0.76*** 
(0.02) 
0.77*** 
(0.03) 
0.78*** 
(0.03) 
0.80*** 
(0.04) 
LR test (IIA) 95.94*** 63.87*** 51.53*** 45.02*** 
Observations 102256 91204 91204 83700 
Investments 6391 6049 6049 5580 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of equation (4.6). The regressions are based on the nested logit 
estimator. The IV parameters in the [0;1] interval and the significant LR test statistic confirm the nesting 
structure with East and West Germany as two nests. The dependent variable is the discrete choice of 
multinational firms to locate in one of 16 German federal states. The independent variables are as described in 
Chapter 4.4.2 and based on the variables listed in Table A4.1 in Appendix A4.2. Based on the specification of 
column (1), columns (2), (3) and (4) successively introduce land rents, non-nation-specific industry clusters and 
R&D expenditure, university graduates, school leavers without a degree and population density as additional 
control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses with significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
Column (1) contains the results for the basic equation without land prices due to the 
fact that these were not available for the entire sample. Business taxes have the expected 
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negative sign, while the real estate tax somehow surprisingly shows a significant positive 
impact. High unit labour costs decrease the probability for a state being chosen as an FDI 
location. Internal market access as well as – although to a lesser extent – Harris’ external 
market potential, help attracting foreign investors. A good local infrastructure allows for a 
better attainability of potential consumers in the periphery. Finally, the fixed cost 
specification of equation (4.2) seems valid. Both a higher number of existing affiliates with 
the same source country and within the same industry and the existence of a common border 
reduce the costs of entering a foreign market and induce investors to decide for that particular 
federal state. 
In general, the results remain stable with the inclusion of the prices for building land in 
column (2). However, the tax rates can no longer be estimated as being significantly different 
from zero. The positive coefficient of land prices is striking in this context. Together with the 
positive coefficient of the real estate tax rate in column (1), the result suggests a density effect 
in metropolitan areas, which attracts investors despite of the relatively high prices. Finally, the 
inclusion of a variable measuring the costs of the second production factor, land, reduces the 
negative impact of unit labour costs. The other coefficients remain stable in terms of sign, 
magnitude, and significance level. 
In column (3), in addition to the number of affiliates in the same sector and with the 
same country of origin ( ciktN ), the total number of affiliates in the same sector aggregated over 
all foreign countries of origin ( fiktN ) is included. As expected, the positive influence of the 
aggregate cluster variable is smaller than the impact of the country-specific cluster variable. 
The finding corroborates that firms particularly benefit from national networks, where no 
language or cultural barrier impedes informational interchanges. Interestingly, the coefficient 
of ciktN  has decreased as compared to columns (1) and (2). This result corresponds well to the 
theoretical prediction of intense competition lowering positive network externalities. 
From the additional control variables in column (4), only the share of university 
graduates has a statistically important impact. While the availability of a highly qualified 
workforce matters for the location decision of MNEs, non-skilled workers, public R&D 
expenditures and population density do not seem to play a role. The theoretical discussion of 
Chapter 4.2 and the descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 4.4.1 suggest, however, to look 
at sectors and activities individually. Especially, distribution-related functions of trade 
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affiliates might react to regional conditions differently than production-related activities of 
manufacturing affiliates. 
4.5.2 Sector-Specific Estimations 
Table 4.2 reports the estimates for the manufacturing and the service sector as well as 
for pre- and post-production activities. The first columns contain the results for the baseline 
specification; the second columns introduce the policy control variables. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the location choice determinants of service affiliates, 
excluding wholesale, retail and R&D affiliates as well as holdings. In contrast to the estimates 
for the whole sample (Table 4.1), column (1) indicates that taxes and the local infrastructure 
are relevant for service affiliates. Furthermore, the coefficient of the common border dummy 
is slightly higher. This last finding may be due to the complexity of some services that 
necessitate the adjacency to the parent company. In general, the results are robust to the 
inclusion of the additional control variables in column (2), although the evidence for land 
rents and tax rates is somewhat ambiguous.  
The heterogeneity of the service sector requires, however, a differentiated analysis. To 
this end, columns (3) and (4) contain the results for downstream activities, like wholesale and 
retail trade and columns (5) and (6) report the estimates for upstream activities, like R&D and 
holdings. Taxes and local infrastructure do not seem to matter for wholesale and retail 
affiliates. This result is plausible against the finding of a large, positive coefficient of 
population density in column (4).94 Direct customer proximity rather than the accessibility of 
potential consumers is crucial for the location of downstream activities at the regional level. 
The large positive effect of local market access (and also the positive coefficient of land 
prices in column (3)) supports this interpretation and is also in line with Hanson, Mataloni and 
Slaughter (2001). The authors find that US wholesale affiliates have higher sales in high-
income countries. 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 Note that in column (4), the LR test cannot reject the IIA property. As a robustness check, the regression has 
been repeated using the conditional logit model. The results confirm the relevance of urbanisation for 
downstream activities as indicated through a positive significant coefficient of population density and market 
access. The results of this exercise are not presented here, but can be made available upon request. 
CHAPTER 4   NETWORK AND BORDER EFFECTS: WHERE DO FOREIGN 
MULTINATIONALS LOCATE IN GERMANY? 
 
108 
Table 4.2: Nested Logit Estimations for Different Sectors and Activities 
Dependent variable: choice between federal states 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Other 
services 
Other 
services 
Services: 
Down-
stream 
activities 
Services: 
Down-
stream 
activities
Services: 
Upstream 
activities
Services: 
Upstream 
activities 
Manu-
facturing 
Manu-
facturing 
bus
ittln  -1.02 
(0.79) 
-2.10* 
(1.11) 
-0.70 
(1.10) 
-0.96 
(1.85) 
-1.36 
(1.47) 
-3.31 
(2.16) 
-0.65 
(0.57) 
-1.39 
(1.01) 
est
ittln  0.95** 
(0.44) 
1.08 
(0.92) 
0.29 
(0.60) 
-2.07 
(1.38) 
1.05 
(0.84) 
1.98 
(1.72) 
-0.06 
(0.31) 
0.77 
(0.88) 
itulcln  -3.52*** 
(0.66) 
-3.12*** 
(0.80) 
-1.92** 
(0.92) 
-1.54 
(1.25) 
-1.82 
(1.18) 
0.87 
(1.67) 
0.44 
(0.57) 
1.49 
(0.91) 
itrln  0.20*** 
(0.07) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
0.34*** 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.17) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
0.30 
(0.18) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
itMAln  0.45*** 
(0.06) 
0.56*** 
(0.16) 
0.43*** 
(0.08) 
1.05*** 
(0.38) 
0.62*** 
(0.11) 
0.98*** 
(0.27) 
0.48*** 
(0.05) 
0.58*** 
(0.11) 
iitφln  0.61** 
(0.29) 
0.79* 
(0.47) 
0.59 
(0.41) 
-0.55 
(0.71) 
0.75 
(0.53) 
0.96 
(0.86) 
-0.02 
(0.21) 
0.24 
(0.42) 
ltMPln  0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
0.08 
(0.14) 
-0.17 
(0.20) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.11 
(0.11) 
c
iktNln  0.33*** 
(0.05) 
0.29*** 
(0.05) 
0.42*** 
(0.06) 
0.43*** 
(0.07) 
0.33*** 
(0.10) 
0.22** 
(0.11) 
0.30*** 
(0.05) 
0.34*** 
(0.07) 
f
iktNln  0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
c
iZ  0.33*** 
(0.06) 
0.32*** 
(0.07) 
0.40*** 
(0.09) 
0.36*** 
(0.10) 
0.23** 
(0.11) 
0.30** 
(0.12) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.17*** 
(0.07) 
itRDln   -0.14 
(0.14) 
 -0.43 
(0.28) 
 -0.46* 
(0.23) 
 -0.10 
(0.11) 
itunigradsln   0.11 
(0.14) 
 -0.04 
(0.21) 
 0.04 
(0.22) 
 0.08 
(0.08) 
itnongradsln   0.09 
(0.25) 
 0.12 
(0.41) 
 0.11 
(0.44) 
 0.26 
(0.23) 
itpopdensityln   0.05 
(0.15) 
 0.73** 
(0.32) 
 -0.11 
(0.25) 
 -0.13 
(0.13) 
IV parameters         
East 0.56*** 
(0.09) 
0.49*** 
(0.10) 
0.54*** 
(0.11) 
0.65*** 
(0.19) 
0.46*** 
(0.13) 
0.35** 
(0.14) 
0.40*** 
(0.07) 
0.44*** 
(0.10) 
West 0.81*** 
(0.06) 
0.75*** 
(0.08) 
0.94*** 
(0.07) 
0.92*** 
(0.11) 
0.82*** 
(0.10) 
0.78*** 
(0.13) 
0.74*** 
(0.05) 
0.81*** 
(0.09) 
LR test (IIA) 14.18*** 10.75*** 20.75*** 4.53 8.96** 6.57** 15.95*** 18.13*** 
Observations 29738 26970 22135 20535 8772 7620 27188 25380 
Investments 1971 1798 1469 1369 580 508 1805 1692 
Note: This table presents sector-specific estimation results based on the nested logit estimator. Columns (1) and 
(2) report results for other services, excluding wholesale, retail and R&D affiliates as well as holdings. Columns 
(3) and (4) report results for downstream activities of wholesale and retail affiliates and Columns (5) and (6) for 
upstream activities of holdings and R&D affiliates. Columns (7) and (8) report results for manufacturing 
affiliates. The independent variables of the respective first columns are as in Table 4.1, column (3) and of the 
respective second columns as in Table 4.1, column (4). Standard errors are in parentheses with significance at 
the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Turning to the upstream activities (columns (5) and (6)), we find that only few of the 
standard location choice determinants exhibit importance. It is noteworthy, however, that the 
agglomeration variables have a lower impact on upstream activities. If holdings provide 
headquarter services it is reasonable to believe that they act independently from potential 
competitors. Interestingly, a high level of public R&D expenditure detracts MNEs from 
locating their R&D and holding activities in a certain federal state. One possible explanation 
for this might stem from the actual low number of R&D affiliates within this category. They 
make up for only around 5% of all affiliates conducting upstream activities. Since holdings 
are, except for serving as a local headquarter, also established for tax reasons (see 
Weichenrieder and Mintz 2007), they might have claims at odds with usual pre-production 
activities. 
The results for the manufacturing sector are reported in columns (7) and (8). Two 
main differences with respect to the service sector in general and with respect to downstream 
activities in particular are striking: First, having a common border with the chosen location is 
less relevant for manufacturers. Second, the relatively low IV parameter (East) suggests that 
Eastern German federal states are viewed as especially close substitutes by these investors. 
Thus, since the main investing countries are Western economies (compare Figure A4.1) and 
since manufacturers make up for a large share of investments in East Germany (compare 
Figure 4.2), the result seems to describe the particular situation of Germany well. Education 
policy does, like for the other sectors and activities, not matter for manufacturers. As already 
noted, the possibilities of local policy makers to gain regional competitiveness might be 
considerably weakened by a highly mobile East German labour force. 
4.5.3 Source Country-Specific Estimations 
Chapters 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 have indicated that a common border is relevant for the 
probability to decide for a certain location but plays less of a role for manufacturers. This 
finding may already partly explain the specific situation of the East German federal states. 
Existing nation-specific firm networks also appeared as a robust location choice determinant, 
suggesting that it might be crucial to attract a number of affiliates from one country which 
spurs then – ideally via a self-reinforcing process – additional investments from the same 
country. 
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Table 4.3: Conditional and Nested Logit Estimations for the Most Important Countries 
of Origin 
Dependent variable: choice between federal states 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 NL USA CH GB F 
bus
ittln  -1.00 
(0.93) 
1.27 
(1.10) 
-4.12** 
(1.82) 
-0.63 
(2.08) 
0.18 
(1.68) 
est
ittln  0.31 
(0.51) 
-1.11* 
(0.58) 
1.85** 
(0.88) 
1.05 
(1.15) 
0.48 
(0.85) 
itulcln  -2.76*** 
(0.83) 
-0.05 
(0.93) 
-3.83** 
(1.75) 
-3.80** 
(1.69) 
-2.90 
(1.96) 
itrln  0.13 
(0.09) 
0.26** 
(0.10) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
0.27* 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.17) 
itMAln  0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.40*** 
(0.08) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.65*** 
(0.15) 
0.19* 
(0.11) 
iitφln  0.60* 
(0.32) 
-0.30 
(0.40) 
1.31** 
(0.62) 
0.34 
(0.71) 
0.61 
(0.62) 
ltMPln  -0.05 
(0.08) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
-0.30* 
(0.18) 
0.30 
(0.19) 
0.00 
(0.16) 
c
iktNln  0.26*** 
(0.07) 
0.19** 
(0.08) 
0.28*** 
(0.11) 
0.26** 
(0.12) 
0.49*** 
(0.12) 
f
iktNln  0.20*** 
(0.06) 
0.27*** 
(0.07) 
0.31*** 
(0.09) 
0.36*** 
(0.09) 
0.21** 
(0.08) 
c
iZ  0.37*** 
(0.11) 
 0.48** 
(0.21) 
 0.37** 
(0.18) 
IV parameters      
East 0.50*** 
(0.11) 
0.39*** 
(0.11) 
   
West 0.75*** 
(0.07) 
0.67*** 
(0.07) 
   
LR test (IIA) 8.75** 9.46***    
East-West 
dummy 
  Yes Yes Yes 
Federal states 
dummies 
No No No No No 
Pseudo R²   0.25 0.29 0.18 
Observations 20246 12906 9996 9099 8593 
Investments 1343 857 663 604 571 
Note: This table presents country-specific estimation results based on the nested and the conditional logit 
estimator. The IV parameters in the [0;1] interval and the significant LR test statistic confirm the nesting 
structure for the Netherlands (column (1)) and the US (column (2)); for Switzerland (column (3)), Great Britain 
(column (4)) and France (column (5)) the conditional logit results are reported instead. The independent 
variables are as in Table 4.1, column (3). (Robust) standard errors are in parentheses with significance at the *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
To see which regional factors actually pull or push the most important source 
countries, Table 4.3 displays the individual regression results for the five most important 
countries of origin. The LR test and the IV parameters support the nesting structure for Dutch, 
US and British investors. The LR test could not reject the IIA assumption for Swiss, British 
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and French investors. For this reason, only the conditional logit results are reported for these 
source countries of inward FDI in Germany. 
At the individual country level, it is remarkable that taxes matter only for Swiss and 
US investors, while the latter do not respond to unit labour costs. In contrast, US MNEs seem 
to be located in metropolitan areas where land prices are also high. Using wages instead of 
unit labour costs and omitting land prices, Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) find that US 
investments even react positively to high wages in French regions. Like in this chapter, the 
authors further estimate a relatively low impact of market access on Dutch investors (column 
(1)). 
When looking at the most important source countries individually, assessing the fixed 
cost specification is of particular interest. The descriptive analysis of Figure A4.1 indicates 
that affiliates of Swiss and Dutch multinationals are predominantly located in the adjacent 
federal states of Baden-Wurttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. In the empirical results of 
Table 4.3, a common border is, accordingly, estimated to exhibit a significant influence on 
investments from these countries as well as from France. Furthermore, the agglomeration 
variables indicate that country networks are most important for French investors with a 
coefficient of 0.49 and least important for US investors (with a coefficient of 0.19). It is 
remarkable that MNEs from the US, Great Britain and Switzerland, who are assumed to be 
less affected by language barriers when investing in Germany, are even to a larger extent 
attracted by industry clusters in general than by industry clusters consisting of firms from the 
same country. Dutch and French investors, on the contrary, benefit more from nation-specific 
agglomeration. Hence, the empirical evidence not only for the whole sample and for the 
sectoral regressions, but also for individual countries of origin validates the adopted fixed cost 
specification in equation (4.2). 
The importance of network and border effects has implications especially for East 
Germany. While the lacking adjacency to strong investing countries is an insuperable problem 
for East German policy makers, they might consider the promotion of industry clusters. This 
could be an especially promising strategy with regards to investors that do not heavily rely on 
nation-specific networks. 
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4.6 Conclusions to Chapter 4 
This chapter examined and identified the main determinants of inward FDI into 
German federal states during the time span 1997-2005. Three questions were highlighted: 
First, in the theoretical part, a profit function was derived according to which foreign 
multinationals choose their locations. Common borders and nation-specific industry clusters 
were thought of as facilitating market entry. Possible particularities with regard to the 
distribution-related activities of trade affiliates were mentioned. Second, the specific situation 
of East Germany in terms of attracting less MNEs’ affiliates and depending largely on the 
manufacturing sector was accounted for by adopting a nesting structure. The IV parameters of 
the baseline regressions all point at a higher degree of substitutability among Eastern as 
compared to Western federal states. Third, the empirical estimations confirm the theoretical 
presumptions: the theory-consistent specification of fixed costs shows a significant influence 
in the conditional and the nested logit estimations with the common border and existing firm 
clusters turning out as very robust determinants of inward FDI. The individual country 
regressions showed that network effects arise from aggregate industry clusters as well, but are 
less important for French investors. Finally, the sector estimates confirm that downstream 
industries prefer to locate in highly populated, wealthy (West German) federal states. 
The findings are of high interest not only for the scientific community but also for 
policy makers. The insight that local demand and unit labour costs significantly influence 
foreign investors in their location choices represents indispensable information for regional 
policy makers when reflecting about ways to enhance the location attractiveness in general or 
to investors from certain sectors or countries. This latter strategy might be particularly sound, 
since a critical mass of affiliates from one industry and one country proves to be a reliable 
pull factor for other investors that operate in the same sector and have the same country of 
origin. 
Although insightful, this chapter is limited by the availability of data. Due to lacking 
information about the characteristics of foreign multinational firms, a possible heterogeneous 
behaviour of firms investing at home or abroad cannot be accounted for. This task has 
therefore to be left for future research. 
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A4 Appendix 
A4.1 Number of Affiliates by Country of Origin 
Figure A4.1: Total Number of Affiliates by Country of Origin (1997-2005) 
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Note: In order to retain the confidential nature of the data, country of origin-federal state combinations with less 
than three observations have been made anonymous and defined to count at least three observations. 
Source: Own calculations. Data from Deutsche Bundesbank. 
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A4.2 Variable List and Definitions 
Table A4.1: List of Variables – Chapter 4 
Variable Definition Source 
bus
it  Business tax in percent Federal Statistical Office 
est
it  Real estate tax in percent Federal Statistical Office 
iulc  Unit labour costs measured as the ratio of labour compensation 
per labour input and labour productivity 
Federal Statistical Office 
ikr  Prices of building land per qm² Federal Statistical Office 
iMA  GDP in federal state i at current market prices  Federal Statistical Office 
iiφ  Infrastructure index calculated from the length of motorways, 
other streets, rivers and the number of airway passengers 
Federal Statistical Office 
lMA  GDP in federal states l at current market prices Federal Statistical Office 
ilφ  Great circle distance between federal state i and federal states l as 
measured by the haversine formula 
Latitudes and Longitudes 
from GPS Visualizer 
c
iZ  Dummy = 1 if region i and the source country share a common 
border  
Federal Agency for 
Carthography and 
Geodesy 
f
ikN  Number of MNE affiliates in the same industry  MiDi  
c
ikN  Number of MNE affiliates in the same industry and with the same 
country of origin 
MiDi 
iRD  Public R&D expenditures Federal Statistical Office 
itunigrads  Share of university graduates in the total number of graduates Federal Statistical Office 
itnongrads  Share of school leavers without a degree in the total number of 
graduates 
Federal Statistical Office 
itpopdensity  Number of inhabitants per qm² Federal Statistical Office 
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A4.3 Conditional Logit Results 
Table A4.2: Conditional Logit Estimations 
Dependent variable: choice between federal states 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
bus
ittln  -2.68*** 
(0.46) 
-2.84*** 
(0.47) 
-1.05* 
(0.56) 
-0.86 
(0.56) 
-2.30*** 
(0.83) 
-1.61 
(1.62) 
est
ittln  1.96*** 
(0.23) 
2.05*** 
(0.24) 
0.86*** 
(0.30) 
0.72** 
(0.30) 
0.49 
(0.72) 
-0.09 
(1.36) 
itulcln  -3.63*** 
(0.34) 
-3.47*** 
(0.37) 
-1.95*** 
(0.46) 
-1.96*** 
(0.46) 
-1.04* 
(0.61) 
1.46 
(2.75) 
itrln    0.29*** 
(0.04) 
0.27*** 
(0.04) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.12) 
itMAln  0.69*** 
(0.04) 
0.67*** 
(0.04) 
0.61*** 
(0.04) 
0.54*** 
(0.04) 
0.86*** 
(0.12) 
5.30** 
(2.41) 
iitφln  0.79*** 
(0.17) 
0.81*** 
(0.17) 
0.37* 
(0.20) 
0.29 
(0.20) 
0.25 
(0.36) 
-0.67 
(1.90) 
ltMPln  0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.12** 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
9.04* 
(5.34) 
c
iktNln  0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.66*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.45*** 
(0.03) 
0.44*** 
(0.03) 
0.44*** 
(0.03) 
f
iktNln     0.17*** 
(0.02) 
0.17*** 
(0.02) 
0.17*** 
(0.02) 
c
iZ  0.20*** 
(0.04) 
0.19*** 
(0.04) 
0.21*** 
(0.04) 
0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.33*** 
(0.05) 
0.35*** 
(0.05) 
itRDln      -0.22** 
(0.11) 
-1.07** 
(0.45) 
itunigradsln      0.20** 
(0.09) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
itnongradsln      0.51*** 
(0.18) 
-0.28 
(0.27) 
itpopdensityln      0.23* 
(0.13) 
-7.22 
(5.17) 
East-West dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Federal state dummies No No No No No Yes 
Pseudo R² 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Observations  102256 102256 91204 91204 83700 83700 
Investments 6391 6391 6049 6049 5580 5580 
Note: This table presents the estimation results based on the conditional logit estimator. The dependent variable 
is the discrete choice of multinational firms to locate in one of 16 German federal states. The independent 
variables are as described in Chapter 4.4.2 and based on the variables listed in Table A4.1 in Appendix A4.2. 
Based on the specification of column (1), columns (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) successively introduce an East-West 
(0/1) dummy, land rents, non-nation-specific industry clusters, R&D expenditure, university graduates, school 
leavers without a degree and population density as additional control variables and federal state dummies. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses with significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Summary 
This thesis has not intended to give a complete picture of the complex interactions of 
integration on the one hand and trade and FDI flows within and from outside Europe on the 
other hand. Instead, it highlighted selected questions that arise in the context and provided 
pieces that contribute to the puzzle. These pieces are interrelated through various features. By 
content, since all of them work on internationalisation patterns within Europe, with either 
focusing on trade or on FDI flows. By methodology, since pooled or panel data estimation 
techniques are largely applied. And by modelling, since all estimations rely on equations that 
build upon a monopolistic competition framework with product differentiation and increasing 
returns. 
Chapter 2 analysed the trade impact of the FTAs signed and implemented between the 
EU and each CEEC in the 1990s. According to Viner (1950), preferential liberalisation 
involves two opposing effects – trade creation and trade diversion. The gravity model has 
become a popular instrument to study the ex-post consequences of trade policies. Its empirical 
success was followed up by endowing the equation with theoretical underpinnings. A 
cornerstone has in this context been the contribution of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
who showed that trade between two countries does not solely depend on bilateral trade 
resistances but on the resistance of these two countries to trade with any other country in the 
world (as described through price indices). Not accounting for these multilateral resistances 
leads to an omitted variable bias in empirical estimations that also concerns the FTA 
coefficient as one part of the bilateral trade costs. The methods so far employed in the 
literature reduce the problem either to the time-invariant part of the price indices by using 
country or country pair-specific dummy variables or they entail a computational complexity, 
which makes the estimation of big panel data sets unfeasible. 
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Chapter 2 introduced a new procedure that describes multilateral trade resistance 
through all observable bilateral trade barriers. A decreasing multilateral trade resistance over 
time, e.g. through the conclusion of an additional FTA reduces – under constant bilateral trade 
costs – a country’s imports from a specific trade partner. At the same time, a global trend 
towards greater regional integration increases the worldwide trade flows. This last 
phenomenon is accounted for by a term measuring the world’s resistance to (or – in the 
described case – the world’s facilitation of) trade. 
The empirical estimation results confirm the relevance of the additional multilateral 
measures. First, a Wald test approves the joint significance of these terms in all specifications. 
Second, the results indicate a downward bias of the FTA coefficient in studies, which do not 
properly account for Anderson and van Wincoop’s price indices. In total, the trade stimulating 
effect of the EU-CEEC FTAs is estimated to add up to 72% in the static and 49% in the 
dynamic estimation. This equals an increase of 20 and 18 percentage points as compared to 
the specifications without the MWR terms, respectively. Individually, the FTAs with 
Romania and Bulgaria and with the Baltic States show the highest trade boosts both among 
the contracting parties and with the ROW. The losses that arose from the FTAs with the 
Czech and the Slovak Republic and Slovenia are of no consequence for the overall positive 
effects of the FTAs also for third countries. 
Chapter 3 was built upon the presumption that positive and negative trade 
consequences do not only arise as a result of real but also in the wake of monetary integration. 
The chapter is tied in with the preceding analysis in multiple respects. 
First, the ongoing integration of the CEECs has currently come to the challenge of the 
admission of the new EU member states to the Euro Area. Two views are controversially 
discussed in the literature. On the one hand, the classic OCA theory acts on the assumption 
that a minimum level of integration must be achieved such that the stability losses from 
giving up monetary independence will be outweighed by efficiency gains. On the other hand, 
Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose (2000) document that the classical OCA criteria can be 
fulfilled ex-post since the common currency reduces trade costs and stimulates competition 
through enhanced price transparency. The descriptive statistics show that in 2004, Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary possessed the highest degrees of openness towards the 
EMU-12, which makes them promising candidates for an early Euro adoption under the terms 
of the OCA textbook view. In accordance with the endogeneity assumption of currency areas, 
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however, the countries with the lowest degree of openness in 2004, Poland, Lithuania and 
Latvia, should bear the biggest potential of trade intensification with the EMU-12. 
Second, the chapter continues methodologically the analysis of Chapter 2 by again 
adopting a specification with multilateral trade terms. With respect to the possibility of 
reverse causality of currency unions and trade flows, a HT instrumental variables estimator is 
applied. 
The results of the baseline regression support a trade increasing effect of the Euro 
introduction for the entire time frame 1998-2004 as well as in detail for the years until 2002 
(until 2003 in the out-of-sample estimation). Assuming that the same relationship between 
country characteristics and imports continues to hold for future EMU member states, the 
obtained parameters can be applied to the CEEC data set. The potential import increases are 
then calculated by comparing the results from the baseline scenario without the Euro to the 
counterfactual scenario with the Euro. The results of this exercise show that except for the 
least integrated countries – Poland, Lithuania and Latvia – all CEECs can expect trade gains 
from their EMU accession. This empirical evidence in favour of the classical OCA theory 
gains additional support as the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the degree of 
openness and the potential import increases turns out to be significantly positive. The finding 
entails important policy implications: while the open economies should opt for an early 
introduction of the single currency, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia may prefer to concentrate on 
stronger real integration. 
Chapter 4 shifted the focus to a different international activity of firms, namely FDI. In 
light of recent findings of positive effects of inward FDI on the local economy and on 
domestic firms, not only nations but also regions compete for foreign capital. Ongoing 
disparities between the East and the West of Germany indicate varying degrees of 
attractiveness for foreign investors. The chapter adopts a theoretical framework in which a 
firm decides for a location if the profits outweigh the attainable profits in all other locations. 
In accordance with Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), the fixed costs of establishing a new 
affiliate abroad are subdivided into a region- and a plant-level part. The plant-level part is 
described by the number of firms from the same sector and the same country as the investing 
firm. Whereas higher agglomeration in a certain location is to begin with positive as firms can 
interchange information, they become more reluctant to do so once the market becomes more 
crowded and competition intensifies. The region-level part is described through a common 
border between the chosen location and the home country of the investor. Hence, market entry 
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is facilitated when more information is available – due to existing firm networks or due to 
adjacency. 
The estimations are based on a conditional and a nested logit model that define the 
choice of a certain federal state as a profit maximising decision of a firm. Due to the IIA, the 
conditional logit model presumes a constant degree of substitutability between the 16 federal 
states. Since the motivation to invest in Eastern or Western German regions can substantially 
differ, the nested logit model is preferred for the problem at hand. The descriptive and the 
econometric evidence support the subdivision of the alternatives into the two nests. 
Furthermore, the IV parameters suggest that foreign investors perceive East German federal 
states as closer substitutes than West German federal states. The theoretically derived location 
choice determinants, like taxes, labour costs, market potential and infrastructure underline 
their economic relevance in the estimations. Adjacency and existing sector and country 
clusters appear as especially robust drivers of inward FDI. This result supports the adopted 
fixed cost specification also against the finding of decreasing network externalities among 
firms from different countries. The individual country regressions further show that Dutch and 
French investors highly benefit from nation-specific networks, whereas US, British and Swiss 
investors – possibly confronted with lower language barriers – are equally attracted by cross-
country industry clusters. 
Although the estimated equation describes the profits of a single representative firm, 
in fact, the relevance of the determinants may differ across different sectors. Following recent 
theoretical and empirical studies, Chapter 4 distinguishes four sectoral headings, services and 
manufacturing and as surrounding the latter, pre-production upstream and post-production 
downstream activities. The estimation outcome supports the hypothesis that downstream 
activities of wholesale and retail affiliates are highly attracted by a large sales potential of a 
region. At the same time, a common border matters least for manufacturing affiliates. These 
empirical results support the descriptive statistics, which identified wholesaling and retailing 
as a very important activity in West Germany, and manufacturing as the main activity in East 
Germany. 
In general, the results obtained in the three chapters broadly confirm earlier studies in 
the field, but still extend the literature into various directions. While there are only a few other 
studies measuring the impact of real and monetary integration on the CEECs, the thesis 
contains, to the best of my knowledge, the first analysis of MNEs’ location choice 
determinants in Germany. The econometric analysis abuses recent estimation techniques that 
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invoke important improvements as compared to more traditional methods. E.g. the FEVD and 
the HT estimator report estimates for important explanatory time-invariant variables as the 
distance variable in gravity equations. The HT estimator additionally takes into account 
reverse causality issues that are important in the context of monetary integration.  
All estimations are based upon structural trade and FDI models. In Chapters 2 and 3, 
Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) proposal of introducing multilateral trade resistance is 
accounted for in an innovative way. The estimation results confirm their importance and 
suggest that earlier studies omitting these terms may have provided biased estimates. The 
estimated equation of Chapter 4 also considers the feature of multilateral resistance in parts as 
the choice of location depends not only on the local market access but also on the market 
potentials of all other regions. Its influence, in turn, varies with the remoteness of the chosen 
location. Eventually, the specification of fixed costs exhibits importance since the results 
suggest that the positive effects of agglomeration are stronger if nation-specific and weaker 
with fiercer competition. 
5.2 Outlook 
It has already been mentioned that the determinants and effects of the ongoing 
internationalisation of economic activities are multifaceted and cannot be treated exhaustively 
within one thesis. Despite of the various research strands that had to be left aside in this 
context, some very specific questions that are closely tied in with the treated problems could 
not be analysed due to time and/or data constraints. These restrictions were mentioned in the 
respective chapters. 
There are several interesting directions for future research that pick up aspects studied 
in Chapters 1 to 3. While the trade effects of the Euro have by now been extensively studied 
(at least at the aggregate country level), the transmission channel of monetary integration to 
FDI is hardly explored. If the exchange rate was seen as a trade cost variable, a cost reduction 
(by fixing the exchange rate) would boost trade at the expense of horizontal FDI. The option 
value approach by Pindyck and Dixit (1994) delivers an argument why an investment 
decision may be delayed in the presence of uncertainty. Volatile exchange rates increase the 
uncertainty about the rates of return of an investment project that are necessary to cover the 
fixed sunk costs. The combination of the irreversible nature and the multi-period framework 
of investment projects create a positive value of waiting in a risky environment. In 
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heterogeneous firm models, where revenues are driven by firm-specific productivity levels, 
the cut-off productivity level at which investments just break even is higher in risky 
environments than in stable economies. By allowing less productive firms to bear the sunk 
fixed costs more easily, monetary integration may hence, permanently lower the probability 
that investment opportunities are deferred. Since such an effect rather increases the number of 
investment projects than the FDI volume, it is essential to use firm-level data that allows 
distinguishing the extensive from the intensive margin. 
Another related topic arises from the ongoing internationalisation of the production 
chain which often spans over a number of countries and changes the nature of world trade. In 
a world where not only products, but also capital can move freely across borders, intra-
industry- and also intra-firm trade makes up for a large part of total world trade. The fact that 
intra-industry trade is particularly high in countries that are also increasingly involved in FDI 
activity suggests that both phenomena should be studied jointly. While intra-industry trade 
occurs in similar but differentiated products, intra-firm trade is likely to take place in finished 
products where the foreign affiliate conducts distributional, marketing or service activities 
(OECD 2002: 163). This observation fits well into a very recently rising scientific interest in 
distinguishing the international activities of firms and specifically, in investigating more 
closely the particularities of the service sector (see Krautheim 2007 and Felbermayr and Jung 
2008 for theoretical contributions). The expansion of intra-firm transactions gives rise to at 
least two questions: first, what are the circumstances under which firms decide to export or to 
establish a service affiliate abroad? And second, when will the service activity be conducted 
within the borders of a firm and when will external contracting be profit-maximising? 
These are just a few possibilities in which direction research activities on trade and 
FDI could go from here. The raised questions are expected to give new insights into the 
determinants of FDI flows and the prerequisites and impacts of RTAs and currency unions 
that may complement, weaken or strengthen the points made in the present thesis. 
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